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# A GENTLEMAN AMONG THE FATHERS

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"He, who was like no other man, could not have been given to the world without the special design of Providence." [1] So wrote Arrian, a Greek historian, in the middle of the second century of our era of the amazing youth, Alexander of Macedon, who five centuries before had so effectually removed the barrier between East and West and written a chapter never to be overlooked by the historian anxious to trace the complicated story of the gradual development of "One World." Of all Alexander's contributions, and they were many, it would not be difficult to present a strong case for the contention that none surpassed his act at the delta of the Nile in 332. He had come there to complete his preliminary campaign against the Achaemenidae — the sweeping of their fleet from the sea by the methodical and simple method of depriving them of all harbors and contact with the army to the east. This he did, but he did more. He founded a city, named for himself, which was destined to spread and make current coin the magic of Greek learning and with it her civilization to a degree unsurpassed, if indeed even paralleled, by any other centre.

The story of Alexandria has often been told. It is needless to attempt to repeat it here. Suffice it to say that at the time of the early spread of the ferment subsequently to be known as Christianity this city, with its museum, its unmatched libraries, its host of scholars in all the fields of human thought, not simply tolerated by the civil authorities but sought after and given every encouragement and support, was the unrivalled intellectual centre of the Roman world. It had snatched the torch from the fingers of "violet crowned, illustrious Athens," long the undisputed centre of learning but now but a shadow of her former self, though still

[1] Arrian, de Exped. Alexandri vii, 30, 2.

to remain the home of philosophy until Justinian's fatal edict. Antioch was a city not to be despised, and since her inception had been a zealous, if not over-intelligent, purveyor of what she fondly believed the Greek way of life. But near-by Daphne, the Coney Island of its day, was the symbol of her intellectual life and interest. Rome with its genius for organization and administration was no rival. Her hand was far more fitted to the spear and her voice to the law courts than was her mind to lofty and impractical speculation. She prized Alexandria, but definitely more as the convenient port of entry to the granary of the empire than as the intellectual hub of the universe.

Alexandria's population was cosmopolitan. Men of all lands and cultures rubbed shoulders in the streets and exchanged ideas in the market places and the schools. For centuries Jews had lived there in great numbers. It is no exaggeration to say that there were far more of them in greater Alexandria than in all Palestine. By the days of Ptolemy Philadelphus their adoption of Greek speech, and consequent unfamiliarity with Hebrew, had resulted in what was probably the earliest version of their sacred writings, the Septuagint. Years of contact with other ideas — Greek philosophy and Oriental thought-ways — had rubbed down many of the rough edges of the resultant Judaism as could not be expected in the ancient stronghold of Jewry, Jerusalem. Due to what may be styled the "syncretism of the period," that is, the resultant give and take of ideas, the temper of Alexandria was not only definitely eclectic and tolerant but constructive. Thus it is not surprising that it was in Alexandria that the last great system of ancient philosophy, Neoplatonism, had its inception in the school of Ammonius Sacca, and that at the same time the Christian gospel, hitherto very definitely a practical religion, desperately, if uncritically, concerned with saving a world which not infrequently seemed not over-eager to be saved, became equipped, and too often encumbered, with a systematic and highly organized theology. Greek patristic theology, which has been aptly styled "the last characteristic creation of the Greek genius," was, to simplify perhaps unduly a complex phenomenon, in no small part the equipping of the material of Christian history with a philosophical dialectic. To the Greek mind the gospel was far

too simple, the portrait of God in the writings we now style the New Testament was quite inadequate. A really scientific theology which would present the Christian God as abstract being in the manner common to orthodox metaphysics was a crying need if the religion was to have standing in a clime where cultivated pagans, among them philosophers of all schools of thought, sat attentively listening, along with orthodox Christians, heretical Gnostics, and critical Jews to the claims of Christian teachers. The pronouncements at Nicaea and Chalcedon show the finished product. Men like Origen and Athanasius made their momentous contributions, but the trend, at least the assembly of necessary materials, had started earlier. The French theologian, Denis, has justly said:

All the elements of Christian theology, except the history of Christ, were already prepared in the religious and philosophical eclecticism of Philo and other Jewish Hellenists: the absolute incomprehensibility of God, who, enclosed in the unfathomable abyss of His infinity, acts and manifests Himself only through His Son or the Word; the theory of the Word as necessary mediator between the Most High and rational creatures; that of the prophetic Spirit who sustains and animates the world of souls, and at the same time the entire universe; a morality at once cosmopolitan and spiritualistic even to mysticism; the resurrection or the Zoroastrian = Jewish . . . doctrine of the future life, tending more and more to confound itself with that of the immortality of the soul, or with the form which the belief in a future life had assumed among the Platonists; in short, the very method that led to universal conciliation, and of which the principle was that "the letter killeth and the spirit giveth life." [2]

At this point the investigator finds himself facing the question of first beginnings and with little or no reliable data to aid him. That in the last decade of the second century Christianity was well established in the delta city is beyond dispute; that in the writings of the first two Alexandrian teachers of whom we can speak with any certainty, Clement and Origen, there are abundant traces of very heavy dependence on the part of both of them upon

[2] Denis, De la Philosophie d'Origène, p. 7. This passage is quoted by W. Fairweather, Origen and Greek Patristic Theology, pp. 3 f. This latter volume in its opening chapter gives a brief but balanced and judicious survey of Clement and his predecessors which I have constantly found of value and which I acknowledge with appreciation.

the thought of the Jewish teacher Philo who, a century and a half earlier in the same city, had played so significant a part in familiarizing the scholarly pagan world with the thinking of Israel and Judah, is equally certain. The extent to which this cultured and versatile Jew — whose piety and loyalty to his ancestral religion are always to be seen, despite his familiarity with and appreciation of cultures remote from his Semitic heritage — influenced the thinking of his own people, not simply what has been styled Normative Judaism but what is so casually referred to, with an ease which the evidence available scarcely supports, Hellenistic Judaism, is far from certain. Opinions diametrically opposed are still expressed. Many investigators, among whom was the late George Foot Moore, see Philo as a *rara avis* so far as his own people, at home or abroad, were concerned, or, to change the figure, a mountain peak standing in solitude above the Jewish plain. But Philo's influence upon developing Christian thought is as certain as the origin and first beginnings of the Christian gospel in Alexandria, where later these influences were to be so profound, are unknown. As in Damascus, Rome, and Carthage — to mention but three of many — where we also find Christian groups established, but with no indication by whom; so it is in the city of the Delta. That many foreign missionaries besides Paul were at work at an early date — and far from the place of origin of the movement — seems obvious. Who they were, not only their names but their methods — were they full-time apostles, as Paul apparently was; were they what we would style today "laymen," who like birds of passage sowed their seed — we simply do not know.

Of course at a later time our early Christian brethren, as curious and probably as uninformed as we, sought to answer those questions. The oft-cited opening paragraph of the Acts of Thomas is the classic example. Here the eleven apostles are found assembled: "and we divided the regions of the world, that every one of us should go unto the region that fell to him and unto the nation whereunto the Lord sent him." [3] That by the time such legends were composed Christianity was long established in the places mentioned is apparently the only reliable fact to be gleaned.

[3] Acts of Thomas 1; M. R. James, The Apocryphal New Testament, p. 365.

So in the city of Alexandria. As early as Jerome the tradition is current that Mark "taking the gospel which he himself composed, went to Egypt; and the first to preach Christ at Alexandria, founded (*constituit*) a church so admirable in doctrine and continence of living that he constrained all followers of Christ to his example." [4] In his commentary on Matthew [5] he styles Mark "first bishop of the church of Alexandria." Here Jerome is palpably repeating and amplifying Eusebius who had written:

> They say that this Mark was the first to be sent to preach in Alexandria the gospel which he had also put into writing, and was the first to establish churches in Alexandria itself. The number of men and women who were there converted at the first attempt was so great, and their asceticism was so extraordinarily philosophic, that Philo thought it right to describe their conduct and assemblies and meals and all the the rest of their manner of life.[6]

The basis of this tradition is quite unknown. Chrysostom, to be sure, appears to have considered the place of composition of the Markan gospel to have been Alexandria.[7] It is not unlikely that the basis for his view which contradicts the commonly accepted Roman tradition was not additional information or scholarly judgment as to the place of composition but simply a misunderstanding of Eusebius' ambiguous "which he had also put into writing." That the actual basis of the tradition was the composition of the Gospel of Mark in Alexandria is perhaps not utterly impossible although the statements of both Clement [8] and Origen [9] who appear to have accepted its Roman origin make the possibility very remote. So far as the actual start of the Christian movement in Alexandria is concerned, the tradition would appear to me to give us no real information save that it

[4] Jerome, de Vir. inl. 8.

[5] Jerome, Comm. in Matt., Prolog. — "Alexandrinae ecclesiae primus episcopus" (Migne, Patr. Lat. xxvi, col. 18A).

[6] Eusebius, H. E. ii, 16.

[7] Prooem. in Matt.

[8] Three such statements seem to have stood in the lost Hypotyposes. Two are cited by Eusebius (H. E. ii, 15, 2; vi, 14, 6); the third is preserved in a Latin fragment on I Peter 5:13 (Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus, III, p. 206).

[9] Origen, Comm. in Matt., also cites I Peter 5:13 in this connection (so Eusebius, H. E. vi, 25, 5).

was early, well before the end of the first century — in itself not at all impossible — and to raise the question whether it was perhaps from Rome that the first impetus came. In passing it may be remarked that Eusebius' reference to Philo's interest in the life of these early Alexandrian Christians and his record of them in his On the Contemplative Life would seem to suggest that in his judgment a highly ascetic type of life among Alexandrian Christians was from the first to be seen, far earlier than the exploits of Pachomius and Anthony. But this is but an inference. Actually our definite information does not antedate the writings of Clement. That Alexandrian Christians had stood aloof from the other Christians until the end of the second century, as has been asserted,[10] is but another guess, in large part due to the fact that we hear nothing about them.

That some time after the middle of the second century there was a Christian school in Alexandria would seem a certainty although the frequent references to it as a "catechetical school" or even a "theological seminary" are easier to make than to substantiate. The earliest name to be with probability connected with this school is that of Pantaenus. Eusebius refers to him several times as the teacher and predecessor of Clement and quotes a letter from Alexander, bishop of Jerusalem, to Origen in which Alexander refers to Pantaenus and Clement: "For we know as fathers those blessed ones who went before us: Pantaenus, truly blessed and my master, and the holy Clement, who was my master and profited me, and all others like them." [11] Eusebius further records that Pantaenus "had been influenced by the philosophic system of those called Stoics," that he went on a missionary trip to India, and that "after many achievements was at the head of the school in Alexandria until his death, and orally and in writing expounded the treasures of the divine doctrine." [12] Jerome repeats and embroiders all this information, with the specific word: "Many of his commentaries on Holy Scripture are in-

[10] C. H. Turner, J. T. S., X (Jan., 1909), p. 169.
[11] H.E. vi, 14, 9.
[12] H.E. v, 10, 1 ff.

deed extant."[13] This reference to Panaenus' writings is usually regarded as due to a misunderstanding by Eusebius of Clement's words, for Clement would seem to indicate that such writings were not available to him: one of his purposes in writing the Stromateis was to preserve in his memory what he had learned,[14] and he apologizes for part of what he had learned from the blessed men having already escaped his memory.[15] And once he writes explicitly: "The elders were not wont to write" (*οὐκ ἔγραφον δὲ οἱ πρεσβύτεροι*).[16] Actually Pantaenus, however great his influence upon those of his own day may have been, is to us scarcely more than a name. Occasional attempts have been made to associate fragments known to us with him — Lightfoot[17] suggested that a work by Pantaenus was the source of the last two chapters of the Letter to Diognetus; Bousset[18] sought to attribute part of the Excerpta ex Theodoto to him — but these suggestions are at best highly doubtful. The utter failure by Clement to quote from one whom he obviously prized highly is not easily explained were written works available. Actually the rareness with which Clement calls him by name is surprising. Surely Eusebius' comment: "In the Hypotyposes . . . he mentioned Pantaenus by name as his teacher"[19] suggests it was most uncommon. In Clement's extant writing, a fragment from the Eclogae Propheticae,[20] Pantaenus is mentioned once (*ὁ Πανταῖνος δὲ ⟨ὁ διδάσκαλος?⟩ ὑμῶν*) as having explained the esoteric significance in the prophets of the several Greek tenses.

It is commonly believed that in the often-quoted reference in the opening chapter of the Stromateis regarding his teachers Clement is referring to Pantaenus as the greatest. Eusebius so

[13] Jerome, de Vir. inl. 36 — "huius multi quidem in sanctam scripturam extant commentarii. . . ."

[14] Strom. i, 1 (11,322P). Citation of Clement's writings in this essay include (in parenthesis) Klotz's enumeration of sections employed by Stählin and also Potter's pages. Unfortunately the English translation of Clement in the Ante-Nicene Library does not subdivide the (often very long) chapters.

[15] Strom. i, 1 (14,324P).

[16] Ecl. Prophet. 27, 1 (996P).

[17] J. B. Lightfoot, The Apostolic Fathers, pp. 488 f.

[18] W. Bousset, Jüdisch-christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandria und Rom.

[19] H.E. vi, 13, 2.

[20] Ecl. Prophet. 56, 2 (1002f.P.).

understood the passage which he quoted,[21] although his text appears to have been slightly different:

> Now this present work (i.e., the Stromateis) is not a writing composed for display, but notes stored up for my old age, a remedy against forgetfulness, an image without art and an outline of those clear and vigorous words which I was privileged to hear, and of blessed and truly notable men. Of these one, the Ionian, was in Greece, others in Magna Graecia [22] (one of whom was a Syrian, the other from Egypt); and there were others in the East: one of them was an Assyrian, the other in Palestine was of Hebrew origin. And when I had met the last (and in power he was the first), having hunted him out from his concealment in Egypt, I had rest. He, the true Sicilian bee, culling the flowers of the prophetic and apostolic meadow, engendered a pure and undefiled wealth of knowledge (*ἀκήρατόν τι γνώσεως χρῆμα*) in the souls of his hearers. But these men preserved the true tradition of the blessed teaching directly from Peter and James and John and Paul, the holy apostles, son receiving it from father (but there were few like their fathers), and indeed, by the blessing of God they came even to us to deposit those ancestral and catholic seeds.[23]

This passage, as is unfortunately true of much of Clement's writing, is far from clear. The identity, even the number, of these several teachers is most uncertain. If, as is generally supposed, by the "Sicilian bee" he meant Pantaenus, the statement that he had "hunted him out from his concealment in Egypt" (*ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ θηράσας λεληθότα*) is surprising, for Alexandria would seem to have been the first, not the last, place where an eminent scholar might have been expected to be found. Surely it would seem a definite indication that Clement himself was not an Alexandrian by birth or upbringing. Is it perhaps to be seen as reflecting an Athenian's attitude toward the new and rival Athens on the Delta? Naturally this is speculative in the extreme; in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, with Athens and Alexandria the two places mentioned as sites of his birth, it is perhaps worth noting.

Next to nothing of the life of Clement is known. Our knowl-

[21] H.E. v, 11, 2–5.
[22] That is, South Italy.
[23] Strom. i, 1 (11,322P).

edge of him is almost entirely drawn from his writings, not from any known facts of his life, as in the case of such men as Origen and even more notably Augustine. And in these writings — as Origen later sententiously remarked of Jesus [24] — Clement "at all times avoided unnecessary talk about himself." Westcott [25] hazarded the guess that since his full name was Titus Flavius Clemens, precisely the name of Vespasian's nephew, who was consul in A.D. 95, Clement may have been a descendant of a freedman of that official. As has already been remarked, there is no decisive evidence as to his birthplace. Epiphanius' casual remark, ὃν φασί τινες Ἀλεξανδρέα, ἕτεροι δὲ Ἀθηναῖον,[26] throws no light, for it may equally well reflect the fact that Alexandria was the site of much of his work. His cultivated diction, encyclopaedic knowledge, especially of the Greek classics, his familiarity with intimate details of pagan ceremonies, to which he frequently refers with apparent exactness, above all the constant undercurrent of urbanity, unobtrusive, but insistent, and his evident at-homeness in the world of culture and refinement — all these suggest that he came from a family not only amply able to provide exceptional opportunities for study but a heritage tending to an awareness of values never subsequently to be lost. That this proves that Greece, more specifically Athens, was his birthplace is of course absurd. There were many places in the ancient world where such a heritage could be acquired. On the other hand, the fact that in his quick survey, quoted above, he seems to start his spiritual pilgrimage in Greece, together with the strange reference to Alexandria if the inference on p. 220 is accepted, makes Athens as likely a guess as any.

Presumably he was not a Christian by birth — again the evidence is but inferential — but the type of upbringing he seems to reflect would appear to me to make it highly probable. Occasional words of his own, as, for example, "abjuring our old opinions, through salvation we renew our youth" [27] or "And the tears are we repentant sinners, who have believed in him, and

[24] Origen, c. Cels. i, 48 (end).

[25] B. F. Westcott, "Clement of Alexandria" in Smith and Wace, A Dictionary of Christian Biography, I, pp. 559 f.

[26] Epiphanius, Haer. xxxii, 6 (Holl, I, p. 445).

[27] Paed. i, 1 (1,97P).

to whom he has forgiven our sins," [28] are entirely consonant with this presumption,[29] but are in themselves scarcely decisive, for Clement is a writer into whose words it is singularly easy — and misleading — to read in and then out much that simply is not there. Again it has been not infrequently suggested that his references to details in the so-called mystery cults indicate that he himself had been an initiate. Personally, I have found nothing of so specific a nature as either to make the conclusion appear imperative or on the other hand impossible. Nor does it appear to me wise even to conclude that it was due to Pantaenus that he became a Christian. Clement simply will not yield answers to questions of that sort.

Eusebius, who is our earliest source of information, gives only a few details: "Pantaenus was succeeded by Clement, who directed the instruction at Alexandria up to such a date that Origen was one of his pupils." [30] On an earlier page he had written: "Origen was in his eighteenth year [31] when he came to preside over the catechetical school, and at this time also he came into prominence when the persecutions were going on under Aquila, the governor of Alexandria." [32] This persecution, in the course of which Origen's father Leonidas was a victim and Origen an aspiring one, arose in the tenth year of Severus,[33] that is, A.D. 202. The next we hear of Clement is in a letter which Alexander (subsequently bishop of Jerusalem), then bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, who had been in prison there since 204, wrote to the church at Antioch upon their choice of Asclepiades as bishop. This letter, which was apparently written in 211, was to be carried

> by the hand of Clement the blessed presbyter, a man virtuous and approved, of whom ye yourselves also have heard, and with whom you will become acquainted; who also, when he was present here in accordance with the providence and overseership of the Master, both stablished and increased the church of the Lord.[34]

[28] Paed. ii, 8 (62,205P).

[29] Eusebius too had reached this opinion: *πάντων μὲν διὰ πείρας ἐλθὼν ἀνήρ, θᾶττόν γε μὴν τῆς πλάνης ἀνανεύσας* — Praep. Ev. iii, 2 (end).

[30] H.E. vi, 6, 1.

[31] Origen was born ca. 185.

[32] H.E. vi, 3, 3.

[33] H.E. vi, 1 and 2.

[34] H.E. vi, 11, 6.

Thus when these various bits are put together it suggests that Clement left Alexandria at the time of the persecution, but surely not as a coward fleeing danger, else Alexander, himself a confessor, would scarcely have viewed his advent in Caesarea as "in accordance with the providence and overseership of the Master"; that he spent some time in Caesarea in effective service; that possibly — this is far from sure — he had visited Antioch on his way from Alexandria.[35] The only other detail known is from another letter of Alexander, now bishop of Jerusalem, to Origen, in which it is clear that Clement is now dead:

> For this also has proved to be the will of God, as thou knowest, that the friendship that comes to us from our forefathers should remain unshaken, nay rather grow warmer and more stedfast. For we know as fathers those blessed ones who went before us, with whom we shall be ere long: Pantaenus, truly blessed and my master, and the holy Clement, who was my master and profited me, and all others like them. Through these I came to know thee, who art the best in all things, and my master and brother.[36]

Since this letter is not to be dated later than 216 or possibly 217, Clement's death can scarcely be placed later than 215.

These references suggest that for a time Clement had been a teacher in Alexandria, and that among his pupils Alexander and Origen were numbered. More than that cannot be said with definiteness. The frequent statements [37] that he had been a colleague of Pantaenus and that upon the latter's death or retirement Clement had succeeded him are simply plausible guesses. Surely nothing in Clement's own writings gives any such information. The further suggestion that it was during those years in Alexandria (190–202) that he did most of his writing has often been confidently offered. In Strom. i, 21 — that very long section devoted to various chronologies, with brief epitomes of history, all intended to demonstrate the antiquity of the revelation to the Hebrews and which is a medley of research and nonsense —

[35] Cf. Alexander's phrase *δν ἴστε καὶ ὑμεῖς καὶ ἐπιγνώσεσθε.*

[36] H.E. vi, 14, 8 f.

[37] For example, E. J. Goodspeed, A History of Early Christian Literature, pp. 201 f.: "Clement probably began to assist Pantaenus about A.D. 190, and was head of the school from about 200 to 202.

there are no less than twelve references [38] to the death of Commodus, which date (A.D. 192) is the latest I have detected in his extant works. As early as Eusebius this fact was observed and the conclusion drawn that this was the *terminus a quo* for his writings: "In fact Clement, when compiling his Stromateis, in the first book displays a chronological table, using the death of Commodus as a terminus in measuring his dates; so that it is clear that the work was composed by him under Severus. . . ." [39] It is to be observed that the remark of Eusebius would seem to be limited to the Stromateis, which is scarcely to be regarded as his first writing.

Of Clement's copious writings Eusebius lists ten,[40] all apparently extant at the time he wrote: 1) Stromateis (Miscellanies) in eight books; 2) Hypotyposes (Sketches) in eight books; 3) Protrepticus (Exhortation to the Greeks); 4) Paedagogus (Tutor) in three books; 5) Quis Dives Salvetur? (Who is the Rich Man that is being saved?); 6) On the Pascha; 7) On Fasting; 8) On Slander; 9) Exhortation to Endurance or to the Newly Baptized; 10) Ecclesiastical Canon or against the Judaizers. Maximus the Confessor, the most prominent Greek theologian of the seventh century, refers several times to another writing (in at least two books); 11) On Providence.[41] Palladius mentions in his Historia Lausiaca (ca. A.D. 420) a work; 12) "On the Prophet Amos," which does not seem to have been a part of the lost Hypotyposes and may have been an independent writing.[42] No fragment of it is known. Stählin [43] cites and evaluates the meagre evidence regarding dubious references to 13) letters from Clement. Clement's mention 14) of a writing On Continence [44] or Concerning Marriage [45] would appear to me not to require the assumption of a lost work by this name but rather to be references to his treatment of the subject in the Stromateis. In my own judgment the same may be said regarding the frequently postulated lost writ-

[38] Strom. i, 21 (139–147; 402–409P).
[39] H.E. vi, 6.
[40] H.E. vi, 13, 1–3.
[41] Cf. Stählin, op.cit., III, pp. LIV–LX, 219–221.
[42] Idem, p. LXIII.
[43] Op.cit., III, pp. LX–LXII.
[44] Paed. ii, 10 (94, 226P) — *ἐν τῷ περὶ ἐγκρατείας ἡμῖν δεδήλωται.*
[45] Paed. iii, 8 (41, 278P) — *ἐν τῷ γαμικῷ διέξιμεν λόγῳ.*

ings: 15) On First Principles and Theology (περὶ ἀρχῶν καὶ θεολογίας); 16) On the Resurrection (περὶ ἀναστάσεως); 17) On Prophecy (περὶ προφητείας); and 18) On the Soul (περὶ ψυχῆς). Two more writings, both preserved in part, may be mentioned, viz., 19) the Excerpts from Theodotus (Excerpta ex Theodoto) and 20) Prophetic Selections (Eclogae Propheticae). Opinions concerning these, especially with regard to the Excerpts, differ, but to me it seems not unlikely that both of these, together with the so-called "eighth book" of the Stromateis, were of the nature of unfinished works, in a word, notes and reflections which Clement may well have been prevented from working into final form. At the end of Book VII of the Stromateis he wrote: "And now after the seventh miscellany of ours (μετὰ τὸν ἕβδομον τοῦτον ἡμῖν Στρωματέα) we shall give the account of what follows from another commencement." [46] Precisely what he had in mind is impossible to say. Surely our present eighth book would not seem to be it. There is no apparent connection with the foregoing in this discussion of philosophic concepts and arguments which appear to be notes for lectures or perhaps a treatise on logic. The Excerpts are for the most part quotations from Valentinian works to which criticisms, at times penetrating, always understanding, are added, together with consequent theological speculation. In a word, we have apparent pages from Clement's workbook.[47] The Prophetic Selections, which follow the Excerpts in the eleventh-century Florence manuscript (Laur. V, 3) and its sixteenth-century copy, are also of the nature of notes rather than a finished literary product. In contrast with the Excerpts these are exegetical in nature and may well have been employed in the exegetical work, the Hypotyposes, which while extant in the days of Eusebius, who refers to it frequently with occasional quotations, has now unfortunately disappeared although we have a Latin translation from the sixth-century Cassiodorus of the sections dealing with four of the Catholic Epistles — I Peter,

[46] Strom. vii, 18 (III, 902P).

[47] R. P. Casey, The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria (Studies and Documents I), 1934, provides an able and judicious discussion of this writing, with an analysis attempting to distinguish between Clement's citations from Theodotus and his own comments and criticism.

Jude, I and II John.[48] The recovery of this latter work would be of great value. It was apparently this work which led the ninth-century lexicographer and epitomist Photius[49] to accuse Clement of heresy which included: the eternity of matter, a doctrine of ideas which degraded the Son to a created being, metempsychosis, a belief that there were many worlds before Adam, a nonscriptural view of the birth of Eve,[50] the actual marriage of the fallen angels and daughters of men, a docetic view of the incarnation (*καὶ μὴ σαρκωθῆναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ δόξαι*),[51] and the view that there were two logoi, the lesser of which appeared to men (*λόγους τε τοῦ πατρὸς δύο τερατολογῶν ἀπελέγχεται, ὧν τὸν ἥττονα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιφανῆναι, μᾶλλον δὲ οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνον*). Photius concludes his charge: "And he utters a myriad other nonsensical and blasphemous notions — either he himself or some other purporting to be he" (*καὶ ἄλλα δὲ μύρια φλυαρεῖ καὶ βλασφημεῖ, εἴτε αὐτός, εἴτε τις ἕτερος τὸ αὐτοῦ πρόσωπον ὑποκριθείς*). It is probable that this criticism by Photius, perhaps together with the fact that Origen was his pupil,[52] contributed to the official skepticism regarding the propriety of considering Clement a saint.

Of the writings listed by Eusebius in addition to the Hypotyposes several have disappeared. No traces of the On Fasting or On Slander are known, while only tiny fragments of On the Passover and Ecclesiastical Canon seem to have been preserved. In 1897 P. M. Barnard published as an appendix to his edition of Clement's Quis Dives Salvetur? a sizeable fragment entitled *Κλήμεντος παραγγέλματα* (Fragments of Clement) which he had discovered in a fourteenth-century manuscript in the Escurial Library and which he conjectured might belong to the Exhorta-

[48] Stählin, op. cit., III, pp. 203–215.

[49] Bibl. Cod. 109; in Stählin, op. cit., III, p. 202.

[50] It may well be that Clement followed Philo in his understanding of the story in Genesis — Leg. allegor. ii, 1–14 — which would easily lay him open to the charge of heresy from literalists.

[51] That Photius is correct in this charge is most unlikely. Since we do not have the text of the Hypotyposes, it is impossible to speak categorically. Clement is easily misquoted, especially from "unfinished work" where not infrequently he cites views from which he himself actually differs.

[52] A Coptic Synaxarium stating that Clement, as well as Origen and Arius, had been excommunicated by Demetrius, is mentioned by Zahn, Forschungen, III, p. 141.

tion to Endurance or to the Newly Baptized.[53] Both style and content would seem to make the conjecture highly probable. No better introduction to Clement can be found than this simple, unpretentious, and honest sketch of the essential qualities of Christian life. In it are precisely those emphases so frequent in his more extended writings which would seem to warrant for its author the title "Clement the Gentleman." Its opening words are well worth quoting, as, if space permitted, would be true of the whole fragment: "Cultivate quietness (ἡσύχιαν) in word, quietness in deed, and likewise in speech and gait. And avoid impetuous haste. For then will the mind remain steadfast and will not be confused and so become weak and deficient in understanding and dark of sight." [54] One other word must here suffice: "Take care never to speak what you have not previously weighed and pondered; do not interject offhand your own words in the midst of another's; for you must listen and talk in turn, with time set for speech and silence. Learn gladly and teach ungrudgingly, never through jealousy hindering wisdom from others nor remaining aloof from instruction from a false feeling of shame." [55]

In the four extant works we gain a very clear and revealing portrait of the sort of man Clement was, despite the fact, already remarked, that he is very chary of any references to himself or his doings. Three of these writings stand in at least a logical sequence although it is far from certain that they actually were framed as a trilogy, or, to phrase it differently, that the Stromateis was intended by Clement as the third part of his great work. De Faye in his brilliant study, Clément d'Alexandrie, flatly denied this contention and argued this mélange was but a sort of introduction to the intended but never produced third part to which Clement makes frequent mention and which was to have borne the title Διδάσκαλος. Various other groupings of these writings have been suggested and promptly criticized by other scholars [56]

[53] Texts and Studies edited by J. A. Robinson, Vol. V, No. 2 (1897), pp. 46–52. The fragment is printed by Stählin, op. cit., III, pp. 221–223. The Greek text with English translation is available in G. W. Butterworth's Clement of Alexandria (Loeb Library), pp. 368–377.

[54] Stählin, op. cit., III, p. 221.

[55] Ibid., p. 222.

[56] See Walter Völker, Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus, pp.

in what Aimé Puech styled "une querelle des mots." His own judgment, "les Stromates ont tenu en fait qui devait être la conclusion logique de la trilogie," [57] appears to me eminently sensible. Clement was not a systematic theologian, and attempts to treat him as such are futile. It is highly doubtful, even if we could solve the debated question of order, that we should know anything more about him or his thinking. That the writings we have are preliminary to his *magnum opus* which he was yet to write appears to me as unlikely as the contention often made that Clement refrained from communicating his more rarefied thinking. Again and again he phrases himself in such a way as to suggest that while much might be safely communicated, there were deeper insights and truths which should not be lightly divulged either to scoffers or to less seasoned Christians. But that this means that his writings were simply preliminary and that his greater truths were still undivulged appears to me a quite erroneous conclusion. At the close of Book VII of the Stromateis he wrote: "These points, then, having been formerly thoroughly treated, and the department of ethics having been sketched summarily in a fragmentary way, as we promised; and having here and there interspersed the dogmas which are the germs of true knowledge, so that the discovery of the sacred traditions may not be easy to anyone of the uninitiated, let us proceed to what we promised." [58] It may well be, as he writes a few lines farther on, "And now after this seventh Stromateus of ours, we shall give the account of what follows in order from another commencement," [59] that he contemplated writing more; it should not be neglected that he had, as he himself remarked, already "interspersed the dogmas which are the germs of true knowledge."

The Protrepticus is a definitely apologetic writing; that is, it was intended to win Christian converts. Most apologies have as a seemingly necessary element polemics. So here. In this writing which was definitely intended for Greeks, not for gentiles in general, he is at pains to prove the superiority of Christianity to the

26–34, for a full and judicious résumé. This recent (1952) volume is a very valuable addition to the literature on Clement and related matters.

[57] A. Puech, Histoire de la littérature grecque chrétienne, II, p. 344.

[58] Strom. vii, 18 (110, 901P).

[59] Idem (111, 902P).

religions and philosophies with which his readers were familiar. This attitude was the distinctive one of the Alexandrian school. This is precisely the purpose of Philo, save that his *summum bonum* was Judaism, not Christianity. Clement knew Philo's work intimately and is deeply indebted to him not only in content and phrase but in aim and method.

Clement's style is always complicated: sentence structure, a very wide vocabulary, figures of speech, a plethora of quotations, a regular habit of veering from one subject to the next when to his quick-witted mind he had finished his argument or at least had sketched its chief aspects. In the Protrepticus all of this is particularly conspicuous. Eduard Norden, no mean style master he, acutely remarked: "Der Anfang des clementischen Protrepticus gehört mit seinen zerhackten, rhythmisch fallenden figurengeschmückten Sätzen zu dem Raffiniertesten, was es aus der sophistischen Prosa gibt." [60] Nor is the reason hard to discover. Not only is Clement an Atticist on every page; here he is definitely striving to show that non-Christian scholars and literati need have no fear of a descent to an intellectual gutter in making the necessary transition to the gospel fold. In some ways this writing gives an unfair picture of Clement. By and large, Clement, although a thoroughly convinced Christian, is strikingly fair to his opponents, especially to the philosophers, in particular to Plato. In consequence there has been a constant debate as to whether Clement really is a Platonic Christian or simply an "intellectually Christianized" Platonist. To me there is no question. He is a Christian, and a convinced one. But he sees profound values in other systems and is not ashamed to recognize them. It is the failure to observe this fundamental fairness and intellectual breadth in Clement which has led his readers from the days of Photius — and not unlikely earlier during his stay in Alexandria — to look at him with a certain reserve as not quite sound in the faith.

In the Protrepticus this is less evident. Here he is definitely the apologist. His profound knowledge of classical lore, especially its mythology, is everywhere present, and his quotations are, as in all his writings, amazingly full and frequent. But the great

[60] E. Norden, Die Antike Kunstprosa, II, p. 549.

majority of these are cited to show their tawdriness and lack of foundation, their sensuality and transiency in contrast with the purity and eternal nature of the new song: "The fountain of Castalia is silent, and the other fountain of Colophon; and, in like manner, all the rest of the springs of divination are dead, and stripped of their vainglory, although at a late date, are shown with their fabulous legends to have run dry." [61] He will not, he asserts, divulge the mysteries in mockery as Alcibiades is said to have done, but his treatment of them — the selection of the worst elements — so common in the Christian fathers, whose hatred was surpassed only by their ignorance, is in marked contrast to the tone of his less polemical writings, and stems from his aim: "to show you thoroughly what like these gods of yours are . . . that you may abandon them and speed your flight back to heaven." [62] It is interesting reading, but I never read it save with the wish that he had not so thoroughly adopted what has seemed to be the approved technique of Christian orthodoxy of every age, namely, to run a steam roller over all else and thus, *mirabile dictu*, to find one's own elevation towering high above the plain.

Yet despite this natural, even though to me it seems a bit unfortunate, attempt to destroy the whole of Pactolus since it is not equal in value to salvation, Clement is again and again in this writing revealed in his true colors: as a man who prized brain and insight, who preferred the voice of reasoned conviction to the braying of Balaam's ass, whose one aim is to win his reader from "ignorance to knowledge": "There are miserable wretches of human kind who consider that God utters his voice by the raven and the jackdaw, but says nothing by man." They know the voice of the raven as a messenger of God, "but the man of God, who croaks not nor chatters, but speaks rationally and instructs lovingly, alas they persecute." [63] This is the true Clement.

The third of the three principal writings of Clement which have come to us in their essential completeness, the Stromateis, is treated by most investigators as their chief source, for here

[61] Protrep. 2 (11, 10P).
[62] Protrep. 2 (27, 23P).
[63] Protrep. 10 (104, 82P).

Clement is concerned with the more weighty matters of doctrine; here we have, in a word, the crowning work of the Word, the true and genuine Tutor, referred to in the opening chapter of the Paedogogus: "who first exhorts, then trains, and finally teaches." [64] While it would be absurd to neglect the Stromateis in any attempt to understand Clement, it is equally unwise to overlook this second writing, the Paedagogus, for in this, to me especially attractive, writing, one gets a very revealing and winsome picture of Clement the urbane and cultivated gentleman entirely at home in the world which he knew extraordinarily well, with an innate unperspiring sense of good manners and distaste for vulgar extremes, either to the left or right, who was, in a word, the best example known to me among the early fathers of a man who was the embodiment of that distinctive quality of Greek life at its finest: μηδὲν ἄγαν — "In nothing too much." It would not be an impossible task to make a plausible case for the contention that Clement's chief contribution was not his adventures in the realm of theology, despite the fact that many of his views provided much for the later developing systematic theology,[65] nor even his specific teachings of a quality more strictly ethical than theological,[66] but his quiet yet effective work in giving to the hitherto intellectually undisciplined Christian movement a respectable standing among the educated and well to do. This it definitely had not had hitherto. Paul was severely correct in his contention that "not many wise after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble" were to be found in the Christian ranks. Whatever Paul's personal preference may have been at this point in his early days as an apostle, by the time we know him he had made virtue out of necessity and constantly stressed — and gloried in it — the humble and unpretentious origin and nature of the movement to which he was devoted. That he gloried in

[64] Paed. i, 1 (3, 99P).

[65] This has often received attention. Harnack, to quote one among many, in his article "Der 'Eros' in der alten christlichen Literatur," styled him "der einziger christlich fromme und wahrhaft freisinnige Theologe . . . den die alte Kirche besessen hat" (Sitzungsberichte d. Preuss. Akademie d. Wiss., Berlin, 1918, p. 88).

[66] Ernesti (Die Ethik des Titus Flavius Clemens von Alexandrien, p. v) called him "Begründer der christlichen Ethik als Wissenschaft"; McGiffert (A History of Christian Thought, I, p. 192) wrote: "He was much greater in ethics than in theology."

ignorance and deplored wisdom is very far from the case despite the fact that his words have been from the very start so misunderstood and have done much to provide fire for such critics as Lucian and Celsus, and a seeming buttress to those who then as now believed the most acceptable of all Christian prayers to be that which expressed thanks to the Almighty for the petitioner's ignorance.

In Alexandria, intellectual capital of the hellenistic world though she might be, that would seem to have been the attitude of many Christians in the days of Clement. And against that attitude he stood uncompromising. His caustic word, already quoted,[67] is but one of many protests at what seemed to him a fatal weakness. Again and again he asserts the propriety of making use of what is best in Greek philosophy and other preparatory teachings. To be sure, he insists that the Greeks had borrowed their insights from the barbarians — that is, from the Jewish Scriptures. This thesis, which is stressed frequently and illustrated in minute detail, is supported, he maintains, by none less than the Lord himself: "It having been then, as I think, clearly shown in what way it is to be understood that the Greeks were called thieves by the Lord." [68] To what extent this explanation of similarities between the Judaeo-Christian and pagan world — Justin had earlier explained it as due to the demons — was literally believed by Clement, to what extent it is a conventional expression of his confidence that in the Christian revelation the whole substance of truth is to be found, is to me far from sure. At any rate, the many similarities between the Hebrew and the Greek tradition which he reveals are very impressive. In both the Paedagogus and the Stromateis, unlike his attitude in the zealously apologetic Protrepticus, he shows a genuine and deep appreciation and understanding of these pagan insights. It is probably true to say that this is in part due to his conviction that they are "essentially Christian." It is equally true that they evidence his broad-gauged and catholic spirit.

Much has been written about his treatment of the Logos. That this was for Clement a central truth is self-evident. To the idea

[67] See p. 230.
[68] Strom. v, 14 (140, 733P).

of the Logos, already present in Christian thinking in such writings as the Fourth Gospel and the works of Justin, he gave a greater content. The gospel is, in a word, the highest, although not the only, revelation of the Logos. It had given evidence of its presence constantly whenever man had risen above the state of the savage. The Logos is himself the tutor of mankind, who "strengthens our souls and by his benign commands, as with gentle medicine, guides the sick to the perfect knowledge of the truth." [69] He "first exhorts, then trains, and finally teaches." In a word, Christianity is the doctrine of the Logos who is at once the creator, teacher, and redeemer of man, and whose finished product is found in the man of true knowledge. The deep dependence of Clement upon Philo is nowhere more evident than here: the Logos is the bridge of communication between God and his world. God himself is inexpressible — formless and nameless. We may give him such titles as One, Good, Mind, Absolute Being, Father, God, Creator, Lord. None of these, nor all together, express God, but rather indicate his power.[70] But God's Son, the Logos, is not thus veiled, but has in some degree been known to the noblest spirits of every age and realm. To those in days of old, when the law disciplined the people with fear, the Word was an angel; but now the Word has appeared, and fear is turned to love, and that mystic angel is born — Jesus (*ὁ μυστικὸς ἐκεῖνος ἄγγελος Ἰησοῦς*).[71] He, the Word of truth who regenerates man by bringing him back to the truth, builds up the temple of God in men — no longer the lurking place of demons, that he may cause God to take up his abode in men.[72] Thus in sober reality God is not one who dwells afar off. Rather he is a God that draws near. In essence (*κατ' οὐσίαν*) he is remote; in virtue of the power that holds all things in its embrace he is very near.[73]

Perhaps the most distinctive emphasis of Clement in this regard is upon this primary function of the Logos, instruction. As man's saviour, he delivers him from sin, that is, from guilt and ignorance. Clement breaks utterly with such views as those of

[69] Paed. i, 1 (3, 98P).
[70] Strom. v, 12 (82, 695P).
[71] Paed. i, 7 (59, 133P).
[72] Strom. ii, 20 (117, 490P); cf. Protrep. 11 (117, 90P).
[73] Strom. ii, 2 (5, 431P).

Basilides and Valentinus who saw salvation the consequence of a supramundane election by God which endowed, so to speak, those fortunates with the germ of immortality. For Clement this whole notion of divine election is alien. Sin and rescue from it are due to man's freedom of will, his rebellion and his release. God had foreseen man's rebellion. He had not predestined it. Sin is thus not due to a hereditary taint but to man's deliberate act. Like Adam, we fall, not because of *his* fall but because we, like him, yield to our own lust. Thus sin is not to be attributed to the devil. He tempts us, but sin is to be attributed to the one who does it. And only wilful sin falls under God's punishment. Acts which are not free are not to be judged. Whether done through ignorance or necessity, they involve no condemnation.[74]

Here, then, for Clement is the especial function of Christ, this Logos and the Saviour of mankind. The eternal Word is our helper and teacher. He may be the "lamb of God"; this, however, is due to his innate innocence, not to his quality as a sacrifice. Salvation depends not upon atonement but upon moral amendment, not upon Christ as the world's scapegoat but as the teacher of the race, who guides men to a saving course of conduct through his solicitude for them.[75] Thus despite occasional phrases which can be twisted to a different conclusion, Clement effectually discountenances the notion of an arbitrary or unfair act by God, either in election or redemption. Man must coöperate. "As the doctor cures those who coöperate with him in regaining their health, so God gives eternal salvation to whoever coöperates with him in order to possess knowledge and good works." [76] That is, "Nor will he who is saved be saved against his will, for he is not inanimate; but he will above all voluntarily and of free choice speed to salvation." [77] For sins of ignorance, those committed before the illumination brought through conversion and the resulting baptism, there is full pardon through Christ's work. But the man who has thus received pardon must sin no more. But Clement was no fool. Those whose eyes were opened *should* not sin. Unfortunately they did. Like Hermas, Clement found the

[74] Strom. ii, 14 (60, 461P).
[75] Paed. i, 7 (54, 130P).
[76] Strom. vii, 7 (48, 860P).
[77] Strom. vii, 7 (42, 855P).

rigorous pronouncement of the Epistle to the Hebrews impossible. God in his goodness has granted a repentance for believers too. "The Lord ministers all good and all help, both as man and God: as God, forgiving our sins; and as man, training us to cease from sin." [78] Thus for Clement redemption is not a once-for-all act, not a mechanical restoration from the Fall of Adam: it is something far more, a corrective discipline extending throughout life, both this and of that to come, the glorious climax of human destiny: "The Word of God became man, that thou mayest learn from man how man may become God." [79]

The mature Christian is the true gnostic, a title which Clement indignantly wrests from those who, like Basilides and Valentinus, would usurp it. Having reached a proper insight into life, through the solicitude of our Tutor, who, unlike such teachers as Phoenix, Adrastus, Leonidas, and the rest, guides us through his concern for us to a saving course of conduct, we need have no fears toward life which would lead us to an ascetic withdrawal. The true Christian may engage in all honorable activities — business, marriage, public life — with no fear and no loss. Does not the Scripture plainly assert: "There is nothing which the Lord hates"? "If then he hates none of the things which he has made, it follows that he loves them." [80] Not alone is this the foundation for Clement's wholesome emphasis upon the love, rather than the wrath, of God, his eagerness to bless rather than to curse, his eternal smile upon humanity; it is also the basis for his healthy outlook upon life, a pleasant contrast to the miasma of asceticism which was soon to descend.

There was no exceptional value or virtue in poverty, celibacy, or martyrdom *per se*. The true Christian is seen in terms of his inner love for God, not of his outward circumstances. This constant emphasis is found in a most winsome form in the one sermon we still have from his pen, Quis Dives Salvetur? God is not unjust enough to damn a child whom he has permitted to be born in a home of affluence. No virtue is evident in the beggar whose poverty both prevents him from obeying the divine edict to aid

[78] Paed. i, 3 (7, 101P).
[79] Protrep. 1 (8, 8P).
[80] Paed. i, 8 (62, 135P).

one's brethren and cankers his own life with bitter longing. It is the hankering for wealth and the like evidences of but dimly seen values, in a word, the passions, which hinder a proper and divinely led life, which holds us far from the heavenly mount, as the apostles, themselves poor as far as the goods of the world were concerned, so clearly saw in their fearsome word: "Who then can be saved?"

No better introduction to Clement as a man of poise, *savoir faire*, and native refinement and delicacy is to be found than in his unconscious amplification of this thesis: "There is nothing which God hates." Books II and III of the Paedagogus provide the *locus classicus*. In contrast to the allegorical *tours de force* and absurdities of derivation which are so frequent in his pages, here we find a man who is thoroughly at home in the world of culture and refinement, who is neither afraid nor enamoured of God's good things but who has a constant, if unself-conscious, set of mind — seemingly the product of years of a genuinely liberal background — against both vulgar ostentation and ignorant or illiberal abstinence. Food is not our business nor pleasure our aim.[81] The former is to be simple, ministering to life, not to luxury. Thus uncooked foods and native wines are admirable. The fancy and the exotic, not alone in the making of pastry but in many other phases of diet and deportment, are to be eschewed. Incidentally, he here gives a very vivid picture of the ancient world, its habits and practices, with an exactness and detail which surely suggest that he knew his way around. No total abstainer, he approves Paul's wholesome word "to Timothy," but cautions that it be, as the apostle advised, a "little." [82] He finds a great truth involved in the fact that first the rock was cleft for water; only later did the sacred vine produce its clusters.[83] To be sure, Christ made water wine, but he did not give permission to get drunk. Boys and girls should keep "as much as possible away from this medicine." "It suits divine studies not to be heavy with wine." It is quite proper when studies are over, when the air is chill, especially in the chill of old age which the decay of

[81] Paed. ii, 1 (2, 163P).
[82] Paed. ii, 2 (19, 177P).
[83] Ibid.

time has produced, to gain warmth by the "harmless medicine of the vine" — but let Clement continue: "for old men's passions are not, for the most part, stirred to such agitation as to drive them to the shipwreck of drunkenness." [84]

His observations on table manners [85] are interesting and revealing, both as to his own innate sense of propriety and the apparent prevalence, even among Christians, of the vulgarity he deplores. One should not talk with his mouth full, should avoid tidbits which lure us to eat when not hungry, should not hiccup or sneeze or burp in public, should not chirrup or whistle through one's fingers at domestics. Man may well be a laughing animal, but he should not always be laughing any more than a horse should be neighing. "In a word, whatever things are natural to men we must not eradicate from them, but rather impose on them limits and suitable times." [86]

Many of his observations are highly salty and quotable. In all these sections — be they on cosmetics (of which his knowledge is immense), on one's deportment at festivals or banquets, on sleep, or on marriage — we see the gentleman who knows the world and is not afraid of it, but who exemplifies the old adage, "In nothing too much." After a particularly detailed list of do's and don't's, ending with the warning not to pick one's nose, he concludes: "In a word, the Christian is characterized by composure, tranquility, calmness, and peace." [87] Constantly his sanity is to the fore. Elaborate and overluxurious beds and their trappings are to him distasteful; yet "use of them is not forbidden to them who have them, but solicitude for them is." [88] There is no sense going to absurd extremes as Diomede did, who stretched himself under a wild bull's hide, or the Cynics, but elaborately turned legs on bedsteads are useless and are lurking places for bugs. After all, it is better not to sleep too long or too heavily. Beware the heavy sleep of Lot! Rise frequently at night to seek to increase through wakefulness the length of life, for, after all, sleep is but a form of death.

[84] Paed. ii, 2 (22, 179P).
[85] Paed. ii, 1 (passim).
[86] Paed. ii, 5 (46, 196P).
[87] Paed. ii, 7 (60, 204P).
[88] Paed. ii, 9 (78, 217P).

It would be interesting to quote many other examples of his sane and wholesome moderation: "Do not, like Penelope, spend days weaving habits of temperance only to unbraid them at night." [89] "Do not, I pray thee, put off modesty at the same time you put off your clothes.[90] Clothes ought to show that what they cover is superior; but when a woman whose body if sold would not bring a thousand Attic drachmas spends ten thousand talents on a dress, she proves herself far less valuable than her clothes.[91] "It is not dreadful to appear old when you are not able to shut your eyes to the fact that you are so." [92]

No discussion, however brief, of Clement or the other Alexandrians can venture to overlook that style of interpretation long associated with the delta of the Nile: allegorical exegesis. It is to be found on every page of his writing and is fantastic in the extreme. From the point of view of fidelity to the writings themselves it is rubbish, whether from the pen of a Philo, a Clement, or an Origen. Isaac sporting with his wife, while King Abimelech plays the rôle of Peeping Tom, typifies the mystery of sport being contemplated by a supramundane wisdom. And soon Abimelech gives place to Christ, who, looking through the window from above, beholds our laughter.[93] Or Clement's labored wrestling with Paul's word about milk and meat and the amazing gems of anatomy and physiology which he bears triumphantly from the struggle! [94] From one angle it is pathetic nonsense, and the fact that eminent men of the past were its sponsors in no wise alters the estimate. On the other hand, while it is worse than useless as indicating what the earlier writers had meant to say, it is very revealing so far as the allegorist himself is concerned, for the materials he reads out are values to him which he is thus seeking to find with divine sanction. From this point of view Clement's method adds little to his stature as a student of the past and nothing as an interpreter of its writings; on the other

[89] Paed. ii, 10 (97, 228P).
[90] Paed. ii, 10 (100, 230P).
[91] Paed. ii, 11 — Gk. 10 (115, 239P).
[92] Paed. iii, 3 (16, 262P).
[93] Paed. i, 5 (21 f., 110P).
[94] Paed. i, 6 (34–52, 118P).

hand, it does suggest the values which he prized. One example must suffice:

> But, as appears, only intercourse with good men benefits; on the other hand, the all-wise Instructor, by the mouth of Moses, recognizing companionship with bad men as swinish, forbade the ancient people to partake of swine; to point out that those who call on God ought not to mingle with unclean men, who, like swine, delight in corporeal pleasures, in impure food, and in itching with filthy pruriency after the mischievous delights of lewdness.
>
> Furthermore, he says: "Thou art not to eat a kite or swift-winged ravenous bird, or an eagle," meaning: Thou shalt not come near men who gain their living by rapine. And other things are also exhibited figuratively.
>
> With whom, then, are we to associate? With the righteous, he says again, speaking figuratively; for everything which "parts the hoof and chews the cud is clean." For the parting of the hoof indicates the equilibrium of righteousness, and ruminating points to the proper food of righteousness, the word, which enters from without, like food, by instruction, but is recalled from the mind, as from the stomach, to rational recollection. And the spiritual man, having the word in his mouth, ruminates the spiritual food; and righteousness parts the hoof rightly, because it sanctifies us in this life and sends us on our way to the world to come.[95]

As a commentary upon the meaning of the ancient Hebrew legislation, this is triple-A nonsense; as an indication of Clement's sense of values, it is not to be despised.

It would be easy to pick out other elements in his writings equally mistaken. Along with allegorical exegesis stand his frequent highly fanciful, at times grotesque, derivations of words and terms, in which gentle art, as in his exegesis, he discovers what he wants to find: *νήπιος* from *ἤπιος*,[96] *κραιπάλη* from *κάρα πάλλειν*,[97] *ἔλαιον* from *ἔλεος*,[98] *Ποσειδῶν* from *πόσις*,[99] *Ἄρης* from *ἄρσις* and *ἀναίρεσις*,[100] *μυστήριον* from either *μύσος* or *μυθήρια*.[101]

[95] Paed. iii, 11 (75 f., 297P).
[96] Paed. i, 5 (19, 108P).
[97] Paed. ii, 2 (26–end, 182P).
[98] Paed. ii, 8 (62, 205P).
[99] Protrep. 5 (64, 56P).
[100] Idem.
[101] Protrep. 2 (13, 12P).

So also he was a past master in the mysteries of sacred arithmetic.[102] These, however, do not reveal the true Clement or suggest his distinct contribution, the intellectual undergirding of the still popular and uncritical wildfire movement and its establishment as a system to be appreciated and reckoned with.

Among the early fathers he stands in his own proper place. In Fairweather's happy phrase: "He was neither an eloquent orator nor a bustling ecclesiastic, neither a public disputant nor a social reformer, but a genial man of letters, of a meditative cast of mind, and with a certain distaste for the strife and turmoil of everyday life." [103] Probably Origen was a profounder student of Scripture; certainly Augustine a far more systematic theologian. But both of them, not to mention the relentless and vitriol-tongued Tertullian, must have been hard to live with. Surely again and again the latter two had the facility to make the saving love of God appear in a most unattractive light. Not so Clement. It might even be said that, unlike many of his early colleagues, he made it pleasant to become a Christian. There is throughout his writings — and the only way to know the real Clement is to read him *in extenso*: few writers are more distorted and misrepresented by casual or atomistic quotation — a contagious confidence in human nature, a conviction that under the guidance of its divine Instructor it can and must ascend the delectable mount of God that is most winsome. The face of God is not to be seen in an angry visage peering through the storm clouds of Sinai but in the beneficent and kindly Saviour whose smile is upon all that is noble and honest. In a word, "It has been God's fixed and constant purpose to save the flock of men: for this end the good God sent the good Shepherd." [104] It is thus that there is in his thinking a place for all culture, especially that of ancient Greece, in the all-embracing gospel. It is only as one advances in knowledge that he can advance in insight and can draw nigh to the one who is ever nigh to him. Tertullian viewed all Greek learning as the invention of demons; against it the Christian must rigorously insulate himself with an invincible faith. Not so Clement. The

[102] Strom. vi, 11 (passim).
[103] W. Fairweather, op. cit., p. 14.
[104] Protrep. 11 (116, 89P).

cure of error is not more ignorance but more knowledge. Faith (πίστις) is essential — never would he deny it — but it is but the stepping stone to love (ἀγάπη), which in its turn leads us to knowledge (γνῶσις). This union of faith and knowledge was highly suspect among the "simple" Christians in Alexandria who, in his own phrase, were "afraid of Greek philosophy as children fear ghosts" (μορμορλυκεία).[105] "There is in philosophy, though stolen as the fire by Prometheus, a slender spark, capable of being fanned into flame, a trace of wisdom and an impulse from God." [106]

There was a place for Clement in those days of early and not too easy adolescence. There would seem to me a not too dissimilar place still open in our day when once again the fog and miasma of irrationalism and of pessimistic despair of any human stability, not to say advance, are dimming the "Light which lighteth every man."

[105] Strom. vi, 10 (80, 780P).
[106] Strom. i, 17 (87, 369P).

# A DIATRIBE OF GALEN

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Dedicated to Dr. S. van den Bergh for his seventieth birthday

The Arabic summary of Galen's Περὶ ἠθῶν, a work which appears to have been of some importance for moral philosophy in the early centuries of philosophical speculation in Islam, is the only remnant of this rather comprehensive work of the philosophizing doctor of the century of the Antonines. It is, as happens so often in the case of Galen, a work in which traditional doctrine and statements taken from some great predecessor make themselves more strongly felt than the author's own contribution and his particular intention. Posidonius' restoration of Plato's psychology, as far as ethical speculation is concerned, appears to be the basis of Galen's description of moral character.[1] There is no need to refer to Posidonius if we want to explain why Galen thought it right to insert fables and sermon-like exhortations into his theoretical treatment of a subject of moral philosophy. But it may, nonetheless, be appropriate to remember that Posidonius insisted on the importance of exhortation as well as of description and analysis: moral philosophy is in equal need of both. Seneca Epist. 95, 65: "Posidonius non tantum praeceptionem. . . . sed etiam suasionem et consolationem et exhortationem necessariam iudicat. His adicit causarum inquisitionem. . . . Ait utilem futuram et descriptionem cuiusque virtutis: hanc Posidonius ethologiam vocat, quidam characterismon appellant, signa cuiusque virtutis ac vitii et notas[2] reddentem quibus inter se similia discriminentur." We should, however, in a work on *ethe*, expect to find neither a *suasio*, a *hypothetikos logos*, which has its place in a *praeceptio* (*didaskalikos logos*) nor a *conso-*

[1] This has been shown in a previous article: New Light on Galen's Moral Philosophy (from a recently discovered Arabic source). Classical Quarterly 1949, pp. 82–96; cf. p. 84 n. 3 and n. 5.

[2] Cf., e.g., De moribus p. 31. 10 Kraus: "I should put down the distinguishing marks (*'alāmāt*) of the ἤθη." Follows the discussion of ὀργή and θυμός and the very interesting description of ἀνδρεία which contains some very unusual features.

*latio*, a *paramythetikos logos* — whose function it is to heal the emotions, but only an *exhortatio*, a *protreptikos logos*. This was, as I learn from Professor K. Reinhardt, Posidonius' view. (Cf. Clemens Alexandrinus, Paedag., I, 1, p. 90, 1 Stählin, a passage which elaborates the statement by Seneca, referred to before.) [2a] Accordingly Galen used only *protreptikoi logoi* in his work on *ethe*.

The summary appears to have preserved one of Galen's *exhortationes* in its entirety. It is to be found at the end of the second book, in which the *ethe* which originate from the appetitive soul are discussed and the difference between a sensuous and a rational life is worked out in detail. The main adversary, although never mentioned by name in the summary, is Epicurus, misunderstood in his intentions as so often in the platonizing philosophy of the Imperial Age, e.g. in Plutarch's philosophical essays. The ultimate source of a great part of the second book is again somewhere in the neighborhood of Panaetius and Posidonius, as has been shown previously.[3] The protreptic chapter consists of three parts:

(I) A more theoretical discussion of the immortality of the *nous*, slightly spoiled by Galen's well known meek scepticism [4] but probably quite consistent in the original which he follows.

(II) A fable, put in to illustrate his view more vividly; this fable was previously known in a full quotation of this part of

[2a] Cf. now Pauly-Wissowa-Kroll, Halbband, 43, 1953, col. 768 f.

[3] Cf. Class. Quart. (above n. 1), p. 91 f. and p. 84 n. 4. The further development of the Φιλανθρωπία (cf. S. TROMP DE RUYTER, De vocis quae est φιλανθρωπία significatione atque usu, Mnemosyne 59, 1932, p. 271 ff.) into a general love of mankind on philosophical grounds deserves a special inquiry. It comes, surprisingly, to the surface in an Arabic work on moral philosophy, based entirely on a lost Greek treatise and written by the Christian Arabic philosopher Yaḥyā ibn 'Adī (cf. G. Graf, Geschichte der christlichen-arabischen Litteratur II p. 233ff.), the pupil of Al-Fārābī (d. A.D. 950) who naturalized the platonic philosopher-king in Arabian lands: *Kitāb tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, Rasā'il al-Bulaghā, 3rd edition, Cairo 1946, p. 517.

[4] Cf., e.g., Galen, Quod an. virt. 3 (Scripta Minora II p. 36. 12): ὅτι δ'ἐκ τούτων τῶν εἰδῶν τε καὶ μερῶν τῆς ὅλης ψυχῆς τὸ λογιστικὸν ἀθάνατόν ἐστι, Πλάτων μὲν φαίνεται πεπεισμένος, ἐγὼ δ'οὔθ'ὡς ἔστιν οὔθ'ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἔχω διατείνεσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν ("Plato seems to be convinced that the rational part of the whole soul is immortal, but with respect to his view I am unable to maintain either that it is or that it is not") and Περὶ τῶν ἑαυτῷ δοκούντων, vol. IV p. 761, 2 ff., Kuehn (Cf. Plato Arabus I., London 1951, p. 15 and n. 4).

the chapter to be found in Al-Bīrūnī's India and was used by him for purposes of his own, which will be discussed later. E. Sachau, the editor of Al-Bīrūnī's work (published in 1887–1888),[5] overlooked the fact that the fable, though in a slightly different and less good recension, is preserved in a metrical version by Babrius (no. 30; imitated by Avianus 23, who may have used a Latin prose paraphrase of the text of Babrius), and, accordingly, the last critical editor of Babrius, O. Crusius (1896), is unaware of the parallel to be found in Galen.

(III) A solemn exhortation, based on an allegorical understanding of the fable, to live a philosophical life, trying, as Plato demanded, to become similar to God as far as mortal beings can.

I give the text of the passage in full (p. 39.20–41.4 Kraus):

(i) Know that the body has been joined to you only in order to serve you as an instrument in the performance of your actions; that the appetitive soul has been given to you for the body's sake only, and the spirited soul in order to embolden you in your fight against the appetitive soul. Now if a man's hands and feet were cut off and those other limbs of his, without which he is able to live and still to remain a human being since his mind and his intellect continue to exist, he would nonetheless remain a human being. In the same way, then, it is possible that a man remains alive and thinking after the loss of all the limbs of his body, having been divested, together with the body, of that soul which nourishes it. Now since you are a human being through your rational soul alone, being able through it to remain alive and thinking and to do without the spirited and appetitive souls — were the rational soul free of both of them, it would have never been entangled in a bad way of life — you should disregard the actions and 'accidents' (i.e. emotions, *pathe*) connected with these two. And if you, after having become free of both of them together with the body, are still able to reason and to think — according to the best philosophers' statements about the state of man after death — you should know that you will have, after having become free of the body, a life like the gods.[6] But if you are not yet certain that your mind is immortal,

[5] P. 59.10–60.5 of the Arabic text, vol. I p. 123 of the translation (Second edition: London 1910). Al-Bīrūnī completed his work on India about A.D. 1030 at the court of Maḥmūd of Ghazna.

[6] This was certainly to be read in the Greek original. The Arabic translator has 'angels' *malā'ika* instead. Cf. below n. 14.

then there is nothing easier than to strive that your way of life becomes similar to the life of the gods [7] while you are still alive.

But you may object: 'It is impossible to live up to this standard.' I should agree to this, since one cannot help eating and drinking; but in the same way as you would become a god [8] if you were able to live without food and drink, you will come near to being a god [9] if you confine yourself to what is indispensable for the life of the body. It is your choice to honour your soul by making yourself similar to the gods [10] or to disrespect your soul by making yourself similar to the beasts.

(ii) It is told that two men came at the same time to an idol-merchant (*bā'iʿ aṣnām*) and bargained with him for an idol of Hermes. The one wanted to erect it in a temple (*haikal*)⌜to remind people of Hermes⌝ (Al-Bīrūnī: as a memorial of Hermes); the other wanted to erect it on a tomb and thus recall to mind a deceased person. However, they could not come to terms with the merchant that day, and so they postponed the business until the following day. That night the idol-merchant saw in his dream that the idol spoke to him: "O excellent man, I am your work now, I have received through the work of your hands a shape which is thought to be the shape of a god.[11] Now I am no longer called a stone as before: I am now called Hermes.[12] Now it is up to you to make me a memorial either of something imperishable or of something which has already perished."

(iii) This is my word to him who directs his attention to his own soul and cares for it. He is even superior to the idol insofar as nobody else can dispose of his self, for he is free and master of his will. Now what is worthier of him who is thus provided than to put his soul in the highest rank of honour? But there exists no greater honour to your soul than to imitate God [13] according to human capacity. This goal is reached by disregarding present pleasures and giving preference to the noble.

[7] 'Angels': Arabic version.

[8] 'Angel': Arabic version.

[9] 'Angel': Arabic version.

[10] 'Angels': Arabic version.

[11] 'Star': Arabic version and Al-Bīrūnī. Cf. below n. 15.

[12] 'Mercury, '*uṭārid*': Al-Bīrūnī (i.e. the name of the star, cf., e.g., Plato Arabus I, Ch. IVe).

[13] 'God': Also in the Arabic version. This way of expression was not objectionable to a Muslim mind. Cf., e.g., Al-Kindi's (d. after A.D. 870) reference to the Platonic ὁμοίωσις θεῷ as *tashabbuh bi-l-bāriʿ* 'assimilation to the Creator' (Rasā'il p. 274.14 Abū Rīda); Miskawaih, Tahdhīb (cf. below n. 27) p. 30.14.

Some words in the Arabic text are changes due either to the translator's monotheistic piety [14] or to his ignorance of pagan Greek religion of which he could have only a dim idea transmitted to him by a late Neoplatonic tradition in which the heathen gods were identified with stars.[15] They have been tacitly replaced by the obvious original expressions.

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The Platonic tenor of the exhortation is apparent and scarcely calls for any detailed comment. The survival of the rational part of the soul, as asserted in Plato's Timaeus and by the early Peripatetics, is commonly accepted, with the proviso of the *ekpyrosis* by the philosophers of the Porch also. But the use made of the fable related by Babrius and this fable in itself deserve some attention. It will be convenient to give the version of Babrius in full.

A sculptor had a marble Hermeias [16] for sale. Two men bargained for it, one to use it as a gravestone — a son of his had recently died — the other to dedicate the artefact as a god. It was late and the sculptor had not sold it yet, but he had agreed with them to show it again when they came next morning. The sculptor, having fallen asleep, saw Hermes in the gates of dream saying to him: "Well, you now hold my fate in the balance; you will make one thing of me, either a dead man or a god." [17]

[14] Notes 6–10. Cf. Plato Arabus I (London 1951) pp. 24 f. 48. Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, De instit. Christ. p. 70.29 Jaeger: *τὸν τῶν ἀγγέλων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ζήσεσθε βίον* and his Christianization of Platonism: *Χριστιανισμός ἐστι τῆς θείας φύσεως μίμησις* (Cf. Ernst H. Kantorowicz, Harvard Theological Review 45, 1952, p. 276 n. 70). Cf. also Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica N.S. 14, 1937, p. 128 f.; Chalcidius cap. 132–134 (p. 195ff. Wrobel). Proclus, Ad Plat. Tim. 90a (ed. Pfaff, Corpus Medicorum Graecorum Suppl. 3, 1941, p. 57 l. 15 and note i. Al-Fārābī, Siyāsa, p. 3.11. — F. Cumont, Lux Perpetua, Paris 1949, p. 231 and n. 3–8.

[15] The Christian Jacobite translator of the so-called "Theology of Aristotle" can translate the plotinian *θεοί* by 'stars,' 'planets,' 'masters,' 'masters of the stars,' cf. Plato Arabus I p. 48. For the identification of the pagan gods with stars cf. Al-Bīrūnī (below p. 254) and, e.g., E. Levi della Vida, La traduzione araba delle storie die Orosio, Miscellanea Galbiati III, Milano 1951, p. 188f. n. 4: "La religione dei Romani prima del Christianesimo consisteva nel culto degli astri. Così racconta Orosio (!)" (Cf. Ibn-al Qifṭī p. 10.1 ff. Lippert).

[16] *Ἑρμῆς* or *Ἑρμείας* can mean both the herm pillar and the god.

[17] *Γλύψας ἐπώλει λυγδινόν τις Ἑρμείην*
*τὸν δ' ἠγόραζον ἄνδρες, ὃς μὲν εἰς στήλην*
*(υἱὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ προσφάτως ἐτεθνήκει)*
*ὁ δὲ χειροτέχνης ὡς θεὸν καθιδρύσων.*
*ἦν δ' ὀψέ, χὠ λιθουργὸς οὐκ ἐπεπράκει*

Both versions refer to the manufacture of a herm, or a statue of Hermes, i.e. the idol in question is either a sculpture like the Hermes of Praxiteles or a bust of Hermes to be put on the top of a pillar. An entire figure of Hermes the God as a sepulchral statue is still possible in Roman times, and the connection of herm and grave is not uncommon, at least since the beginning of the Hellenistic period.[18] A 'Hermes' can indeed either stand for a dead person or represent the living god, and it is not without interest to realize that we have here conclusive evidence from literature for what is apparent from the interpretation of the monuments. Babrius mentions the recent death of a son of one of the prospective buyers and his tomb, to be adorned by the 'Hermes,' the youthful god as glorified representation of the dead youth (A. D. Nock) but he is silent about the destination of the figure of the god. Galen does not mention the tomb but says that the figure of the god, either a full-sized statue or a herm, is to be erected in a temple, inside the building. But this may be due to the translator who may have misunderstood the Greek *temenos* as 'temple,' whereas the precincts of a sanctuary were intended. If one wants to stress the possibility that a herm pillar was meant, we may think of a sculpture like the 5th century artist Alcamenes' famous bust of the Hermes of the Gateway which was to be found at the entrance of the sacred precincts of the Acropolis at Athens.[19]

There is no essential difference in the description of the dream

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*συνθέμενος αὐτοῖς εἰς τὸν ὄρθρον αὖ δεῖξαι*
*ἐλθοῦσιν. ὁ δὲ λιθουργὸς εἶδεν ὑπνώσας*
*αὐτὸν τὸν Ἑρμῆν ἐν πύλαις ὀνειρείαις,*
*«εἶεν» λέγοντα, «τἀμὰ νῦν ταλαντεύῃ*
*ἓν γάρ με, νεκρὸν ἢ θεόν, σὺ ποιήσεις.»*

l.4 *χειροτέχνης* has not yet been satisfactorily explained. If one believes a Greek author of the 2nd century A.D. to be capable of such a clumsy way of expressing himself — and the present writer can certainly not claim to be an expert in Babrius' style —, the second buyer would be an artisan who intends to dedicate a statue of the patron of the artisans, Hermes. But C. Lachmann's and O. Schneider's slight alteration of *χειροτέχνης* to *χειροτέχνημ'*, as E. Panofsky rightly insists, gives a good sense: "a work of human hands representing a god" and fits in very well with the general character of the fable.

[18] Cf. K. Friis Johansen, The Attic Grave Reliefs of the Classical Period (Copenhagen 1951), p. 71 ff. and p. 72 n. 1 and the literature quoted by him.

[19] Cf., e.g., Gisela M. Richter. The Sculpture and Sculptors of the Greeks, 3rd edition (New Haven 1950) p. 238 and fig. 628/9 or G. Lippold, Die griechische Plastik, Handbuch der Archaeologie, Fünfte Lieferung (München 1950), p. 186 and Tafel 67.3.

of the sculptor who 'sees' the god (in Babrius), or, better, the idol itself (in Galen) addressing him. The first part of the speech is only to be found in Galen. It recalls a popular *topos* as old as Epicharmus (fr. 131 Kaibel): ἐκ παντὸς ξύλου κλοιός τε κα γένοιτο κἠκ τωὐτοῦ θεός, («out of any piece of wood the yoke of a plough may be made and out of the same piece, a god»).[20] The original purpose of the fable was perhaps not at all to drive home some moral argument more forcibly but to state a witty paradox and to make the hearer enjoy it. Cf. Horace Serm., I, 8: "Olim truncus eram ficulnus, inutile lignum, cum faber, incertus scamnum faceretne Priapum, maluit esse deum . . ." Here we have also the reference to the decision of the artist, which is common to Galen and Babrius. But the difficulty in which the sculptor of the Hermes or the herm finds himself entangled is of a particular kind. He has to decide whether the figure which he has already finished shall be erected on a tomb or placed in a sacred precinct. It seems that no particular change is envisaged once the decision has been taken: one might assume that an inscription would have to be added but this assumption is by no means necessary. It does not seem that the features of the figure were to be altered in order to produce a kind of portrait of the deceased.[21] The figure must be the same whatever the ultimate purpose; if not, neither Babrius' poem nor Galen's moralizing reference to the fable can have had any meaning. At any rate, if a witty paradox was ultimately at the base of this fable — which is obviously open to doubt — it is no longer apparent in Babrius' version. He is slightly amused but rather puzzled by the fact that the same artefact can represent an immortal god and at the same time a deceased mortal man and that the artist has the power of decision. It was not difficult to use this story — we do not actually know in what form it reached Galen or his predecessor — for the purpose of philosophical exhortation, by substituting the gods or the divine and eternal first cause of philosophy for the individual god of popular religion, and the world of change, of coming-to-

[20] A strange variation of obviously the same motif Apuleius, Apol. 43: "non enim ex omni ligno, ut Pythagoras dicebat, debet Mercurius exculpi." Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras 34.245.

[21] Cf. K. Friis Johansen, op. cit., p. 70 and p. 148 n. 1. Cf. also L. Curtius, Interpretationen von sechs griechischen Bildwerken, Bern 1947, p. 11 f.

be and passing away, for the dead man of the fable. It is comparable to the Hellenistic and Stoic way of interpreting the great poets of the past in an allegorical way, to use poetry as an auxiliary to philosophy, which had taken the place of poetry in the minds of educated people. The hand of a philosopher, of the Porch or the Academy, is also to be noticed in a small but significant detail in the fable as reported by Galen. The idol of Hermes is to be a 'memorial' of the god: its function is to remind people of his existence. In no other way can image worship be maintained and defended in an enlightened age. The image has no longer any magical powers, but human nature is too weak to do without this symbolic representation of the divine if it is not to forget about it. It may be sufficient to refer to Plutarch's attitude [22] or to a well known passage in Maximus of Tyre's philosophical sermons.[23] The same reasoning applies to the figure on the tomb. It has, according to Galen, no other function than to remind the living of the man who died, and its original meaning is either forgotten or deliberately overlooked.

It will scarcely appear far-fetched to refer in this context to a different yet somehow similar way of expression. I mean the idea of comparing the self-education of the individual, based on the free choice between good and evil, to the sculptor's work. To speak of the shaping of one's personality is as old as Plato's Republic VI 500 d.[24] But the interest in artistic creation as such became more common in the Hellenistic period, and with it, a metaphor of this kind became more obvious for expressing the education and self-education of man.[25] Plotinus who not only

[22] De Is. et Osir. 67. 377 f.

[23] II 10, p. 29.9 Hobein: "If a Greek is stirred to the remembrance of God (*πρὸς τὴν μνήμην τοῦ θεοῦ*) by the art of Phidias, an Egyptian by paying worship to animals, another man by a river, another by fire — I have no anger for their divergences; only let them know, let them love, let them remember (*μνημονεύετωσαν*)." Cf. L. Friedlaender, Sittengeschichte Roms, vol. IV, p. 221. Julian Orat. IV (V Hertlein) p. 170 A f. For a completely different attitude (Iamblichus) cf. P. Kraus, Jābir ibn Hayyan II (Cairo 1942), p. 123 ff. and John Philoponus' refutation of Iamblichus, Photius Bibl. Cod. 215.

[24] *Ἆν οὖν τις αὐτῷ ἀνάγκη γένηται ἃ ἐκεῖ ὁρᾷ μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἦθη καὶ ἰδίᾳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ τιθέναι καὶ μὴ μόνον ἑαυτὸν πλάττειν, ἆρα κακὸν δημιουργὸν αὐτὸν οἴει γενήσεσθαι σωφροσύνης τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ συμπάσης τῆς δημοτικῆς ἀρετῆς;*

[25] Plut. *Ἐκ τῶν Περὶ ἡσυχίας* (vol. VII p. 119 Bern. = Stob. Flor. IV, cap. XVI 18): *ἡ δὲ ἠρεμία σοφίας οὖσα γυμνάσιον ἠθοποιὸς ἀγαθὴ καὶ πλάττει καὶ μετευθύνει τῶν ἀνδρῶν τὰς ψυχάς.* Gregory of Nyssa, De professione Christiana p. 133.5

revived the traditional terms but used them as if they had never existed before, also gave new life to this now possibly traditional metaphor. I quote one rightly famous passage (I, 6, 9):

> Withdraw into thyself, and see thyself. And if as yet thou see no beauty in thyself, then do as does the maker of an image which will at last be fair: as he strikes off a part and a part planes away, as he makes this smooth and releases that, until he has revealed upon the image its face of beauty; so do thou strip away all excess and make straight all crookedness; whatsoever is yet prisoned in darkness, labour to release it that it may be bright; and cease not from the fashioning of thine own image (*μὴ παύσῃ τεκταίνων τὸ σὸν ἄγαλμα*) until that day when the glory of virtue as of a god shall flame upon thee and thy eyes shall behold Serenity (*sophrosyne*) established on her stainless pedestal. (Translated by E. R. Dodds.[26])

But there is no stringent resemblance between the passage from Plotinus and the Hellenistic references on one side and the page of Galen preserved in the Arabic summary on the other. On the contrary, a consideration of their obvious differences makes the peculiar feature of the new text still clearer. Above all, the decision of the sculptor is not mentioned and could not be mentioned by Plotinus. It is bound up with the double significance of the figure of Hermes and its application to a fundamental moral action. There seems to be no parallel to the new text in Greek literature. Is it too rash to assume that this impressive page of Galen derives from the work of a profound mind like Posidonius, whose influence has been discovered in other sections of Galen's work? It is definitely beyond Galen's capacity of remoulding and interpreting Greek tradition — even if the actual wording may be his own.[27]

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Jaeger: *τὴν φύσιν ἑαυτῶν τῇ πίστει μορφώσαντες.* [Socrates] ap. Stob. Flor. III, cap. 1, no. 89: *τοῦ βίου καθάπερ ἀγάλματος πάντα τὰ μέρη καλὰ εἶναι δεῖ.* Diotogenes ap. Stob. IV p. 265.10 Hense=L. Delatte, Traités de la Royauté etc. p. 39.10: *ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς ἀρχὰν ἔχων ἀνυπεύθυνον καὶ αὐτὸς ὢν νόμος ἔμψυχος θεὸς ἐν ἀνθρώποις παρεσχημάτισται.*

[26] Cf. E. R. Dodds, Select Passages Illustrating Neo-Platonism, London S. P. C. K. 1923, p. 113.

[27] I think it is not out of the way to mention here one other interesting feature from Galen's work De moribus which seems not to be mentioned in other Greek works on moral philosophy. In the third book (p. 45 Kraus) Galen did not compare the interplay of the three Platonic 'souls' to a charioteer and two winged horses as Plato does in the Phaedrus (246 E ff.), but likened them to a hunter,

It has been mentioned before[28] that Al-Bīrūnī, the great Muslim interpreter of Indian religion, a contemporary of Avicenna (980–1037), quotes the text of the fable from Galen's work which he knew in an Arabic translation of the 9th Century. He did not refer to it because of its protreptic value and does not say a word about the context in which it appears. He rightly states that Galen's work was written during the reign of the Emperor Commodus[29] and, wrongly, assures his reader that the event related had taken place in his time. The quotation is to be found towards the end of the eleventh chapter of his India in

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a dog and an unspecified greedy animal who almost form a single whole, so closely are they knitted together. Sometimes the animal succeeds in forcibly carrying the hunter and dog with it. The hunter wants to ascend to a high and very beautiful spot, whereas the animal tries to use his help for the satisfaction of its own greed. The hunter soon realizes that only by resorting to a trick will he increase his own and his dog's strength and permanently keep down the animal. He waits until the animal falls asleep and then starts deceiving it by removing everything which might rouse its appetite. When it wakes up again, it finds only scanty food, just sufficient to relieve it of its hunger. Thus the animal which represents the vegetative or appetitive soul will be definitely weakened, and the hunter and dog, having time to increase their concerted strength, will keep it in its place. There appears to be no parallel to this 'parable' (*mithāl*) in extant Greek or Latin texts but the Arabic writer Miskawaih (died A.D. 1030) knows a better version of it, in which the 'animal' is the riding beast of the hunter (Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq. cap. 2, p. 18, 20 ff. of the Cairo edition of 1322/1904). He does not ascribe it to Galen, although he knows his De moribus very well (cf. Class. Quart. 1949, pp. 83 n. 2 and 93 f.), but to the ἀρχαῖοι (*qudamā*) in general. Miskawaih's immediate source may well have been Porphyry or some otherwise unknown author of a manual which depended on him. But the comparison itself must be older than Galen and have been invented by some representative Hellenistic philosopher. — In the first book (p. 21 f. and p. 27. 19 ff. Kraus) Galen likens the relation to be established between the rational and the spirited soul to the relation of a rider to his horse or of a hunter to his dog. There is again an Arabic parallel. Al-Kindi (died after A.D. 870) compares the spirited soul to a dog and ascribes the comparison to Plato (Rasā'il p. 274.15 ff. Abū Rīda: the rational soul is likened to a king, the appetitive soul to a pig. Cf. De moribus p. 34.2, 37.1 Kraus and also Al-Ghazaii, Das Elixier der Glückseligkeit, transl. by H. Ritter, Jena 1923, p. 31 f.); in another passage of the same psychological treatise he compares the spirited soul to a horse (op. cit. p. 273.11). Al-Kindi's ultimate source in this essay is almost certainly Porphyry (Cf. Un frammento nuovo di Aristotele, Studi Italiani di Filologia Classica N. S. 14, 1937, p. 125 ff. and Proclus, In Remp. II p. 96.10 Kroll). There are no traces of Galen's De moribus in Al-Kindī's work, and we are thus again thrown back to the same predecessor of Galen.

Galen, De placibis Hipp. et Pl. p. 455.6 Mueller (vol. V p. 475 K.), cf. K. Reinhardt, Poseidonios. col. 738 (Pauly-Wissowa).

A. F. Wensinck, La pensée de Ghazzātī (Paris 1940), p. 62 and n. 3.

[28] Cf. above n. 5. Cf. also A. Jeffery, Al-Bīrūnī's Contribution to Comparative Religion, Al-Biruni's Commemoration Volume, Calcutta 1951, pp. 126–160 passim.

[29] Cf. Class. Quart. 1949, p. 83 and n. 10.

which he discusses the worship of images as practiced by the Hindus and tries to give reasons for this strange attitude of people whom he respects. It is obvious that he, like every Muslim, rejects pictorial representation of the divine, with which he is familiar from Christian and Manichean usage.[30] But his explanation takes up the old Hellenistic idea, accepted also by the Christian Church,[31] that the images have no magic power but that their true function is to remind the non-philosophical pious man of the existence of the divine. He quotes Indra appearing to a king called Ambarīsha in human shape and saying: "If you are overpowered by human forgetfulness, make to yourself an image like that in which you see me; offer to it perfumes and flowers and make it a memorial of me, so that you may not forget me. If you are in sorrow, think of me; if you speak, speak in my name; if you act, act for me." [32] This is, according to Al-Bīrūnī, the origin of Hindu image worship. It was in this connection that he remembered the fable reported by Galen. It in-

[30] I like to refer, in this context, to some remarks by H. Ritter, to be found in Studies in Islamic Cultural History ed. G. E. van Grünebaum (The American Anthropologist 56 Memoir no. 76, 1954), p. 22: "Mr. R. drew attention to the almost complete lack of sculpture among the Arabs and their acustic rather than visual talent, which possibly is a common Semitic characteristic. The Arab resents the idea of representing God in human shape but not of his talking like a human being. As in the Old Testament, the faculty of hearing precedes that of seeing; it is always 'God is hearing and seeing (*samī'un wa-baṣīrun*).'

[31] Cf. St. John Damascene, Orationes tres adversus eos qui sacras imagines abiciunt, passim. Prof. Milton Anastos draws my attention to a passage from the Acts of the Second Oecumenical Council of Nicaea (A.D. 787) to be found in J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima collectio 13 (Florence 1767), 44 E–45A: *καὶ ὥσπερ παῖδες γνήσιοι πατρός τινὸς ἀποδημήσαντος πρὸς καιρὸν ἀπ' αὐτῶν, πολλῇ τῇ στοργῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς διακείμενοι, κἂν τὴν ῥάβδον αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ θεάσωνται κἂν τὴν χλαμύδα, ταῦτα μετὰ δακρύων καταφιλοῦντες ἀσπάζονται· καὶ οὐκ ἐκεῖνα τιμῶντες ἀλλὰ τὸν πατέρα ποθοῦντες καὶ τιμῶντες· οὕτως καὶ ἡμεῖς οἱ πιστοὶ ἅπαντες ὡς μὲν ῥάβδον Χριστοῦ τὸν σταυρὸν προσκυνοῦ(μεν).* There are many similar passages in the same context.

Well known is St. Bonaventure's defense of religious images. They are admissible "propter simplicium ruditatem propter affectuum tarditatem propter memoriae labilitatem" — In Lib. III Sent. dist. 9, art. 1, qu. 2, quoted by E. Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism, Latrobe 1951, p. 31 f.

Avicenna considers formal prayers and other acts of religious observance as reminders, as necessary to "keep people's thought fixed firmly upon the recollection of God . . . without these reminders they will be apt to forget all about it one or two generations after the prophets' death." — Najāt (Cairo edition 1938) p. 306.11 ff. 307.6 ff. English translation by A. J. Arberry, Avicenna On Theology, London 1951, p. 45 ff.

[32] Cf. Sachau's translation, vol. I, p. 115, and note 30.

terested him that the figure of Hermes was to be a memorial of the deceased man or a memorial of a god, and nothing else but a memorial, and for this reason alone he quoted Galen. He did not understand Greek religion as it was still alive in Galen's time. He was only aware of a late Neoplatonic-Gnostic type of star-worship with which the Arabs became familiar through the pagan survival of Greek polytheism in Harran, and some odd change in the Arabic version of Galen and in the slightly different text which Al-Bīrūnī quotes are due to this lack of knowledge.[33] The Greek philosophers whom Al-Bīrūnī mentions had, like the late Neoplatonists and Ps. Dionysius the Areopagite, e.g., a negative theology. This is what he says about them: "The ancient Greeks also considered the idols as mediators between themselves and the First Cause, and worshipped them under the name of stars and the highest substance. For they described the First Cause not with positive but only with negative predicates, since they considered it too high to be described by human qualities, and since they wanted to describe it as free from any imperfection, therefore they could not address it in worship." [34] It took humanity a long time until a more adequate understanding of Greek religion, in its originality and overwhelming beauty, became possible.

[33] Cf. above n. 15.
[34] Cf. Sachau's translation, vol. I, p. 123.

# THE DEVELOPMENT OF AUGUSTINE'S IDEAS ON SOCIETY BEFORE THE DONATIST CONTROVERSY

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In the Preface to the Retractationes, Augustine suggests: "Perhaps whoever will read my works in the order in which they were written will discover how I made progress while writing them." [1] The present essay is an attempt to carry out this suggestion of Augustine, with particular attention to his ideas on society, from the earliest Dialogues of 386 up to the time, shortly after 400 A.D., when the Donatist controversy introduces a new period in Augustine's thought.[2]

The material has been grouped into four sections: I. The early ideas as stated in the language of Greco-Roman philosophy. II. The early ideas as stated in biblical and ecclesiastical language. III. The development of Augustine's ideas from 393 through the Ad Simplicianum of 396. IV. The elaboration of the new position of the Ad Simplicianum in the writings from 396 through 400.

[1] retract., prol. §3.

[2] There appears to be no earlier treatment of this exact topic. Valuable material may be found in many works dealing with related subjects.

A. Works not limited to Augustine's early period. K. Adam, Die geistige Entwicklung des heiligen Augustinus (Augsburg, 1931); H. Arendt, Der Liebesbegriff bei Augustin (Berlin, 1929); F. Hofmann, Der Kirchenbegriff des hl. Augustinus in seinen Grundlagen und in seiner Entwicklung (München, 1933); K. Holl, "Augustins innere Entwicklung" in his Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Kirchengeschichte (Tübingen, 1928) Vol. III, 54–116; A. Pegis, "The Mind of St. Augustine" Mediaeval Studies VI (1944) 1–61; J. Ritter, Mundus Intelligibilis (Philosophische Abhandlungen VI) Frankfurt, 1937; O. Scheel, Die Anschauungen Augustins über Christi Person und Werk (Tübingen, 1901); W. Theiler, Porphyrios und Augustin (Schriften der Königsberger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, geisteswiss. Kl., XI, 1(1933)).

B. Works dealing with the period 386–400 A.D. P. Alfaric, L'evolution intellectuelle de saint Augustin (Paris, 1918); H. Becker, Augustin. Studien zu seiner geistigen Entwicklung (Leipzig, 1908); P. Courcelle, Recherches sur les Confessions de saint Augustin (Paris, 1950) with full bibliography; A. Guzzo, Agostino dal 'Contra Academicos' al 'De vera religione' (Firenze, 1925); G. Hultgren, Le commandement d'amour chez Augustin. Interprétation philosophique et théologique d'après les écrits de la période, 386–400 (Paris, 1939); K. Janssen, Die

Sections I and II overlap chronologically, but they have been separated since exposition is easier when texts using the same terminology are grouped together, e.g. those which speak of the intelligible world as against those which speak of the heavenly Jerusalem. It is however always assumed that Augustine's thought for any given period should be studied as a coherent unity. His statements in the language of Plato must therefore ultimately receive their meaning in the context of his contemporary statements in the language of the Bible and vice versa.

The main works to be considered, with their probable dates,[3] are:

1. Contra Academicos (c. Acad.). 386. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (=CSEL) LXIII,3–81.

2. De beata vita (b. vit.). 386. CSEL LXIII,89–116.

3. De ordine (ord.). 386. CSEL LXIII,121–185.

4. Soliloquia (sol.). 386. J.-P. Migne, Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina (=PL) XXXII,869–904.

5. De moribus ecclesiae catholicae et de moribus Manichaeorum (mor. eccl. cath.). 387–88, probably revised later. PL XXXII,1309–78.

6. De animae quantitate (anim. quant.). 388. PL XXXII,1035–80.

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Entstehung der Gnadenlehre Augustins (Rostock, 1936); H. Lother, "Augustins Entwicklung als Christ" Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift XXXVII(1926)429–42; 449–74; A. Pincherle, La formazione teologica di Sant'Agostino (Roma, 1947); W. Thimme, "Augustins geistige Entwicklung in den ersten Jahren nach seiner Bekehrung," Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Kirche III(1908).

The present article is not concerned with the problem of Augustine's specific sources. A good brief account, with bibliography, of his relation to the Greco-Roman tradition may be found in B. Capelle, "Augustinus" Reallexikon für Antike und Christentum, Fasc. VII(1944)981–93. Two significant later articles should be added: P. Courcelle, "Plotin et saint Ambroise" Revue de Philologie LXXXVI (1950)29–56; R. Lorenz, "Die Herkunft des augustinischen FRUI DEO," Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte LXIV(1952–53) 34–60.

For works dealing with Augustine's theory of the two cities, see note 193, below.

[3] The dates given are those of G. Bardy in his edition of the retractationes in the Oeuvres de Saint Augustin (Bibliothèque Augustinienne) Vol. XII (Paris, 1950). There is in some cases dispute about the absolute dating, but the relative order is well-established. For a fuller discussion of the chronology of Augustine's writings, see S. M. Zarb, "Chronologia Operum S. Augustini," Angelicum X(1933)359–96; 478–512; XI(1934)78–91. For a bibliography of textual studies, see Clavis Patrum Latinorum (Sacris Erudiri III,1951)50–74.

7. De libero arbitrio (lib. arb.). 388–c.395.[4] PL XXXII,1221–1310.

8. De Genesi contra Manichaeos (Gen. c. Man.). 389. PL XXXIV, 173–220.

9. De musica (mus.). 387–9, Book VI revised later. PL XXXII, 1081–1194.

10. De magistro (mag.). 389. PL XXXII,1193–1220.

11. De vera religione (ver. relig.). 389–90. PL XXXIV, 121–172.

12. De sermone Domini in monte (serm. in mon.). 393–94. PL XXXIV,1229–1308.

13. Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola Apostoli ad Romanos (exp. prop. Roman.). 394. PL XXXV,2063–88.

14. Expositio Epistolae ad Galatas (exp. Galat.). 394. PL XXXV, 2105–2148.

15. De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII (div. quaest. 83). c. 389–c. 395. PL XL,11–100.

16. Ad Simplicianum (Simplic.). 396. PL XL,101–148.

17. De doctrina Christiana (doctr. Christ.). I–III,25,§35. 396–97. PL XXXIV,15–122.

18. Confessiones (conf.). 396–97. ed. Skutella (Leipzig, 1934).

19. Contra Faustum Manichaeum (c. Faust.). c. 400. CSEL XXV,1 pp. 251–797.

20. De catechizandis rudibus (catech. rud.) c. 400. PL XL,309–348.

21. De consensu evangelistarum (cons. evang.). c. 400. CSEL XLIII.

22. Retractationes (retract.). 426–27. CSEL XXXVI.

Some additional material for the period 386–400 A.D. is found in the following collections:

1. Sermones (serm.). PL XXXVIII–XXXIX; ed. G. Morin, Miscellanea Agostiniana (Rome 1930–31), Vol. I. For the dating, see A. Kunzelmann, "Die Chronologie der Sermones des hl. Augustinus" ibid., Vol. II,417–520.

2. Epistulae (epist.). CSEL XXXIV; XLIV; LVII. For the dating see CSEL LVIII,12–63.

3. Enarrationes in Psalmos (en. in psalm.). PL XXXVI–XXXVII.

[4] For the dating of the various parts of the lib. arb., see W. Thimme, op. cit. (note 2 B.) p.6–10.

For the dating, see H. Rondet, Recherches de Science religieuse XXXVII (1950)628–33, with the references to the articles of S. Zarb.

## I. The Early Ideas as Stated in the Language of Greco-Roman Philosophy.

The main theme of Augustine's first Dialogues is the quest for wisdom. As a Christian, he is sure that he will never depart from the authority of Christ; as a Platonist he is confident that reason will find in Platonism what agrees with Christianity.[5] But while Augustine thus recognizes two ways to wisdom, through authority and through reason, it is the method of reason which dominates the early writings.[6] In working out the method of reason Augustine centers his attention on the individual Christian thinker, and society plays only a subordinate role. There are nevertheless several points at which Augustine works out ideas on society which are significant for his later development.

In a number of passages, Augustine uses the metaphor of the fatherland (patria) to describe the blessed life; this is the earliest form of his continuing conviction that man's destination is, in one form or another, a heavenly society. He first mentions the fatherland in the Contra Academicos, and his argument illustrates the typical synthesis of Christianity and Platonism. The one discipline of most true philosophy, maintains Augustine, has finally appeared. "For it is not the philosophy of this world, which our sacred rites most properly detest, but of that other intelligible world. And yet the most subtle reason would never have called souls back to the intelligible world, souls blinded by the manifold darkness of error and made forgetful by the deepest stains of the body, unless the highest God, with a kind of clemency for the many (populari quadam clementia) had lowered the authority of the divine intellect as far as the human body itself. Thus souls which had been aroused, not only by its precepts but also by its acts, might even without argument and disputation return to

[5] c. Acad. III,20,§43; compare c. Acad. II,2,§5, and ver. relig. 5,§8. Sic enim creditur et docetur, quod est humanae salutis caput, non aliam esse philosophiam, id est sapientiae studium, et aliam religionem. . . .

[6] c. Acad. III,20,§43 ita enim iam sum affectus, ut quid sit uerum non credendo solum sed etiam intelligendo apprehendere impatienter desiderem. Compare c. Acad. II,2,§4 f.; lib. arb. I,2,§4 f., II,2,§5 f.

themselves and regain (resipiscere) the fatherland." [7] In several other passages Augustine explains that the fatherland, or proper region of the soul, is God.[8]

In the De beata vita Augustine develops the metaphor of the fatherland at greater length and combines it with the important concept of pilgrimage. All souls begin their lives as pilgrims; they are far from the fatherland and tossed about on the stormy sea of the world. The fortunate ones are able to steer themselves to the harbour of philosophy, or they are blown to it by the winds of fortune. From here, if they can avoid the dangerous mountain of vainglory, they may reach the quiet and tranquillity of the fatherland.[9]

While the heavenly society of the fatherland receives only brief treatment in the early works, Augustine has a good deal to say about human society in this world. Admittedly, human society is not of great value in itself, and the wise man should beware of too great attachment to it. Nevertheless a proper attitude toward society is a stage on the way to wisdom, and even the philosopher must know how to live with his fellow-men.

In his theoretical analysis of human society, Augustine makes

[7] c. Acad. III,19,§42. For the return to heaven, compare II,1,§2 ergo non erumpet aliquando ista uirtus et . . . rursus proiecto totius corporis onere recurret in caelum. II,8,§22 de uita nostra de moribus de animo res agitur, qui se superaturum inimicitias omnium fallaciarum et ueritate comprehensa quasi in regionem suae originis rediens triumphaturum de libidinibus atque ita temperantia uelut coniuge accepta regnaturum esse praesumit securior rediturus in caelum. In the retract. I,1,§3 Augustine observes that he should have said *iturus in caelum* and not *rediturus*.

[8] anim. quant I,§2 utrumnam quasi regionem ejus (sc. animae) et patriam, unde huc venerit, nosse desideras . . . Propriam quamdam habitationem animae ac patriam, Deum ipsum credo esse a quo creata est. Compare mag. 8,§21 . . . vires et mentis aciem, quibus regionis illius, ubi beata vita est, calorem ac lucem non modo sustinere, verum etiam amare possimus. In lib. arb. III,9,§27–28 Augustine speaks of the *habitatio caelestis* of the soul; in sol. I,1,§4 he prays to God as . . . domus mea, patria mea, salus mea.

[9] b. vit. I,§1–2. The *portus philosophiae* appears also in c. Acad. II,1,§1; for the *portus sapientiae*, see c. Acad. I,1,§1 and III,2,§3. For the notion of pilgrimage, compare anim. quant. 31,§63, where Augustine urges the soul not to plunge too deeply into the senses, donec corrigas firmesque vestigia, quae usque ad ipsum deum animum ducunt: ne ab illo secretissimo et tranquillissimo mentis habitaculo, a quo nunc, dum haec incolit, peregrina est . . . avertaris; epist. II (386–87 A.D.) . . . ut se totus animus, etiam dum hoc corpus agit, in ea quae semper eiusdem modi sunt neque peregrino pulchro placent, feratur atque aestuat. In b. vit. 1,§2 (possibly in sol. I,1,§1) Augustine speaks of the *cives* of the fatherland.

use of two somewhat different approaches. In the first he studies society under the aspect of image, and he argues that human society as part of the sensible world should be a copy or image of the intelligible world which is its exemplar. In the second he studies society under the aspect of order, and he argues that human society, as part of God's universal order, should itself be ordered through the supremacy of things intelligible and the subordination of things sensible. Roughly speaking, the image argument is more important in the earliest period, and the order argument later gradually displaces it; however, no rigorous separation of the two is possible.

In the Dialogues of 386 Augustine on several occasions discusses human society as the image of a higher, intelligible reality. In the Contra Academicos, for example, he summarizes Plato's doctrine of the two worlds. The intelligible world is true; the sensible world is only an image of the true world and only like-the-true (veri similem). "Whatever is done in this world through the so-called civil virtues (which virtues are only like-the-true virtues, while the true virtues are unknown to all but the few who are wise) cannot be called anything more than like-the-true." [10] Somewhat later Augustine says of moral judgments, "He rightly tests the image who contemplates the exemplar." [11]

In other Dialogues Augustine describes law in terms comparable to those used of the civil virtues. He prays to God "from whose kingdom law is copied down (describitur) even into these kingdoms," and he goes on to explain that God's kingdom is "the whole world which sense does not know." [12] He maintains that the law

[10] c. Acad. III,17,§37. The *civiles virtutes* are not mentioned again in the early works. For an interesting later usage see epist. CXXXVIII,3,§17.

[11] c. Acad. III,18,§40. Compare lib. arb. III,9,§28 Ideo quanquam orbis iste terrenus rebus corruptibilibus deputatus sit, tamen servans quantum potest imagines superiorum, exempla nobis et indicia quaedam demonstrare non cessat; div. quaest. 83, §53,2.

[12] sol. I,1,§3. For Augustine's later revision of these statements, see retract. I,4,§2. Compare also ord. I,11,§32 esse autem alium mundum ab istis oculis remotissimum, quem paucorum sanorum intellectus intuetur, satis ipse Christus significat, qui non dicit, "Regnum meum non est de mundo," sed: "Regnum meum non est de hoc mundo." Here too Augustine later revises his statement, retract. I,3,§8.

of God "which always remains fixed and unshaken in Him (apud eum) is as it were transcribed into wise souls." [13]

The order argument receives its fullest statement, as the title would suggest, in the De ordine.[14] There is a universal order, and everything which God made is moved in accord with it. In this all-inclusive order even evils are seen to be necessary. Human society is of course part of the order, and as evils are necessary in the universe, so executioners and prostitutes are necessary and proper in a well-ordered city.[15]

The universal order is not only all-embracing; it is also everywhere accessible to the mind of man. Augustine and his friends are led to meditate on a cock-fight which had distracted them from their studies. "Where is there not law? Where is not the power of command owed to the better? Where is there not the shadow of constancy? Where not the imitation of that most true beauty? Where is there not mode?" [16]

Under these conditions the duty of man, and of the wise man in particular, is to comprehend the order in all things and to rise to the contemplation of its highest mode. Here is the vantage point of wisdom, and from here, even while involved in human affairs, the wise man can so look down upon them and so understand them that their apparent irregularity leaves him unmoved.[17]

Against this background of an individualist and intellectualist transcending of society and the world, Augustine includes in the De ordine a brief and traditional summary of social ethics. The wise man should, for example, regard as his own family all those over whom he has power. He should so serve that men shame to rule him and so rule that men delight to serve him. In all human contacts, let him hold to the familiar proverb: Don't do to others what you don't wish done to you. He ought not to administer the

[13] ord. II,8,§25.

[14] For some useful comments on the organization of the De ordine, see A. Dyroff, "Über Form und Begriffsgehalt der augustinischen Schrift De Ordine" in: Aurelius Augustinus, Festschrift der Görresgesellschaft zum 1500 Todestag des hl. Augustinus (Köln, 1930)15–62. For the concept of *ordo* here, see Hultgren, op. cit. (note 2 B.) p.25 f.

[15] ord. I,7,§18; II,4,§12.

[16] ord. I,8,§26.

[17] ord. II,5,§14.

republic until he is perfect, and he should hasten to become perfect.[18]

Thus as early as the Cassiciacum Dialogues of 386, Augustine introduces a few significant ideas on society. However, he does little to develop them, and his main interests evidently lie elsewhere. Wisdom is found in the contemplation of the exemplar, not in the study of the image. The wise man delights in the comprehension of the universal order; he is not primarily concerned with its parts.

Augustine's position does not change radically during the years immediately following. Nevertheless the problems of ethics and of society become more important, and the early ideas on society are worked out in greater detail. Three arguments from the period 387–90 may be singled out for special analysis: the discussion of law in Book I of the De libero arbitrio, and the sections on society in the De musica and in the De vera religione.

Augustine's aim in Book I of the De libero arbitrio is to discover the nature of sin and wrong-doing. His conclusion is that sin is a violation of God's order in which things eternal should be superior and things temporal subordinate. "All sins are contained in this one category, that someone turns away from the things which are divine and truly permanent and turns toward the things which are mutable and uncertain. For while these things are rightly ordered in their own place and exhibit a certain beauty of their own, it is the action of a perverse and disordered soul to follow, and thus be subject to, the things which, by divine order and right (ius), it should command and lead at will." [19]

In the course of the argument Augustine introduces an important discussion of law. The eternal law, which is God's highest reason, reigns over all things, and by this law it is just that all things should be most ordered. The eternal law is impressed on

[18] ord. II,8,§25. There is a somewhat cryptic reference to Pythagorean politics at the very end of the De ordine. II,20,§54 . . . mirari et paene cotidianis, ut scis, ecferre laudibus soleo, quod regendae rei publicae disciplinam suis auditoribus ultimam tradebat iam doctis iam perfectis iam sapientibus iam beatis.

[19] lib. arb. I,16,§35. Compare §34 utrum sit aliud male facere, quam neglectis rebus aeternis, quibus per seipsam mens fruitur, et per seipsam percipit, et quas amans amittere non potest, temporalia et quae per corpus hominis partem vilissimam sentiuntur, et numquam esse certa possunt, quasi magna et miranda sectari. Nam hoc uno genere omnia malefacta, id est peccata, mihi videntur includi.

man's mind, and it commands that he should turn his love from things temporal to things eternal and that within man reason (or mind or spirit) should be supreme over the body and over the irrational parts of the soul.[20]

In addition there is a temporal law which is derived from the eternal law and dependent on it.[21] In human society the temporal law aims at peace, and it represses, as far as possible, the crimes which threaten peace. "What do you think the temporal law orders, unless that the things which may temporarily be called ours . . . should be possessed in accord with that right (eo jure) by which human peace and society are preserved, as much as they can be preserved in such things?" [22] Augustine lists, as subject to the temporal law, the body and its goods, liberty from human domination, the family, the city, and lastly wealth. These things, and only these, are controlled by the temporal law "by which earthly peoples and cities are governed." [23]

As there are two classes (genera) of things, temporal and eternal, and two corresponding laws, so there are two classes of men. The first love temporal things, and the temporal law is imposed on them; the second love things eternal, and they act of themselves under the eternal law.[24] By the definition of the De libero arbitrio, the first are the sinners, the second the just.

[20] lib. arb. I,6,§15. For a useful description of Augustine's texts on the eternal law, see A. Schubert, Augustins Lex-aeterna-Lehre (Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters XXIV,2 (1924)). Augustine does not at this time appear to have any separate concept of a *lex naturalis*; compare div. quaest. 83, §53,2.

[21] E.g., lib. arb. I,6,§15. Simul etiam te videre arbitror in illa temporali (sc. lege) nihil esse justum atque legitimum, quod non ex hac aeterna sibi homines derivarint; I,15,§31; ver.relig.31,§58.

[22] lib. arb. I,15,§32. Compare I,5,§13. Ea enim vindicanda sibi haec lex populi assumit, quae satis sint conciliandae paci hominibus imperitis, et quanta possunt per hominem regi.

[23] lib. arb. I,15,§32. It is not clear what Augustine thinks of the implied contrast with *celestial* peoples and cities. In lib. arb. III,20,§57 he mentions *civitatis beatissimae gloriam*, but this is in a later section of the De libero arbitrio, dated by Thimme in Augustine's priesthood, op. cit. (note 2 B.) p.9.

[24] lib. arb. I,16,§34 et rerum duo genera, aeternarum et temporalium, duoque rursus hominum, aliorum aeternas, aliorum temporales sequentium et diligentium, satis aperteque distincta sunt. Compare I,15,§31. Cum igitur manifestum sit alios esse homines amatores rerum aeternarum, alios temporalium . . . nam beatos illos ob amorem ipsorum aeternorum sub aeterna lege agere existimo, miseris vero temporalis imponitur. In the last part of the argument Augustine seems to be thinking not so much of the law of human society as of the law of God's provi-

This is the first appearance of a motif which will become steadily more important in Augustine's thinking, that human society is in some way divided into two classes or two groups or two cities. It is therefore particularly important to notice the form of the division as we find it in the De libero arbitrio. In the first place, while the two classes are the sinners and the just, the argument of the De libero arbitrio is that it rests with the free choice of the individual to which group he shall belong. There is a right order; man chooses or he does not choose to accept it freely; as a result of the one choice or the other, there are constituted two classes of men.[25] In the second place, at this period Augustine feels that the whole universe, both in its obvious order and in its apparent disorder, calls upon man to make the right choice and proves its rightness. His mood can be illustrated from Book II of the De libero arbitrio where he writes that wisdom shows herself joyously in the way and meets you in all providence. "Wherever you may turn yourself, she speaks to you through the traces she has impressed on her works, and when you fall into outer things, by the very forms of the outer things, she calls you back within." [26]

The second work to be noticed here, the De musica, is one of a projected series of books on the liberal arts. The aim of the series is to demonstrate how man's reason can move "as it were by sure steps from things corporeal to things incorporeal." [27] The

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dence which is imposed on those who will not accept it freely. See, e.g., mus. VI,10,§30, where the sinner, Turpis enim factus est voluntate, universum amittendo quod Dei praeceptis obtemperans possidebat, et ordinatus in parte est, ut qui legem agere noluit, a lege agatur. Compare also en. in psalm. I,§2; div. quaest. 83,§27; mus. VI,14,§48.

[25] Compare lib. arb. I,16,§34. quid autem quisque sectandum et amplectandum eligat, in voluntate esse positum consistit, nullaque re de arce dominandi rectoque ordine mentem deponi nisi voluntate.

[26] lib. arb. II,16,§41. The reference to wisdom is a reminiscence of Wisdom VI,17; for other similar reminiscences, see lib. arb. III,16,§42 and 17,§45. For the general approach, compare ord. I,8,§25 quid enim non ambiunt, qua non peragrant oculi amantum, ne quid undeunde innuat pulchritudo rationis cuncta scientia et nescientia modificantis et gubernantis, quae inhiantes sibi sectatores suos trahit quacumque atque ubique se quaeri iubet?

[27] retract. I,5,§6 (=ed. Maur. I,6) Augustine here speaks of moving *quibusdam quasi passibus certis*. His more usual expression is that found e.g. in mus. VI,1,§1 ut . . . non praepropere, sed *quibusdam gradibus* a sensibus carnis . . . avellerentur.

special aim of the De musica (in particular of Book VI) is to do this through the "numbers" of rhythm and to show "how from corporeal and spiritual, but mutable, numbers one reaches the immutable numbers which exist in immutable truth itself, and so the invisible things of God are clearly seen as they are understood through the things which are made (Romans I, 20)." [28]

The sight of the invisible things of God involves the comprehension of His universal order, and De musica VI is in large part a discussion of this order. Here for the first time Augustine makes extensive use of the simple schematic description which will be basic in his later writings: order is the proper hierarchy of God, souls, and bodies. "For the soul should be ruled by what is above it; the soul should rule what is below it. Above it is only God; below it is only body. . . ." [29] In this context Augustine offers a systematic analysis of the way in which sin produces disorder in society and of the way in which virtue preserves and restores order.

Sin in the De musica, as in the earlier works, is primarily man's choice of what is temporal as against what is eternal. More specifically, sin results from the soul's preoccupation with actions which involve the body. In this way the soul falls into pride, through which vice the soul would rather imitate God than serve Him.[30] Or it may be guilty of apostasy as it pursues some private work to the neglect of universal law.[31]

Within human society sin perverts the order of rule and subjection. By God's universal law, the rational soul receives command only over the souls of beasts. Through pride it wrongly desires to rule and dominate other rational souls, who should

[28] retract. I,10,§1 (ed. Maur. I,11,§1).

[29] mus. VI,5,§13. Compare anim. quant. 36,§80. Deus igitur summus et verus lege inviolabili et incorrupta, qua omne quod condidit regit, subjicit animae corpus, animam sibi, et sic omnia sibi . . . ; serm. CCXIV,2 (391 A.D.) Haec omnia fecit omnipotens, mediis ima et summa conjungens.

[30] mus. VI,13,§40 Generalis vero amor actionis quae avertit a vero, a superbia proficiscitur, quo vitio Deum imitari quam Deo serviri anima maluit.

[31] mus. VI,14,§48; VI,16,§53. Compare lib. arb. I,6,§14 Porro si paulatim depravatus idem populus rem privatam rei publicae praefert . . . II,16,§41 ut non jam privato suo gaudeat quod implicavit rebus transeuntibus sed exuta omnibus temporum et locorum affectionibus apprehendat id quod unum atque idem semper est; ver. relig. 46,§88. The contrast is developed at length in the probably later div. quaest. 83, §79,1.

rightly be its fellows and consorts under the same law. But sinful souls who refuse obedience to God and who try to impose obedience on their fellows are properly punished when they themselves have difficulty in commanding their own passions and their own bodies.[32]

In contrast, virtue, the proper order of the soul, is prerequisite to the proper order of society. Justice, for example, is the order "by which the soul serves none but God, by which it wishes to be equal to none but the purest souls and to dominate none but bestial and corporeal natures." [33] Or, in terms of love: "The soul holds its order when with its whole self it loves what is above it, that is God, and when it loves its fellow-souls as itself." [34]

In society, the ordered soul will act upon human bodies for the sake of their welfare (salus), not for its own pleasure. It will act upon other souls for their utility, not for its own proud excellence.[35] Thus man enters into proper relationship with his neighbor, the neighbor whom he should love as himself because of the natural bond of a common law (juris).[36] And if Augustine in the De musica by no means regards life in society as an end in itself, nevertheless this ordered love of neighbor is a most certain step on the way to the goal "that we may cling to God, that we may not merely be held by His ordering (ordinatione) but also ourselves hold our own order in certainty and steadfastness." [37]

In the second part of the De vera religione,[38] the part based

[32] mus. VI,13,§41.

[33] mus. VI,15,§50.

[34] mus. VI,14,§46. Compare §43.

[35] mus. VI,14,§45. Augustine makes the statement in terms of the technical distinction between the four "numbers" of rhythm, but he actually organizes his ideas around a triple classification of the lusts (see note 42 below). . . . homo . . . qui omnes illos numeros qui sunt de corpore, et adversus passiones corporis, et qui ex his memoria continentur, non ad carnalem voluptatem sed ad salutem tantum corporis refert: omnesque illos qui de adjunctis animis operantur, vel qui ad adjungendas exseruntur (see mus. VI,13,§41–42 for the distinction) non ad superbam excellentiam suam, sed ad ipsarum animarum utilitatem redigit. . . .

[36] mus. VI,14,§45. For the notion of a common bond, see ord. II,12,§35; epist. XXXIII,1.

[37] mus. VI,14,§46. Compare mor. eccl. cath. I,26,§48 . . . ut nullus certior gradus ad amorem Dei fieri posse credatur, quam hominis erga hominem charitas; De utilitate credendi 10,§24 CSEL XXV,1 p. 30; Contra Adimantum §6 CSEL XXV,1 p. 126.

[38] On the De vera religione, see H. Dörries, "Das Verhältnis des Neuplatonischen

on the method of reason, Augustine reasserts the main position of the De musica and develops some points more fully. The general aim is the same: "Let us see how far reason can make progress from things visible to things invisible, ascend from what is temporal to what is eternal." [39] And Augustine concludes the long argument with the vision of that form (speciem) "in comparison with which are ugly even those things which by its bounty are fair. 'For the invisible things of God are clearly seen as they are understood from the creation through the things that are made, both His sempiternal power and His divinity.' (Romans I, 20). This is the return from things temporal to things eternal, and the reformation from the life of the old man into the new man." [40]

From the standpoint of this comprehensive intellectual optimism, Augustine develops at some length the thesis that man is called back to the blessed life even through his vices. "What remains then, whence the soul cannot recall that first beauty which it deserted, when it can do so even through its own vices?" [41] Augustine groups the vices, as often in his later writings, under the three main heads of lust (libido), pride, and curiosity (curiositas).[42]

The discussion of pride is essentially an analysis of government and society: how pride corrupts them and how even pride points to the source of their reformation. Man in his desire for nobility and excellence wishes to be the One to whom all things are subject, and this is a perverse imitation of God. But if he would rightly imitate God as God's subject, then all other things

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und Christlichen in Augustins 'De vera religione'" Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft XXIII(1924)64–102 and W. Theiler, op. cit. (note 2 A.) p.7 f.

[39] ver. relig. 29,§52. In a part of the section closer to the terminology of the De musica, Augustine declares: In quorum consideratione non vana et peritura curiositas exercenda est, sed gradus ad immortalia et semper manentia faciendus.

[40] ver. relig. 52,§101. Compare ord. II,19,§51. . . . promitti nobis aspectum pulchritudinis, cuius imitatione pulchra, cuius conparatione foeda sunt cetera.

[41] ver. relig. 39,§72.

[42] ver. relig. 38,§69 Serviunt enim cupiditati triplici, vel voluptatis, vel excellentiae, vel spectaculi. §70 . . . vel libidine, vel superbia, vel curiositate damnati. In §70 Augustine uses I John II,16 as biblical authority and in §71 he links the classification to the triple temptation of Christ. For a philosophic derivation of it, see lib. arb. II,19,§53 with parallels in mus. VI,14,§45. On occasion, Augustine links the lusts with certain of the animals of the creation story, e.g. Gen. c. Man. I,23,§40; en. in Psalm. VIII,13. See W. Theiler, op. cit. (note 2 A.), p. 36 f.

would be subject to man.[43] Man wishes to be unconquered, and properly, for this belongs to the soul after God in whose image the soul was made. But he who refuses to obey God will be conquered not only by other men but even by his own vices.[44] If he would be truly unconquered, let him love only that which cannot be taken away from him; he does this when he loves God with all his soul and his neighbor as himself. In a somewhat extreme argument, Augustine maintains that the proper love of neighbor is a love of human nature without fleshly limitation (sine carnali conditione) and that such human nature cannot be taken away from its lover.[45]

Thus the wise man is properly related to all his fellows. He uses a friend for the repaying of favors, an enemy for the exercise of patience, whomever he can as a recipient of good deeds, and all as objects of good will. And while he does not love temporal things, he uses them rightly and gives temporal help to those with whom he is associated.[46] Augustine concludes the section with a restatement of his thesis. "Consequently, if pride itself is a shadow of true liberty and of the true kingdom, then divine providence reminds us even through our pride what we betoken (significemus) when we are vicious and whither we ought to return when we are corrected." [47]

We have now noticed the main early ideas of Augustine on society, insofar as they appear in the language of Greco-Roman philosophy. These ideas on society receive only limited emphasis in the early writings, and Augustine's orientation remains individualist and intellectualist.

At the center of his thought, Augustine places the concept of a universe which is ordered through the hierarchies of sensible and intelligible, of bodies, souls, and God. Man comprehends the universe only as he sees it in its eternal and intelligible aspects, but the universe leads him to this comprehension through

[43] ver. relig. 45,§84.

[44] ver. relig. 45,§85; compare 52,§101.

[45] ver. relig. 46,§86 f. §89 ipsa igitur natura humana sine carnali conditione diligenda est, sive sit perficienda sive perfecta. For a penetrating analysis of Augustine's thought in this area, see H. Arendt, op. cit. (note 2 A.).

[46] ver. relig. 47,§91. Et quamquam temporalia non diligit, ipse recte utitur temporalibus, et pro eorum sorte hominibus consulit.

[47] ver. relig. 48,§93.

all its temporal and sensible aspects. Freely to accept the order of the universe is justice; to reject it is sin. But not even sin can escape the order, and even sin leads man back to the order.

Human society, as part of the universe, must be ordered in terms of the same hierarchies of sensible and intelligible, of bodies, souls, and God. As sin cannot destroy or make incomprehensible the universal order, so the sins of society such as pride are reintegrated into the universe by their punishment and they image the proper order even in their sin.

As human society is sensible and temporal, the wise man must detach himself from it even while he aids in its ordering. From the standpoint of the universal order, society must always appear on the subordinate level of means and needs. The wise man shows detachment even in his love of neighbor, for he loves not the particular individual but that part of man which should be capable of the same detachment from what is temporal and sensible.

All in all, this remains a Greco-Roman universe and a Greco-Roman solution. Man has within himself and in his power all that is necessary for the right decisions and the right choices. He rises by reason through ordered stages to his goal. And his goal is integration at the level of comprehension with a universe which is in all its essential aspects comprehensible.

## II. The Early Ideas as Stated in Biblical and Ecclesiastical Language.

In the writings so far noticed, Augustine makes primary use of the language of Greco-Roman philosophy. In other contemporary works he makes primary use of the language of the Bible and of the church. The change in language need not in itself involve changes in Augustine's ideas. As we have seen in the Contra Academicos, he was sure that what he found in Platonism would not be out of harmony with the Christian mysteries.[48]

Nevertheless the form of the biblical and ecclesiastical statement is very different. Accordingly our first task is to study certain new concepts and to relate them to the ideas already discussed.

[48] See p. 258 above.

How does Augustine in his earliest period understand such central Christian concepts as sin, Christ, and the ecclesia? His general method is to explain them as different ways of stating the same world-view which we have already seen expressed in the language of Greco-Roman philosophy. Sin, as noted above, is the free turning away from things which are divine and truly permanent and the turning toward things which are mutable and uncertain.[49] Christ appears primarily as teacher and example; both by his precepts and his acts, he calls men back from sin and demonstrates to them the way to the intelligible world.[50] The ecclesia, in turn, is essentially a place of instruction where men are taught the way to blessedness, whether on the higher level of reason or on the popular level of authority.[51] In Augustine's Platonism, the basic ethical distinction is between things sensible and things intelligible; he now uses this to explain the biblical distinction between the flesh and the spirit.[52]

Augustine admits that there are some Christian dogmas, such as original sin and the resurrection of the flesh, which he accepts willingly but without full understanding.[53] Perhaps in such cases there are potential contradictions between his Platonism and his Christianity. But in terms of Augustine's own awareness, insofar as this is accessible to us in his writings, there appear to be no serious tensions within his general unity of true religion and true philosophy.

[49] See p. 262 above. Compare Gen. c. Man. I,3,§6 Illud autem lumen non irrationabilium avium oculos pascit, sed pura corda eorum qui Deo credunt, et ab amore visibilium rerum et temporalium se ad ejus praecepta implenda convertunt. Quod omnes homines possunt si velint. . . .

[50] See p. 258 above. Compare div. quaest. 83,§25. Sapientia Dei hominem ad exemplum, quo recte viveremus, suscepit.; §43; In ver. relig. 16,§32–17,§33 Augustine explains the Incarnation as illustrating disciplina morum, disciplina naturalis, and disciplina rationalis. Valuable material on the problem may be found in O. Scheel, op. cit. (note 2 A.) p. 1–149.

[51] Compare the use of *schola Dei* in serm. II,4,§5 (c. 391 A.D.) and in serm. CCXCII,1,§1 (393–405 A.D.). For an analysis of Augustine's thought about the ecclesia in this period see F. Hofmann, op. cit. (note 2 A.) p. 36 f.

[52] E.g. mag. 12,§39 Namque omnia quae percipimus aut sensu corporis aut mente percipimus. Illa sensibilia, haec intelligibilia, sive, ut more auctorum nostrorum loquar, illa carnalia, haec spiritualia nominamus. Compare De duabus animabus §12 CSEL XXV,1 p. 66.

[53] E.g. mor. eccl. cath. I,22,§40. Sed inter omnia quae in hac vita possidentur, corpus homini gravissimum vinculum est, justissimis Dei legibus, propter antiquum

A similar harmony prevails in the more limited area of his ideas on society. As man's destination is the fatherland and the intelligible world, so it is the heavenly Jerusalem and the house of God. And when Augustine explains the biblical phrases he frequently uses the terms and the ideas of his philosophic works. In Sermo CCXVI (391 A.D.), for example, Augustine urges his audience to be weary of their Babylonian captivity. "Behold, Jerusalem, the heavenly mother, meets you in the ways and joyously summons you. . . ." [54] The passage is in part a reminiscence of Wisdom VI,7: Wisdom shows herself joyously to them in the way, and she meets them in all providence. Augustine uses the same text three times in a philosophic context in the roughly contemporary De libero arbitrio II, and in each case he keeps wisdom as the subject.[55] We may conjecture that in the sermon he could substitute Jerusalem as the subject because in his thinking it makes no essential difference whether one refers to man's destination as the harbour of wisdom or as God's heavenly city. Likewise, in the same sermon, Augustine starts from the biblical "house of God" and goes on to speak, in the manner of his philosophic works, of the "blessedness of this region and habitation." [56]

In Sermo CCLIX (393 A.D.), the heavenly Jerusalem appears in the context of a brief universal history. Six ages of human history are to be followed by a chiliastic seventh age; the saints and the just men of God will enjoy their sabbath on earth. The eighth age will be one of eternal rest, and Augustine interprets this as a cyclic return to the starting point. "Then, as it were, one returns to the beginning (ad caput). Just as when these seven days have been accomplished, the eighth is the same as the first, so when the seven ages of the transient world have been finished and accomplished, we shall return to that immortality and blessedness from which man fell." [57] Meanwhile we labour in the night

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peccatum, quo nihil est ad praedicandum notius, nihil ad intelligendum secretius. Compare anim. quant. 28,§55; 33,§76.

[54] serm. CCXVI,4,§4.

[55] See note 26 above.

[56] serm. CCXVI, 1,§1 . . . ut inhabitem in domo Domini omnes dies vitae meae. Atque hujus regionis et habitationis beatitudinem explanans. . . . Compare the probably contemporary serm. CCXIV,8–9 for similar expressions, and see note 8 above.

[57] serm. CCLIX,2–3. If Augustine had written retractationes on the sermons

and wander in the desert until we come to the celestial Jerusalem, like the land of promise flowing with milk and honey. Here again Augustine understands the Bible in such a way that it is in harmony with his Platonist statement. The heavenly Jerusalem is like the timeless intelligible world which is the fatherland of the soul, and the goal is restoration to the eternity which man had once participated.

There are a few other scattered references to the heavenly Jerusalem and the city of God in the writings from 388 to about 393.[58] However the concept receives little emphasis, and it shows no tendency to expand or develop.[59]

In contrast, Augustine in his biblical and ecclesiastical statement has a good deal to say about human society in the world. His most significant ideas appear in areas where the Bible forces him to consider new problems. The Platonist statement can, for example, largely ignore history, since its interest centers on the individual's typical and timeless ascent from the sensible to the

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he would probably have changed the *rediemus* of §2, as in the contra Academicos he changed *redituru*s *in caelum*. See note 7 above. For the eighth day as a return *ad caput*, see serm. in mon. I,4,§12. For chiliastic parallels, see div. quaest. 83, §57,2; en. in psalm. VI,1 f.

[58] Compare, for example, serm. CCXIV,§11 (391 A.D.) Sanctam quoque ecclesiam matrem vestram, tanquam supernam Jerusalem sanctam civitatem Dei honorate, diligite, praedicate; CCCLIII,2,§4 (391–96 A.D.); CXC,3,§3 (391–400 A.D.); CCLII,7,§7 (396 A.D.). There are also a few references in other writings, e.g. lib. arb. III,20,§57. God prepares, civitatis beatissimae gloriam triumphantibus de illo qui primum hominem ad istam miseriam perduxit.; Gen. c. Man. II, 10,§13; De fide et symbolo 6,§13 CSEL XLI,15; serm. in mon. I,15,§41; II,25, §84; en. in psalm. XV,3.

[59] It appears that in this period Augustine usually speaks of the ecclesia simply as a preparation for the heavenly city of God; he does not identify the ecclesia with the heavenly city. Compare, e.g. en. in psalm. V,8 . . . quibus civitas illa constabit, quam nunc parturit et paulatim parit ecclesia; exp. Galat. §24 (with the variant readings); div. quaest. 83, §61,2. Whether Augustine does or does not call the ecclesia on earth a city of God is perhaps merely a question of style. In serm. L,8,§11 (394–95 A.D.) there is an account of three "houses" of the Lord: . . . in domo ejus, id est in ecclesia, . . . . Prima enim domus, id est, cives terrenae Jerusalem. . . . ad aeternam gloriam domus novissimae. It would seem to take no more than a change in terminology to make this a doctrine of three "cities." It would take more than a change of terminology for Augustine at this time to speak of a *single* society which includes both the angels in heaven and the Christians on earth; for this development see the discussion of the De catechizandis rudibus, p. 309 below. Serm. XV,3 (before 400 A.D.) illustrates the later approach; however the argument of the sermon is close to that of the Contra Faustum (see below p. 305 f.), and it should not be dated much before 400.

intelligible world. A biblical statement, however, must justify the ways of God in time toward the whole human race, and it must make understandable the history of the Old and the New Testaments.

Here again, however, Augustine's solution reconciles Plato and the Bible, for his method is to identify the stages of God's providence in history with the stages of the Platonist ascent. He mentions, for example, the distinction between the Jews as carnal and the Christians as spiritual, and he maintains that the same distinction can be seen within each individual. "And thus it is most fitting (pulcherrimum) that what happens in one rightly trained man by the order of nature and by instruction, the same happens and is arranged in the whole human race by divine providence." [60] Likewise when Augustine would explain the biblical contrasts between the carnal man and the spiritual man, the earthly and the heavenly man, or the old and the new man, he starts from the Platonically understood contrast between the outer man and the inner man.[61] He writes in the De diversis quaestionibus LXXXIII, for example, of the differences "between the two men, the old and the new, the outer and the inner, the earthly and the heavenly, that is between him who pursues carnal earthly goods and him who follows after eternal spiritual goods." [62]

In the context of these identifications, Augustine rethinks a traditional Christian theory of the six ages of history.[63] In the tradition, there are five ages of Old Testament history, each containing either ten or fourteen generations; the sixth and last

[60] div. quaest. 83, §49.

[61] div. quaest. 83, §64,2 . . . quoniam omnia visibilia ad exteriorem hominem pertinent, quibus christiana disciplina renuntiatur. . . . quoniam et nobis vocatis a Christo visibilium delectatio minuitur, ut invisibilium amore homo interior recreatus, ad interiorem lucem quae numquam occidit, revertatur; en. in psalm. I,4 . . . quia ut haec terra visibilis exteriorem hominem nutrit et continet, ita illa terra invisibilis interiorem hominem; ver. relig. 39,§72; mag. 1,§2.

[62] div. quaest. 83, §36,2; §64,2; ver. relig. 26,§48–49; mor. eccl. cath. I,19,§36.

[63] On this theory, see H. Scholz, Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte (Leipzig, 1911) p.154 f.; Oeuvres de Saint Augustin (Bibliothèque Augustinienne) Vol. XI (Paris, 1949)552–4. Most of the extensive bibliography of Augustine's ideas of history deals only with his later position; however there is an excellent statement of the differences between the De vera religione and the De civitate Dei in the important work of W. Kamlah, Christentum und Geschichtlichkeit, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1951) p. 302 f. and particularly 311 f.

age of history begins with the coming of Christ. Further each age corresponds not only to one of the days of creation but also to one of the stages in the life of an individual. Augustine first develops such a scheme of history in the De Genesi contra Manichaeos,[64] and he later works it out more carefully, though without reference to the days of creation, in the De vera religione.

Augustine in the De vera religione first lists the stages in the physical life of an individual from infancy to old age. "This is the life of man living from the body and bound up with the desires of things temporal. He is called the old man, the outer man, and the earthly man, even though he may obtain what the many (vulgus) call happiness in a well-established earthly city . . . and indeed even he has his certain mode of beauty." [65] Some people never lead any life but this of the old man. "Some of necessity begin life with him, but they are reborn within. . . . Such a one is said to be the new man, the inner man, and the heavenly man." [66]

Like the old man, the new man has his stages, and Augustine describes them largely in the language of philosophy. The new man begins with the examples of useful history, but already in the second stage he "trusts himself to the steps of reason toward the highest immutable law." [67] In the third and fourth stages he learns to control his carnal appetites and to live unshaken by the storms of the world. The fifth age is one of perfect peace "in the riches and abundance of the immutable kingdom of the highest ineffable wisdom." In the sixth age the new man moves in all his aspects toward eternal life; he approaches the perfect form, made in the image and likeness of God, and he reaches the point of total forgetfulness of the temporal life. Finally, the seventh age is eternal quiet and perpetual blessedness. "As the

[64] Gen. c. Man. I,23,§35 f.

[65] ver. relig. 26,§48.

[66] ver. relig. 26,§49.

[67] ver. relig. 26,§49. Augustine on a number of occasions works out schemes of progress and ascent, and many of these show similarities with the schemes of the Gen. c. Man. and of the ver. relig. Compare for example anim. quant. 33,§70 f. and doctr. christ. II,7,§9 f. On the general topic, see E. Hendrikx, Augustins Verhältnis zur Mystik (Cassiciacum I,1936) p. 110–123; J. Pépin, "Primitiae Spiritus. Remarques sur une citation paulinienne des 'Confessions' de saint Augustin" Revue de l'histoire des religions CXL(1951)155–202 p. 193 f. with note 2.

end of the old man is death, so the end of the new man is eternal life. For the former is the man of sin, the latter the man of justice." [68]

The two men, the old and the new, have their analogies in the human race, "whose life is as it were the life of one man from Adam to the end of the world." [69] Mankind is thus divided into two classes (genera). One is the throng of the impious, who bear the image of the earthly man from the beginning to the end. The other is the lineage of the people of God, and this second class is further divided into an earlier and a later stage. From the time of Adam to John the Baptist, it lives the life of the earthly man with a kind of servile justice, "and its history is called the Old Testament, as promising an earthly kingdom, and the whole history is nothing but the image of the new people and of the New Testament promising the heavenly kingdom." [70] The later stage, the life of the new people, begins with the coming of the Lord, but it remains a temporal life to the last judgment, when the pious people will completely transform its relics of the old man into the new.

Augustine in the De vera religione thus combines a Jewish-Christian theory of the successive stages in God's providential dealing with mankind and a Greco-Roman theory of the successive stages in man's ascent from the sensible to the intelligible world. The result is an outline of history in terms of universal progress, for history is God's gradual education of the whole human race.

The ideas on society which appear in this history do not differ fundamentally from those of the De libero arbitrio, though the typical contrast between the lovers of the temporal and the lovers of the eternal has become the historical contrast between the Jews and the Christians.[71] In the De libero arbitrio temporal

[68] ver. relig. 26,§49. It must be remembered that Augustine still defines sin as in the passages cited note 19, above.

[69] ver. relig. 27,§50. At about this time, Augustine frequently distinguishes the two aspects of God's providence, individual and public. Compare ver. relig. 25,§46. Quoniam igitur divina providentia non solum singulis hominibus quasi privatim, sed universo generi humano tanquam publice consulit.; div. quaest. 83,§44 Aliud enim est quod divina providentia quasi privatim cum singulis agit, aliud quod generi universo tanquam publice consulit.

[70] ver. relig. 27,§50.

[71] For the lib. arb., see p. 264 above. The distinction between the impious and

law, imposed on lovers of the temporal, rules earthly cities and peoples; in the De vera religione the Jews, under the constraint of a servile justice, are an earthly people and possess an earthly kingdom. As in Augustine's Platonism, things sensible are images of things intelligible, so Jewish history is an image of the Christian people and of their heavenly kingdom.

Augustine harmonizes his Christianity and his Platonism not only in his theory of history but also in his exegesis of biblical passages on the proper order within man and society. In the De sermone Domini in monte, for example, he explains the beatitude: Blessed are the peace-makers (Matthew V,9). The peace-makers, declares Augustine, are those who in themselves subordinate all the movements of their soul to reason, that is, to mind and spirit. They thus "become the kingdom of God in which all things are so ordered that what is outstanding and preeminent in man commands the parts which he has in common with the beasts and that these parts obey without resistance. In turn, what is preeminent in man, that is, mind and spirit, is subject to what is higher (potiori), which is truth itself, the only-begotten Son of God." [72] From this most peaceful and most ordered kingdom the devil has been cast out, who rules only those who are perverse and disordered.

Augustine in his biblical and ecclesiastical statement continues to discuss society primarily in terms of utility and welfare (salus).[73] The love of neighbor is still highly detached. The Christian loves his enemies, but even in his family he "hates the things which are transient in those who, he hopes, will come with him to the things which remain always." [74] The Christians are subject to all powers which are given men for the rule of the

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those devoted to the true God is not utilized in Augustine's outline of history, and he treats the Jews and the Christians as if together they constituted the human race. In ver. relig. 28,§51 he remarks of the prophets, Quisquis autem populi terreni temporibus usque ad illuminationem interioris hominis meruit pervenire, *genus humanum* pro tempore adjuvit . . .

[72] serm. in mon. I,2,§9. Compare with the *homo ordinatissimus* of lib. arb. I,8,§18 f.

[73] E.g., ver. relig. 28,§51 Non enim honoribus suis vanis consulunt et inanibus laudibus, sed utilitati eorum cum quibus societatem vitae hujus inire meruerunt; Gen. c. Man, I,25,§43 propter utilitatem fraternae societatis; mor. eccl. cath. I,26,§48.

[74] serm. in mon. I,15,§41.

commonwealth; they give to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's.[75]

To a first approximation then we may say that Augustine's ideas on society, like his other ideas, are until about 393 A.D. characterized by a harmonious synthesis of his Christianity and of his Platonism. We may leave open the question to what extent the synthesis is Augustine's own and to what extent he received it from earlier Christian thinkers. If we ask which phase of his thought, Platonist or Christian, is the more important, the general answer is that his Platonism is in this period the major partner. If we compare Augustine's writings first with a typical Neoplatonist work and second with the New Testament, the form of his thought appears closer to the Neoplatonist work. And within his own writings it is generally true that philosophical concepts, such as order, give new meaning to biblical texts, while the biblical texts, by and large, simply reenforce meanings, such as order, which are already present.

But in the long run Augustine's synthesis is precarious. He has tried to harmonize two bodies of thought which are essentially disparate. He has tried to express his own Christian experience in a language which is basically alien to it. Already in 393 there are some slight signs of emerging tensions; in the next few years fundamental changes will occur with extraordinary rapidity.

## III. The Development of Augustine's Ideas from 393 through the Ad Simplicianum of 396.

To a first approximation, the broad outline of Augustine's thought remains unchanged from 386 to about 393. He is trying, particularly in the first years, to achieve a philosophic statement of his position. He is also trying, particularly toward the end of the period, to achieve a biblical and ecclesiastical statement of his position. The two statements are felt to be in harmony, and it does not appear that Augustine markedly modifies either after his first presentation of it.

In the years following 393, however, Augustine moves rapidly to the new position of the Ad Simplicianum. The background of

[75] ver. relig. 55,§111. Compare en. in psalm. II,9.

the change is seen in the gradual abandonment or weakening of the general assumptions of the old solution. Meanwhile the actual working out of a new solution takes place in terms of certain specific problems which dominate Augustine's thinking at this time.

On the general level, Augustine after 393 slowly abandons his original high estimate of man's intellectual and moral capabilities. Augustine's intellectual goal is still the comprehension of the universe and the sight of the invisible things of God, but he is increasingly doubtful whether man can ever achieve the goal except through God's grace and whether he can ever achieve it at all in this life.[76] Similarly in his analysis of morality, Augustine places more and more emphasis on the continuing consequences of sin and on the absolute need for grace.[77]

At the same time, Christ and the ecclesia begin to play a larger role in Augustine's thought, and their functions are reinterpreted. Christ is not only the teacher and an example of the way to salvation; He is also the God through whose death man is saved.[78] The ecclesia is not only the school of God; it is also the place of the sacraments of grace.[79]

The special problems which concern Augustine during the crucial years 394–396 center about his search for a new statement of God's public providence as seen in the history of mankind. His solutions take the form of biblical exegesis, particularly of St. Paul (see nos. 13, 14, 15 in part, and 16 of the list above).

The selection of the problems and the preoccupation with St. Paul are both understandable in terms of the orientation of Augustine's thought at this time. In the years from about 390 through 393 Augustine had worked mainly at the biblical and ecclesiastical statement of his position. In this statement a theory of history as universal progress occupies a central place; it not only serves as a main organizing principle but it also makes possible the harmony between Augustine's interpretation of the

[76] E.g. De utilitate credendi 12,§27 CSEL XXV,1 p.34; exp. Galat. §36; Contra Epistulam Fundamenti 4, CSEL XXV,1 p. 196. On the general development see F. Hofmann, op. cit. (note 2 A.) p. 99 f.

[77] Compare serm. in mon. I,12,§34; Contra Fortunatum Disputatio §22, CSEL XXV p. 104 f. On the development, see K. Janssen, op. cit. (note 2 B.) p. 96 f.

[78] Compare O. Scheel, op. cit. (note 2 A.) p. 79 f.

[79] Compare F. Hofmann, op. cit. (note 2 A.) p. 76 f.

Bible and his philosophy. Now, however, Augustine's new understanding of sin and grace threatens to undermine this theory of history, and it is clearly essential for him to reconsider the whole problem. In such a situation Augustine naturally seeks help in Paul. On the general level Paul offers, or Augustine can read into Paul, a solution which is a possible end-point of tendencies already present in Augustine's thinking: a total denial of man's ability to do anything toward salvation on his own. On the particular level, Paul's analysis of the relation between the Jewish Law and Christianity is clearly relevant to Augustine's search for a more adequate explanation of God's providence in history.

Augustine's development after 393 starts from the theory of history which he had worked out earlier in the De Genesi contra Manichaeos and in the De vera religione. Augustine had here taken a traditional scheme of six ages and had combined it with a doctrine of gradual progress through God's education of the whole human race. The older theory reappears essentially unchanged in some of the earlier writings of the period 393–396, though it is nowhere stated at length.[80] Soon however the context of gradual progress is dropped, and while Augustine continues to make use of the six ages, the Old Testament periods serve merely as convenient chronological divisions.[81] We may conjecture that Augustine begins to be dissatisfied with the theory of the De vera religione because it does not sufficiently emphasize grace and because the assumption of gradual and regular progress seems inconsistent with his increasingly absolute contrast between sin and salvation.

In the Expositio quarundam propositionum ex Epistola Apostoli ad Romanos Augustine makes use for the first time of another traditional scheme of history.[82] According to this scheme, history is divided into four ages: 1. before the law. 2. under the law. 3. under grace. 4. in peace. The four ages, like the earlier

[80] E.g. div. quaest. 83, §58,2; §64,2; serm. CCLIX,2 (c. 393 A.D.); contra Adimantum 2 CSEL XXV,118.

[81] The most important texts are listed in H. Scholz, op. cit. (note 63) p. 154 f.

[82] exp. prop. Roman §13–18 with frequent later allusions: §30,35,45-46,51, and 53. Compare also exp. Galat. §46 and §61; div. quaest. 83, §61,7 and 66,3. On Augustine's use of this scheme of history, see P. Platz, Der Römerbrief in der Gnadenlehre Augustins (Cassiciacum V,1938) p. 123 f.

six ages, correspond to stages in the life of the individual.[83] Augustine probably prefers the scheme of the four ages since it better brings out the crucial importance of grace. In general, he has little to say of the first age, and human history has two main divisions, the Jews under the law and the Christians under grace.

Under these circumstances Augustine is forced to attempt a more careful statement of the relation between Judaism and Christianity. His first answers do not differ materially from what he had said in the De vera religione: Judaism and Christianity are two stages, the less perfect and the more perfect, on the way to eternal life.[84] Augustine develops the idea in terms of various contrasts such as between things carnal and things spiritual, between fear and love, between slavery and liberty.[85]

Gradually, however, Augustine's thinking comes to center on the absolute contrast between the sinners and the saved, and in consequence he begins to abandon the whole idea of a series of steps or stages on the way to salvation. The movement of his thought is clearly reflected in his changing attitudes first, toward the law of the Old Testament and second, toward the Jews. In the first instance, the law of the Old Testament becomes, not a stage on the way to the law of Christ, but the same thing as the law of Christ. The Mosaic Law is spiritual, even though the Jews were carnal and failed to understand it. "It is manifest that the scripture which was given the earlier people (sc. the Jews) is the law of Christ, which he came to fulfil with love. The same scripture and the same commandment is the Old Testament when it oppresses slaves clinging to earthly things, and it is the New Testament when it raises up free men who burn for things eternal." [86] In the second instance, the Jews as a people are de-

[83] div. quaest. 83, §66,3 Ex quo comprehendimus, quatuor esse differentias in uno homine quibus gradatim peractis in vita aeterna manebitur. Augustine appears in this scheme to have placed the Jews in *pueritia* and the Christians in *juventus*; see div. quaest. 83, §44,§49; exp. Galat. §28; retract. I,25§44 (= ed. Maur. I,26).

[84] See above, p. 274 f.

[85] mor. eccl. cath. I,28,§56; ver. relig. 4,§9; 17,§33; serm. in mon. I,1,§2; de utilitate credendi 3,§9 CSEL XXV,12; exp. Galat. §19,§22; div. quaest. 83, §61,1.

[86] exp. Galat. §58. Compare §7 non per illam spiritualem legem quam acceperunt Judaei. . . . Lex enim spiritualis est nec carnaliter se cogit intelligi, sed illorum vitium est, qui et illa quae acceperunt carnaliter sentiunt.

pressed to the level of the heathen, and they no longer form a special stage in the universal progress of mankind. They are sinners who serve the spirit of slavery which has the power of death.[87]

Augustine effects the same revision in relation to the Christians and the New Testament. On the one hand, the newness of the Christian people becomes almost accidental in the face of an eternal decree. "The people of the New Testament is a new people, and yet its predestination in God (apud Deum) is ancient (antiqua) and so is the heavenly Jerusalem itself." [88] On the other hand the worthies of the Old Testament are more and more assimilated to the saints of the New Testament. Men like Abraham received as individuals the same grace which Christ later granted generally.[89]

Thus not only the "six ages" but also the "four ages" lose their original significance; they are no longer the important stages in a universal history of mankind's providential progress.[90] Augustine has accordingly set the stage for the Ad Simplicianum, where he will develop a new and profound interpretation of history to replace the traditional theories which are no longer adequate for him.

The Ad Simplicianum climaxes Augustine's development from 393 to 396 not only on the special level of history but also on the general level of grace. On this general level it represents a radicalization of tendencies already present in Augustine's think-

[87] exp. prop. Roman. §52. Augustine does not wish to set up a merely comparative distinction between the Jews (spiritus servitutis) and the Christians (spiritus adoptionis). Nam si spiritum servitutis ipsum spiritum hominis intellexerimus, incipit spiritus adoptionis ipse intelligi tanquam in melius commutatus.

[88] exp. Galat. §40. It will be noted that Augustine does not yet say what he does in the De baptismo contra Donatistas (401 A.D.) I,15,§24 CSEL LI,168 Ecclesia uero, quod est populus Dei, etiam in istius uitae peregrinatione antiqua res est. . . .

[89] exp. Galat. §23. On the general problem, see J. Beumer, 'Die Idee einer vorchristlichen Kirche bei Augustinus" Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift III(1952) 161–75.

[90] For explicit statements of Augustine's changed attitude toward the six ages, compare the later texts: Quaestionum Libri VII, VII,§49 CSEL XXVIII,2 p. 500. . . . ex omnibus quippe aetatibus ecclesia congregatur. In Joannis Evangelium, Tract. IX,6 PL XXXV,1461. Illa ergo tempora sex, quasi articulis distributa atque distincta, quasi vasa essent inania, nisi a Christo implerentur.

ing. He had, for example, earlier concluded that mankind after Adam was a "mass of sin" (massa peccati), and the mass of sin becomes the new universal concept in place of the "whole human race" of the De vera religione.[91] Similarly he had decided that grace is absolutely necessary for the moral reformation and salvation of sinners and that God predestines the sinner's salvation.[92]

Despite these tendencies, Augustine before the Ad Simplicianum still preserves some small area of human freedom in man's relation to salvation. While grace is absolutely necessary to all sinners, grace is given to those who merit it by faith, and faith, in turn, is a free choice of the individual. Not even God's predestination can annihilate this freedom, since God predestines men to salvation on the basis of His foreknowledge of their free choice of faith.[93]

In the Ad Simplicianum[94] divine omnipotence overwhelms these last barriers. God chose Jacob and rejected Esau. He did so not by foreknowledge of their works and by the same token not by foreknowledge of their faith. God's election is finally of wills. "But the will itself, unless there be something which attracts and delights the soul, cannot in any way be moved. And that something of this sort should present itself is not within the power of man."[95] God chooses His elect on the basis of His foreknowledge of His determination of their wills. Those He chooses are called; they have faith; they are justified; and they are glorified.

Against the background of this radicalization of the need for

[91] *massa peccati* is used div. quaest. 83, §68,3 . . . et omnes una massa luti facti sumus, quod est massa peccati.

[92] exp. prop. Roman. §44,§55.

[93] exp. prop. Roman. §55; §60 f.

[94] Augustine was well aware of the importance of the Ad Simplicianum in his development. Compare retract. II,27,§3 (= ed. Maur. II,1,§1) in cuius quaestionis solutione laboratum est quidem pro libero arbitrio uoluntatis humanae, sed uicit dei gratia . . . ; De praedestinatione sanctorum 4,§8 (PL XLIV,965 f.) Videtis certe quid tunc (= exp. prop. Roman.) de fide atque operibus sentiebam, quamvis de commendanda gratia Dei laborarem: in qua sententia istos fratres nostros esse nunc video; quia non sicut legere meos libros, ita etiam in eis curaverunt proficere mecum. Nam si curassent, invenissent istam quaestionem secundum veritatem divinarum Scripturarum solutam in primo libro duorum, quos ad beatae memoriae Simplicianum scripsi . . . ;. De dono perseverantiae 20,§52 (PL XLV,1026).

[95] Simplic. I,2,22.

grace, Augustine introduces in the Ad Simplicianum his new interpretation of history. On the basis of Pauline texts (e.g. Romans IX,24 f.) he first points out that God did not call all the Jews or all the Gentiles but that He called some from each race. "For after Adam there is one mass of sinners and of the impious, in which, without grace, Jews and Gentiles belong to the same leaven (conspersionem)." [96] All are sinners, but not all are saved; and God's providence must be understood in terms of the absolute contrast between those who are saved and those who are not.

Augustine then elaborates his ideas on providence in the form of a commentary on Ecclesiasticus XXXIII,10–15.[97] This passage, declares Augustine, is "most necessary for the problem we are considering and marvellously confirms what has just been discussed." [98]

Augustine finds in Ecclesiasticus first an account of man's exclusion from Paradise. God changed men's ways and they became mortal. "Then was made the one mass of all, arising through the transmission of sin and the punishment of mortality." [99] The universal starting point is the mass of sin.

From the mass of sin which is mankind, God blessed some and God cursed some. In the words of Ecclesiasticus: From them He blessed some and exalted them; He sanctified them and drew them to Him. From them He cursed some and dashed them down; He turned them toward their own strife." (XXXIII,12). Augustine in his commentary relates the passage to Paul's metaphor of the potter and the clay; God does with man what He will. Nevertheless neither God's justice nor His providence may be denied, and the just punishment of the damned is of providential service to the saved.

[96] Simplic. I,2,19.

[97] Augustine cites the passage as follows: Et omnes homines de solo, et ex terra Adam creatus est. In multitudine disciplinae Dominus separavit eos, et immutavit vias eorum. Et ex ipsis benedixit et exaltavit, et ex his sanctificavit et ad se applicavit, et ex ipsis maledixit et humiliavit: et convertit illos ad dissensionem illorum. Quasi lutum figuli in manu ipsius plasmare illud et disponere, omnes viae ejus secundum dispositionem ejus; sic homo in manu illius qui se fecit, et reddet illi secundum judicium suum. Contrarium malo bonum est, et contra mortem vita est; sic et contra virum justum peccator. Et sic intuere in omnia opera altissimi: duo, duo; unum contra unum.

[98] Simplic. I,2,20.

[99] Ibid.

Thus the lesson of history is the general lesson of the Ad Simplicianum. The better are such only through grace, not through their works but by God's mercy. The whole purpose of Paul, and of all teachers of grace, is that whoever glories should glory in the Lord.[100]

And the pattern of history, as it emerges from Ecclesiasticus, is no longer the gradual stages of progress of the De vera religione; [101] it is the absolute contrast between the damned and the saved. Again in the words of Ecclesiasticus: "The opposite of evil is good, and the opposite of life is death; so too the sinner is the opposite of the just man. And in the same way, look at all the works of the Almighty: two by two, the one opposite the other." (XXXIII,15).

In the Ad Simplicianum Augustine has accordingly achieved a clear and coherent solution to his questions on grace and history. He first developed the solution in a series of biblical commentaries, and he appears to have thought out the problems almost entirely in terms of a biblical and ecclesiastical statement. Nevertheless, because of the original equivalence of Augustine's Christianity and his Platonism, changes in the one necessarily imply changes in the other. And even in the Ad Simplicianum itself Augustine indicates something of the extent to which his new position on grace on history must lead to modifications of his earlier philosophic statement.

On the negative side the most important point is that the movement of thought culminating in the Ad Simplicianum leaves unchanged Augustine's description of the proper structure of the universe and of society. By 396 Augustine maintains that all mankind, the "mass of sin," has fallen into disorder, and that no man can win his way back to order except by God's grace. But there is no sign that Augustine has new ideas on the characteristics of the proper order. God's order — the hierarchy of God, souls, and bodies — still exists, and Augustine continues to describe it as he had earlier.

Augustine speaks, for example, of the goodness of God's creation, a goodness which even sin cannot destroy. He mentions

[100] Simplic. I,2,20–21.
[101] See above, p. 273 f.

the figure and structure of the body, the vital spirit which gives life to the earthly members, "and the whole nature of man, marvellously tempered through the rule of the soul and the service of the body." [102] Or as he phrases the point in an earlier passage of the Ad Simplicianum, "The soul is more excellent than the body; God who is the maker and creator of both, is more excellent than either body or soul, and He hates nothing in man but sin. Sin then is the disorder and perversity of man, that is his turning away from the more excellent creator and his turning toward the less excellent creature." [103]

Similarly, from the standpoint of an image theory, Augustine preserves his older description of human justice. He now argues, in contrast to his earlier position, that sinful men without God's grace could only wither away before they would thirst for justice. Nevertheless when he speaks of justice in human society, he describes it, as in his earlier writings, as a kind of image or vestige of divine justice.[104]

On the positive side the most important point is that Augustine now places the old ideas in a very different context. The will of sinful man cannot accept the order and image of justice; the mind even of the just man cannot comprehend them.

On the simplest moral level, this has already been seen in Augustine's new doctrine of grace and sin. Though the order is still existent, sinful man is out of relation with it, and action in terms of it is impossible for him.

A comparable change, and perhaps a more profound one, occurs on the intellectual level, and Augustine now feels that the total order of justice is beyond human comprehension. Human justice,

[102] Simplic. I,2,20. Similar statements are found in the roughly contemporary Contra Epistulam Fundamenti §33 (CSEL XXV,236–37) applied to a prince of the Manichaean realm of evil. Lauda tu mecum speciem, distinctionem, ordinationem, pacem, unitatem formarum, membrorum congruentias et numerosas parilitates, uitalia spiramenta et nutrimenta, temperamentum salutis, regimen et moderamen animae famulatusque corporis, . . . adtendite quanta laudabilia remanebunt: compago corporis, membrorum hinc atque inde congruentia, formae unitas et pax contextarum inter se partium, animae regentis et uegetantis famulantisque et uegatati corporis ordo et dispositio.

[103] Simplic. I,2,18. Compare the definition of sin with that given above p. 262 and note 19; there is a new emphasis on the contrast between creator and creature as fundamental.

[104] Simplic. I,2,16.

for example, is just, because it is an image of divine justice; divine justice, however, is "a hidden equity not to be searched out by mere human measure." [105] God is certainly just, but Augustine can no longer comprehend the grounds of the justice. "Thus in some God punished impiety by damnation and in some He removes it by justification, according as He judges through His inscrutable judgments what should be done." [106]

Ultimately, though Augustine may maintain continuity on the descriptive level of order and image, the new insights of the Ad Simplicianum imply a total reorientation of his world-view. Augustine's early doctrine of human wisdom and self-sufficiency had been strictly correlative with his early doctrine of the rational comprehensibility of the universe. Now that he has totally denied human self-sufficiency, he must also deny the comprehensibility of the universe. He does so in the important closing section of Book I of the Ad Simplicianum. "Let us believe, though we can-

[105] Simplic. I,2,16. In ipsis rebus humanis terrenisque contractibus . . . in quibus nisi supernae justitiae quaedam impressa vestigia teneremus, numquam in ipsum cubile ac penetrale sanctissimum atque castissimum spiritualium praeceptorum nostrae infirmitatis suspiceret atque inhiaret intentio. . . . Haec imago vel, ut supra dixi, vestigium negotiis hominum de fastigio summo aequitatis impressum est. For a similar passage, probably somewhat earlier, see div. quaest. 83, §53,2. Ex hac igitur ineffabili atque sublimi rerum administratione, quae fit per divinam providentiam, quasi transcripta est naturalis lex in animam rationalem, ut in ipsa vitae hujus conversatione moribusque terrenis homines talium distributionum imagines servent.

[106] Simplic. I,2,16 . . . quod Deus "cujus vult miseretur et quem vult obdurat," hoc est, cujus vult miseretur et cujus vult non miseretur, esse alicujus occultae atque ab humano modulo investigabilis aequitatis. . . . Eorum autem non miseretur, quibus misericordiam non esse praebendam, aequitate occultissima et ab humanis sensibus remotissima judicat. Inscrutabilia enim sunt judicia ejus, et investigabiles viae ipsius (Romans XI,33).

In the writings of the preceding period Augustine sometimes speaks of "hiddenness" in a similar context but its meaning is different: e.g. div. quaest. 83, §68,4 Prorsus cujus vult miseretur et quem vult obdurat; sed haec voluntas Dei injusta esse non potest. Venit enim de occultissimis meritis . . . ; exp. prop. Roman §63; possibly serm.CCXIV,3(391.A.D.). Here it is the "facts" which are hidden, and if Augustine knew them he would understand the Why of God's action; in the case of Jacob and Esau, there are no facts, and the Why of the action must remain incomprehensible.

The notion of incomprehensibility as it appears in the Ad Simplicianum should, I think, be distinguished from Neoplatonist unknowability as it is found in the De ordine II,16,§44; 18,§47 in relation to God. Similarly this "measure" which cannot be grasped is to be distinguished from the "measure without measure" of De Genesi ad Litteram IV,3,§7. On this last, see J. Ritter, op. cit. (Note 2 A.) p. 11.

not grasp it, that He who made the whole creation, both spiritual and corporeal, disposed all things in number and weight and measure. (Wisdom XI,21). But inscrutable are His judgments, and His ways are past searching out. (Romans XI,33).[107]

And from the standpoint of the new world-view, Augustine must now rethink almost all of his early ideas on society. How, for example, is the Christian to know of the fatherland and of the heavenly Jerusalem, and how is he related to them? What is the mode of existence of a Christian or of a Christian society on earth? Augustine himself appears early to have recognized the need for thinking out the answers to such questions. The writings from 396 to about 400, notably the Confessiones, may be regarded from one aspect as a brilliantly successful attempt to meet the need.

## IV. The Elaboration of the New Position of the Ad Simplicianum in the Writings from 396 to 400.

The Confessiones[108] tower above the other writings of the years following the Ad Simplicianum. They are the most important statement of Augustine's general position, and they also provide the most significant elaboration of his new ideas on society.

The general approach of the Confessiones is suggested in the opening biblical quotations where Augustine praises God and declares: "Of Thy wisdom there is no number (Psalm CXLVI, 6)."[109] This is the position of the Ad Simplicianum, and it is a far cry from the claim of the early De musica to see clearly the

[107] Simplic. I,2,22. In contrast, compare the early ord. II,7,§24. et tamen etiam ista omnia, quae fatemur esse peruersa, non esse praeter diuinum ordinem alta quaedam et a multitudinis uel suspicione remotissima disciplina se ita studiosis et deum atque animas tantum amantibus manifestaturam esse promittit, ut non nobis summae numerorum possint esse certiores.

[108] On the Confessiones in general, see P. Courcelle, op. cit. (note 2 B.) with full bibliography; F. Cayré, "Le sens et l'unité des Confessions de saint Augustin" L'année théologique augustinienne XIII(1953)13–32.

[109] conf. I,1,§1. There are some comments on the interpretation of Psalm CXLVI,6 in en. in psalm. CXLVI, §11. Ergo intelligentiae ejus non est numerus. Conticescant humanae voces, requiescant humanae cogitationes: ad incomprehensibilia non se extendant quasi comprehensuri, sed tanquam participaturi; . . . dictum est de Jerusalem, cujus dispersiones colligit, dictum est de illa quiddam magnum: Jerusalem quae aedificatur ut civitas, cujus participatio est in idipsum. (Psalm CXXI,3).

immutable numbers which exist in immutable truth itself.[110] Augustine in the Confessiones meditates on the relations between Christians and a God whose saving providence exceeds their comprehension; the saved participate eternity in some way but Augustine no longer hopes to grasp it.

The two main divisions of the Confessiones are Books I–IX (X),[111] which deal with Augustine himself, and Books XI–XIII, which deal with God's universal government from the creation of the world through the final rest of the saints. The two divisions correspond to the two aspects of God's providence, private and public; first we have an account of His dealing with Augustine as an individual and then an account of His dealing with all mankind.[112] In the Confessiones the two aspects are organically connected since both Augustine's own story and God's public providence culminate in the heavenly Jerusalem.

Books I–IX contain comparatively little that is directly relevant to Augustine's ideas on society. In Book VII, Augustine tells of his reading of the "Platonists"; his comments, like much of the Confessiones, constitute as it were a "retractatio" of his earlier philosophic statement. From the standpoint of man's heavenly destination, the Platonists failed, according to Augustine, because while they could see the fatherland (patria) they could not see Christ the Mediator who is the only way to it.[113] The turning point in Augustine's story is of course the scene in the garden (VIII,12,§28 f.), and we may regard it as an autobiographical statement of the conclusion of the Ad Simplicianum: wills are chosen.

The culmination of Augustine's experience, as he tells it in the Confessiones, is the dialogue with Monica at Ostia. Earlier, after reading the Platonists, Augustine had achieved at least briefly the sight of the invisible things of God. (Romans I,20). However he had been unable to continue in the vision, and his reaction was one of disillusion and dissatisfaction.[114] At Ostia the

[110] See p. 264 f. above.
[111] Book X stands somewhat apart from the rest of the work and will be treated separately; see p. 297 below.
[112] For the distinction, see note 69, above.
[113] conf. VII,26,§26; 21,§27.
[114] conf. VII,17,§23; 20,§26.

circumstances are different. Augustine and Monica do not seek a direct vision of God. ". . . forgetful of things past, and stretching out (extenti) to the things which are before (Philippians III, 13), we were enquiring between ourselves . . . of what sort the eternal life of the saints was to be. . . ." [115] The quest is successful. They are granted a foretaste of the Christian heavenly society as they attain to that "region of neverfailing plenty where Thou feedest Israel with the food of truth." [116] There they had "touched" eternal wisdom, and there they had left bound up the first-fruits of the spirit. In contrast to the mood following the Platonist visions, Augustine now achieves peace, and he is confident, even after the return to this world of time and change, that his long search is ended. His final destination is God's heavenly Israel. This is the closing note of Book IX as Augustine requests prayers for Monica and Patrick. May his readers remember those who were "his parents in this transitory light, his brethren in our Catholic mother under Thee our Father, and his fellow-citizens in the eternal Jerusalem, for which the pilgrimage of Thy people sighs, from their going out to their final return." [117]

Membership in the eternal Jerusalem has set the seal on Augustine's individual story, and in Books XI–XIII he goes on to meditate on universal history under the same aspect of God's heavenly city. He would consider "the marvellous things of Thy law from the beginning (principio) in which Thou madest heaven and earth through to the perpetual reign with Thee of Thy holy city." [118] Universal history will in turn further reveal the significance of Augustine's own story, and Augustine prays to Christ

[115] conf. IX,10,§23. On the vision at Ostia, see P. Courcelle, op. cit. (note 2 B.) p. 222 f.; J. Pépin, op. cit. (note 67, above).

[116] conf. IX,10,§24.

[117] conf. IX,13,§33.

[118] conf. XI,2,§3 et considerem mirabilia de lege tua ab usque principio, in quo fecisti caelum et terram, usque ad regnum tecum perpetuum sanctae civitatis tuae. Compare X,43,§70. ecce domine, iacto in te curam meam, ut vivam et considerabo mirabilia de lege tua.

There has been surprisingly little scholarly study of Books XI–XIII of the Confessiones. See however W. Lipgens, "Die Bekenntnisse Augustins als Beitrag zur christlichen Geschichtsauffassung" Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift (II (1951) 164–77); J.-M. Le Blond, Les Conversions de Saint Augustin (Paris, 1950) Part III.

the Mediator, "Thy Word, through whom Thou madest all things, and among them, me also; Thy Only-begotten, through whom Thou callest to adoption the believing people, and in it, me also." [119]

In Book XI Augustine begins with the creation, but he quickly moves to the main topic of the book, the problem of time.[120] What is the relation between the eternity of the Creator and the time of the creature? The analysis is developed brilliantly, and Augustine's answer constitutes another "retractatio" of his earlier philosophic statement. In the first writings, a main theme was that even in temporal things man can find vestiges of the eternal and that through these vestiges he is always being called back through regular stages and steps to the eternal intelligible world which is his fatherland.[121] But Augustine now sees very differently man's involvement in time and the possible conditions of his escape. Time, which is in the soul, represents merely dispersion and dissipation, what Augustine will call "distention." If man is to be saved, God's grace must somehow make it possible for him, as at Ostia, to touch eternity.

The crucial argument, for our purposes, is found in the last sections of Book XI. Time in the soul appears as past, present, and future; the soul remembers the past, attends the present, and expects the future. But all three levels lack unity and reality. What is present has no quantity (spatium), and the soul loses its unity as it is stretched (distenditur — extenditur — tenditur) into both past and future. Augustine illustrates his argument in terms of a memorized poem. "Before I begin my expectation is stretched (extenditur) over the whole, but when I have begun, however much of it I shall separate off into the past, by so much is my memory stretched out (tenditur). Thus the life of this action of mine is distended or stretched out (distenditur) into memory, because of what I have already said, and into expecta-

[119] conf. XI,2,§4.

[120] On Augustine's doctrine of time, particularly in the Confessiones, see P. Brunner, "Zur Auseinandersetzung zwischen antikem und christlichem Zeit- und Geschichtsverständnis bei Augustin" Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche N.F. XIV(1933)1–25; J. F. Callahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy (Cambridge, 1948), Chapter IV; C. Rau, "Theories of Time in Ancient Philosophy" Philosophical Review LXII(1953)514–25.

[121] Compare p. 264 f, above, on the De musica, and mus. VI,11,§29.

tion, because of what I am still to say." [122] And what happens in the "life" of the poem also happens "in the whole life of a man, whose parts are all the actions of a man, and in the whole "world" (saeculo) of the sons of men, whose parts are all the lives of men." [123]

But Augustine escapes this tragic involvement in time, as at Ostia, through the experience of his heavenly destination, and in his escape he comes to full realization of the involvement. "But because Thy mercy is better than all lives, behold, my life is (nothing but) distention, and (yet) Thy right hand took me up in my Lord the Son of Man, the Mediator between Thee the One and us the many in our manynesses (nos multos, in multis per multa)." [124] Again as at Ostia, Augustine uses Philippians III,13 f. to explain his experience: 13 . . . forgetting the things which are behind, and reaching forward (extentus) to the things which are before, 14. I follow on intently (secundum intentionem). . . ." In a difficult passage, he combines this Pauline terminology with his own terminology of distention: ". . . forgetful of what is past, not distended but extended, and not to those things which shall come to be and pass away but to those things which are before, I follow on, not through distention but through intention, after the reward of my heavenly calling, where I may hear the voice of praise and contemplate Thy delight which neither comes to be nor passes away." [125] Augustine has achieved

[122] conf. XI,22,§38.

[123] Ibid.

[124] conf. XI,29,§39.

[125] conf. XI,29,§39 . . . praeterita oblitus, non in ea quae futura et transitura sunt, sed in ea quae ante sunt non distentus sed extentus, non secundum distentionem sed secundum intentionem sequor ad palmam supernae vocationis . . . Augustine's experience of his eternal calling to the heavenly Israel seems regularly to be stated through some use of Philippians III,12–14. Compare e.g. conf. IX,10,§23 (see p. 289 above); conf. XII,16,§23 . . . et recordans Hierusalem extento in eam sursum corde . . . ; doctr. christ. I,34,§38 (see p. 306 below). For other possibly contemporary interpretations of the text, see serm. CCLV,6,§6 (418 A.D., but see Kunzelmann, op. cit. (p. 257 above) p. 479.); serm. Denis XVIII,2 (at latest 399 A.D.).

It will be noted that Paul has a simple contrast between the things which are past and the things which are before, and the things which are before serve to express man's heavenly calling. Augustine's scheme is more complicated. He has the contrast between past and future and the corresponding actions of memory and expectation. However both memory and expectation are grouped to-

his unity through the grace of eternity, and from this vantage point he can look back with new insight to his former state. "I had burst asunder (dissilui) into times, whose order I do not know." [126] He closes the book with another confident statement on the relation of the eternal God to His society. "Oh, how high art Thou, and yet the humble in heart are Thy house, for Thou raisest up those that are bowed down, and they fall not whose elevation Thou art." [127]

In Book XII Augustine goes on to analyze more carefully the nature of the heavenly society to which he is called. He starts from the "heaven of heaven" (caelum caeli) of Psalm CXIII,6. This he explains as "some intellectual creature, which though in no way coeternal unto Thee the Trinity, yet participates Thy eternity. Through the sweetness of that most blessed contemplation of Thyself, it strongly restrains its mutability; without any fall since its first creation, by clinging to Thee it rises above all the rolling vicissitudes of times." [128] The heaven of heaven neither expects the future nor conveys what it remembers into the past; "it is not altered by any change, and it is not distended (distenditur) into any times." [129]

Augustine has thus made plain the two main theses of Book XII. First, man's heavenly destination is not an eternal intelligible world, as in the early writings; it is a creature of the creator. Second, though a creature, it neither has fallen nor will it ever fall into the mutability of time.

Augustine goes on to describe the heaven of heaven with the traditional biblical terms. It is God's house, which is "most harmoniously one through that established peace of the holy spirits, the citizens of Thy city in the heavenly places which are above the heavens we see." [130] Augustine sighs in his pilgrimage, "re-

gether as distention, and Augustine's distention in time is contrasted with his intention (sometimes extention) on his eternal calling.

In his early period, Augustine makes use of a simpler interpretation which harmonizes well with his Platonism of the time: Gen. c. Man. II,9,§12. . . . anima quae debet in ea quae anteriora sunt se extendere, id est, in Deum, et ea quae posteriora sunt oblivisci, id est, corporeas voluptates.

[126] conf. XI,29,§39 at ego in tempora dissilui, quorum ordinem nescio, . . .

[127] conf. XI,31,§41.

[128] conf. XII,9,§9.

[129] conf. XII,11,§12.

[130] conf. XII,11,§12.

membering Jerusalem with his heart stretched (extento) above to it, Jerusalem the fatherland, Jerusalem the mother, and Thyself that rulest over it." [131] There are his first-fruits [132] of the spirit; thence he is certain of these things; and thither he would be collected from his dispersion and deformity.

In Books XI and XII of the Confessiones Augustine analyzes a few problems exhaustively and with a full discussion of other possible solutions. By the end of Book XII, however, he realizes that such an approach cannot be continued if he is to treat God's universal law within the limits of a single work.[133] Accordingly the tempo changes, and in a single book Augustine completes his meditation on the whole history of God's providence.

Book XIII is the most wide-ranging portion of the Confessiones. In form, the bulk of the Book is a free allegory on the opening chapters of Genesis, but there is often only a very tenuous connection between the text and the explanation. No brief account can be adequate to the multiplicity and profundity of Augustine's thought, and the following discussion attempts only to point out some of the main phases of the argument.

Augustine's starting point, and a continuing theme, is the total dependence of the creature on the creator. This is true even of the heaven of heaven, the spiritual creature which is the celestial Jerusalem. "Angels fell away, and man's soul fell away. They pointed out the abyss of the whole spiritual creature in deepest darkness, unless Thou hadst said in the beginning, 'Let there be light' and there was light, and unless every obedient intelligence of Thy heavenly city clung to Thy spirit and rested in it." [134]

The blessed heavenly city was made light, without interval of time, at the moment of its creation. The story of human salvation, in contrast, is the story of an alteration between darkness and light. "We were darkness, and we are being made light." [135]

The starting point of human history is thus universal darkness and the mass of sin.[136] Through Adam's fall, there flowed from

[131] conf. XII,16,§23.
[132] See the account of the dialogue at Ostia, p. 288 f. above.
[133] conf. XII,32,§43.
[134] conf. XIII,8,§9; compare XIII,2,§3.
[135] conf. XIII,10,§11.
[136] conf. XIII,14,§15.

him "the brackishness of the sea, the human race so profoundly curious (curiosum) and so tempestuously arrogant and so changeably lax (instabiliter fluvidum)." [137] Throughout Book XIII, the sea will symbolize sinful mankind, "the embittered ones" (amaricantes).[138]

Yet even the sea of sinful mankind is subject to God's order. He brings the impious together into one society, for they all aim at the same goal of temporal and earthly happiness; God's gathering of the waters, not human bitterness, constitutes the sea. God restrains man's evil desires and imposes limits on them, "and so Thou makest the sea by the order of Thy empire over all things." [139]

Over against the sea, God creates the land, which symbolizes the souls who thirst after Him and who appear before Him.[140] He separates these souls from the society of the sea, and they bring forth their fruit according to their kind.

Above both land and sea, God placed the firmament of the Scriptures.[141] The firmament will play an important role in Augustine's allegory, for it marks the distinction between the spirits of the heaven of heaven and the Christians here on earth. The supercelestial peoples, above this visible heaven, have no need of the Bible, for they see God directly. Christians on earth, the lower peoples, see God's eternal word only in the riddle (in aenigmate) of the clouds and in the glass (per speculum) of the firmament.[142]

On land the soul first brings forth works of mercy "according to its kind" (secundum genus). Here man loves his neighbor in relieving his carnal necessities and in giving him protection.[143] Above this lower stage of action, there is the higher stage of contemplation. Man learns in the Bible to separate things sensible from things intelligible and to distinguish between men attached

[137] conf. XIII,20,§28. It will be noted that Augustine is making use of the triple classification of the lusts; see note 42 above.

[138] conf. XIII,17,§20.

[139] conf. XIII,17,§20.

[140] conf. XIII,17,§21. In conf. XIII,23,§33 Augustine identifies the land with the ecclesia.

[141] conf. XIII,15,§16.

[142] conf. XIII,15,§18.

[143] conf. XIII,17,§21.

to the one or the other. Through the Spirit, some receive the word of wisdom (sapientiae), some the word of science (scientiae), and some the other gifts of the spirit. Wisdom is the food of the spiritual ones of the ecclesia; science and the other gifts of the spirit aid the carnal ones.[144]

The sea in turn brings forth its works. God's holy men bring his sacraments into the "world," and these are symbolized by the "moving creature that hath life" and the "fowls that fly above the earth" (Genesis I,20). Augustine contrasts the bodily sacraments, which vary in time, with unchanging and certain knowledge like the lights of wisdom and knowledge in the firmament. But the bodily sacraments are nevertheless necessary because of the sea, the peoples who are alienated from the eternity of God's truth.[145]

Augustine continues with a second and fuller account of the works of the earth; his starting point in the text is now the "living soul" (Genesis I,24). Such a soul no longer needs baptism, though by God's ordinance there is now no other entrance to the kingdom of heaven. But it continues to use the eucharist, which is the "fish" brought up from the sea to nourish the land, and the "fowl that fly over the land," which are God's ministers to the faithful.[146]

By imitating these ministers in their actions, the faithful are virtuous "according to their kind." They reform themselves from the triple lust of the world: the cruelty of pride, the sloth of pleasure, and the vain name of knowledge (a fallaci nomine scientiae).[147] They may then go on to the higher insights of contemplation, where men no longer live merely "according to their kind" but where they are reformed in God's image and no longer need live by any human authority.

[144] conf. XIII,18,§23. In XIII,20,§27, Augustine groups *sapientia* and *scientia* together in contrast to *operationes corporales*.

[145] conf. XIII,20,§27.

[146] conf. XIII,21,§29.

[147] conf. XIII,21,§30–31. Particularly interesting is Augustine's statement on "knowledge": §31 . . . et serpentes boni non perniciosi ad nocendum, sed astuti ad cavendum et tantum explorantes temporalem naturam, quantum sufficit, ut per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta conspiciatur aeternitas. In the early works (see e.g. p. 265 above) such an ascent leads to the highest point of the Christian's life on earth; here in the Confessiones, it has in some way been "secularized."

Such are the spiritual Christians. They have power "over the fish of the sea and over the fowls of the air, and over all cattle and wild beasts and over all the earth and over every creeping thing" (Genesis I,28). They do not judge of the spiritual truths of the Bible nor of its dark places nor of the distinction between those who are spiritual and those who are carnal nor of the eventual fate of the disordered peoples of the world. But they do judge of the rightness and wrongness of the sacraments, of the interpretation of the Bible, of the acts and morals of the faithful, and of pious thoughts about things we know through the senses.[148]

This is the life of the spiritual man who judges all things, and it is the highest life possible on earth. But Augustine no longer expects an intellectual vision that will take man out of grace and time. God in his firmament most wisely disputes with His faithful "so that we may discern all things with marvellous contemplation, although still in signs and in times and in years." [149] Augustine reaches eternity in his thought when he realizes that through grace God's eternal revelation in some way coincides with Augustine's temporal understanding of it. God tells him: "Thus the things which you see through my spirit, I see, and the things which you say through my spirit, I say. And so, although you see them temporally, I do not see them temporally, and although you say them temporally, I do not say them temporally." [150]

Augustine has accordingly used the opening chapters of Genesis as an allegorical basis for his description of the sea of sinners, the land of the pious, and the firmament of the scriptures. As a theory of history, Book XIII of the Confessiones agrees in general with the Ad Simplicianum. The basic contrast is again between the sinners and the just, between the sea and the land. The contrast is an abiding pattern of history, not merely a means of distinguishing epochs of progress.

Book XIII of the Confessiones also agrees with the Ad Simplicianum in repeating the early philosophic description of the

[148] conf. XIII,23,§34.

[149] conf. XIII,18,§23.

[150] conf. XIII,29,§44. Compare XIII,18,§22. Tu autem idem ipse est et in annis tuis qui non deficiunt, horreum praeparas annis transeuntibus.

proper order in society and in man. God is said, for example, to form the "living soul" of the faithful Christian through ordered affections. "And after that, the mind subject to Thee alone and needing to imitate no human authority hast Thou renewed after Thy image and likeness, and didst subject its reasonable action to its dominant intellect. . . ." [151] Augustine praises the earth and its creatures, most particularly man "created after Thy image and likeness, and even through that Thy very image and likeness (that is, the power of reason and of understanding) set over all irrational creatures." [152]

More clearly than in the Ad Simplicianum, Augustine in the Confessiones defines the two groups of men, the sea and the land, entirely in terms of man's relation to God through grace; they cannot be identified with disorder and order on the descriptive level since the sea sometimes achieves order in part and the land sometimes fails to achieve it completely. Many men, for example, are able to see that God's creation is good, but they necessarily fall into sin when they try to enjoy it rather than use it. It is quite another matter "that when a man sees something to be good, God should in the same man see that it is good, in such a way namely that God should be loved in that which He made, Who cannot be loved except by the Holy Spirit which He gave." [153] Similarly, to contain oneself from the world is of no use to any but the faithful.[154] And if the faithless try to aid God's servants in some need of the present life, they of the sea cannot feed them of the land, who are to be fed only by the land's fruits.[155]

Book X of the Confessiones stands somewhat apart from the rest of the work and is perhaps a later addition.[156] It falls into two main sections. In the first Augustine questions what he loves when he loves God, and in his answer he reevaluates the older Platonist ascent from things corporeal to the sight of the invisible things of God. He concludes that while the things of

[151] conf. XIII,34,§49.
[152] conf. XIII,32,§47.
[153] conf. XIII,31,§46.
[154] conf. XIII,21,§29.
[155] conf. XIII,27,§42.
[156] For its place in the whole work and the argument that Book X is a later addition, see E. Williger, "Der Aufbau der Konfessionen Augustins" Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft XXVIII(1929)81–106.

the world do proclaim God as their creator, sinful man cannot hear their message because he is himself subject to these corporeal things through his disordered love.[157] Augustine continues his search for God with his celebrated analysis of memory, and he finally concludes that God is known to Augustine only insofar as He has told Augustine of Himself. "See, what a space I have gone over in my memory, seeking Thee, O Lord; and I have not found Thee outside it. Nor have I found anything concerning Thee but what I have kept in memory, ever since I learnt Thee." [158] To describe the origin of this memory Augustine must, as in the dialogue at Ostia and in his intention of his heavenly calling, transcend his self and its powers. "Where then did I find Thee that I might learn Thee, but in Thee above me?" [159]

The second main section of Book X of the Confessiones is devoted to another treatment of the theme of the three lusts.[160] In the De vera religione Augustine had used the topic to show that even through his vices man is called back to virtue; the argument attempted to maintain, for an extreme case, the comprehensible order of the universe.[161] Such ideas play no part in the discussion of the Confessiones; Augustine attempts on the contrary to show how the three lusts appear even in the life of the Christian destined for salvation and how they are a threat even to him.

The discussion of pride is, as before, the one most important for Augustine's ideas on society. God alone, he declares, rules without arrogance (sine typho), and Augustine doubts that he can ever escape this third group of temptations. There are certain functions of human society (humanae societatis officia) which make it necessary for men to be loved and feared by their fellowmen.[162] It appears that these functions are common, to use the

[157] conf. X,6,§10. sed amore subduntur eis et subditi iudicare non possunt. Contrast this with the earlier account of Romans I,20 in ver. relig. 52,§101. Imo vero commemorati ab iis quae judicamus. . . .

[158] conf. X,24,§35.

[159] conf. X, 26,§37.

[160] Compare notes 42 and 137 above. For a comparison of the argument in the conf. with that in the ver. relig. see W. Theiler, op. cit. (note 2 A) p. 40 f.

[161] See above p. 267 f.

[162] conf. X,36,§59. For the phrase *humanae societatis officia*, see mor. eccl. cath. I,26,§49.

language of Book XIII, to both sea and land. There is however always the danger that even men of the land will wish to receive this fear and love not on God's behalf but in place of God, and Augustine can never be sure that he has himself escaped the danger.

In summary, Augustine's Confessiones, notably Books XI–XIII constitute a remarkable statement of the new position on society implied by the insights of the Ad Simplicianum. In this fuller statement the similarities and contrasts between the new position and the position of 386 through 393 appear more clearly.

As in his early writings, Augustine still maintains that man's destination is a heavenly society. However the society is no longer the intelligible world which is eternal in its own right. The heavenly Jerusalem is a creature of the creator, even though it is one which through God's grace totally escapes the mutability and distention of time. Further Augustine no longer thinks that any man can return to the fatherland by gradual steps through his own powers; all sinners are inextricably involved in the dispersion of time. Only grace permits the saved Christian to have his first-fruits in Jerusalem, and he does not reach the heavenly city by the steps of reason but when time "touches" eternity or coincides with it.

As in his early writings, Augustine in the Confessiones holds that God's governance embraces all mankind and all history. However the governance in history does not lead to a regular and universal progress which man can comprehend. God's providence, known only to faith, lies in the dualist contrast between the sea and the land, between the damned and the saved.

When Augustine in the Confessiones discusses the life of the Christians within the society of the land, we again find similarities with the descriptions of the philosopher in the early writings. In general, Augustine still concentrates his attention upon an elite rather than upon the whole society; he mentions the carnal ones of the ecclesia, but they play only a subordinate role in his allegory. Further his ultimate values still lie in contemplation rather than in action, and religious insight receives far more emphasis than love or charity.

But as against the early writings, grace is the crucial factor

even in the life of the intellectual and spiritual Christian; Augustine denies that grace ever, in this life or the next, leads to a situation where grace is no longer necessary. By and large, neither the sacraments nor the ecclesia appear to play a dominant role in the life of the spiritual Christian, though both are prerequisite to his existence. Such a spiritual Christian, to judge from Book XIII of the Confessiones, draws his religious values primarily through the Scriptures. He does not, as the philosopher in the early writings, achieve a direct vision of eternity; the high point of his experience is the realization that his own temporal understanding of the Bible in some way embodies and coincides with God's eternal word.

Lastly, Augustine in the Confessiones both preserves and modifies his earlier order and image theory. On some points he must deny the old position. If "wills are chosen," Augustine can no longer maintain that the universe is a comprehensible order in such a way that man can reach his destination by himself and through his own powers. The older theory must therefore be abandoned as a basis of salvation; it must be "secularized" or, perhaps, "creaturized." But if this change is accepted, Augustine does not seem to wish any others. He still describes the old hierarchy of God, souls, and bodies, and within souls there is still the old hierarchy of the contemplative and active parts.

After the Confessiones, Augustine next presents a comparable general statement of his ideas on society and history in the De catechizandis rudibus. In several other works of about the same period, however, he introduces discussions of special aspects of society, and these will be noticed first.

Some of the most significant material is found in the Contra Faustum Manichaeum libri XXXIII. Faustus uses as his main argument the standard Manichaean attack on the contradictions between the Old Testament and the New, and Augustine replies with a restatement of the position of the Ad Simplicianum. The Jewish Law, far from contradicting the law of Christ, is essentially identical with it. "For the very same law, which was given by Moses, was made truth and grace by Christ." [163]

[163] c. Faust. XV,8; compare XVII,6; XIX,7; XXII,6. For an assimilation of

Faustus in his special polemic devotes a great deal of attention to the alleged immorality of the patriarchs, and Augustine's answer takes up the whole of Book XXII, the longest in the Contra Faustum. Augustine starts from the eternal law as his main point of reference, and he makes repeated use of a standard definition. "The eternal law is divine reason or the will of God ordering that the natural order be preserved and forbidding that it be perverted." [164]

The form of the definition does not differ markedly from that found in the early De libero arbitrio, though the new phrasing is more easily harmonized with a sharp contrast between God and the creature, between the creator and the natural order.[165] But in the Contra Faustum, as in the Ad Simplicianum, Augustine departs from his early position when he emphasizes that God's actions in the context of the natural order are incomprehensible to man. God's sending the demons into the herd of swine illustrated a "hidden but everywhere just government." [166] Man's ignorance and his weakness result from the inscrutable judgments of God, and while the Christian has no doubt that all things are done by God's mercy and judgment, "the measures and weights and numbers by which all things are ordered are hidden." [167]

In this context man's duties within the natural order are made totally dependent upon God. Sometimes the individual may know the natural order only through God's revelation, and yet in no case should he use human reason to resist God's commands. In his discussion of the Israelites' thefts from the Egyptians, Augustine remarks, "It may be that there are other most hidden reasons, why this command was divinely given them: but we

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the Old Testament heroes to the Christians, see XIX,14; for the absence of any emphasis on the progressive character of the five ages, see XII,8 and 14.

[164] c. Faust. XXII,27,28,30,43,61,73, and 78.

[165] One might here notice the contrast between the earlier statement of the De ordine II,18,§47 hic est ordo studiorum sapientiae, per quem fit quisque idoneus ad intelligendum ordinem rerum, id est ad dinoscendos duos mundos et ipsum parentem uniuersitatis . . . and div. quaest. 83, §81,1 Omnis sapientiae disciplina, quae ad homines erudiendos pertinet, est creatorem creaturamque dignoscere, et illum colere dominantem, istam subjectam fateri. Compare note 119, above.

[166] c. Faust. XXII,72. Compare XXI,2–3.

[167] c. Faust. XXII,78.

must yield to the divine commands with obedience, not resist them with argument." [168] Such an approach threatens to deny any fundamental permanence to the natural order and to make any rational comprehension of it impossible, and in a later book of the Contra Faustum, Augustine declares: "God the founder and creator of all natures, does nothing against nature, for that will be "natural" to anything which He shall have done to it, from Whom is all mode, number, and order of nature." [169]

But again, if Augustine in the Contra Faustum modifies the theological aspects of his older order theory, it does not appear that he wishes to change it insofar as it simply describes the proper structure in man or in society. Man consists of soul and body, and there can be no doubt that the soul is by the natural order placed before the body. Similarly within the soul, the reason (ratio) is placed by the law of nature before those parts which even the beasts possess. Finally, within reason, contemplation is without doubt to be placed before action.[170]

Similarly, Augustine speaks of a natural order in society which is adjusted to the peace of mortals. Such an order defines the relations between a prince and his soldiers in terms of "peace and the common welfare (salus)." [171] The order holds whether the ruler is pagan or Christian, and even the faithful are sometimes obligated to fight in the army of a sacrilegious ruler to preserve "the order of civic peace." [172] On this point the ideas of the Contra Faustum are in agreement with Augustine's earlier exegesis of Romans XIII in the Pauline commentaries.[173]

As in his earlier writings, so in the Contra Faustum Augustine assigns to society only the limited values of peace and welfare. Nevertheless he does not doubt that man is a social as well as a rational creature [174] and that kingship ranks among the goods divinely established. He argues, for example, that the period of

[168] c. Faust. XXII,71.
[169] c. Faust. XXVI,3.
[170] c. Faust. XXII,27.
[171] c. Faust. XXII,75.
[172] c. Faust. XXII,75. Compare XXII,74 . . . salutis publicae defensores; XXII,31 . . . in caeteris actibus ad humanam pacem pertinentibus.
[173] Compare e.g. exp. prop. Roman, §72,§74. exp. Galat. §28.
[174] c. Faust. XIX,24 et diligamus inimicum propter id quod in eo bonum est, id est, socialem rationalemque creaturam.

the Old Testament was necessary "so that it might first appear that even earthly goods pertain only to the power and decision of the one true God, earthly goods among which are included human kingdoms and victories over enemies, for the sake of which things particularly the city of the impious . . . makes supplication to idols and demons." [175]

In addition to the account of the eternal law and of the natural order, two other developments of the Contra Faustum are relevant to Augustine's ideas on society. In the first, Augustine clears up an ambiguity in his interpretation of the contrast between the outer and the inner man. It will be remembered that in the early works he had identified the contrast with such other contrasts as that between the old man and the new; further he had used all these contrasts to point out the main stages of individual and universal progress.[176] Later Augustine had abandoned many of these ideas as he worked out a new interpretation of providential history in terms of the absolute distinction between the damned and the saved. He had however not explained just how the contrast between the outer and inner man was related to his new view.[177]

Faustus seems to deserve the main credit for making Augustine think through his new position on this point. In an interesting argument, The Manichaean had maintained with the use of Pauline authorities that the outer and the inner man are actually two men and that of the two God created only the inner man.[178] Au-

[175] c. Faust. XXII,76. Compare XII,32 . . . quia ecce conspicimus leges ipsas regni terreni quae aduersus Christum ante fremuerant, nunc jam perempta feritate dulcedini evangelicae praedicandae etiam munimenta praebere.

In the passage quoted in the text, Augustine speaks of the *civitas impiorum*. There are other passages in which Augustine indicates that he is still making use of a dualist interpretation of history; see for example the contrast between *corpus diaboli* and *corpus dominicum* in XXII,93. However there was no need to emphasize this dualism in answering the Manichaean arguments, and Augustine may have deliberately avoided it as dangerously close to the Manichaan argument on two kingdoms.

[176] See above p. 273 f.

[177] There are a few passages before the Contra Faustum which suggest that Augustine has modified his earlier position; e.g. conf. XIII,14,§15 speaks of *interius nostrum tenebrosum et fluvidum*. In div. quaest. 83,§64,2 Augustine still writes, Et quoniam exterior est homo vetus, et novus interior.

[178] c. Faust. XXIV,1. Compare with Faustus' position the earlier statement of Augustine himself, div. quaest. 83, §36,2. Tunc jam persuadendum est fidelibus praecedentibus regenerationis sacramentis, quae necesse est plurimum moveant,

gustine replies that Paul wishes the inner man to be understood as the spirit of the mind and the outer man as in the body and in this mortal life. They are not two men, but two parts of one man, and God made the whole man.[179] On the other hand, the contrast between the earthly and the heavenly man is between what we are in Adam and what we shall be in Christ; [180] the contrast between the old man and the new is between righteousness (iustitiam) and unrighteousness (iniustitiam). Hence, concludes Augustine, "man as a whole, that is in his inner as well as his outer part, became the old man (inueteravit) through sin." [181] The Christian is now being renewed in the inner man in the image of God, and after the resurrection even the outer man, with a spiritual body, will receive the dignity of a heavenly dwelling place.

Augustine's differing interpretations of the outer and inner man may serve as a paradigm for his whole development. He originally gives the contrast a meaning consonant with the main tradition of Greco-Roman philosophy, and he argues that salvation lies in turning away from the outer man and toward the inner man as a special case of the turn away from the sensible to the intelligible, away from the temporal to the eternal. In the early period he further understands the biblical contrasts, e.g. between the old man and the new, in the same sense. In the course of the movement of thought leading to the Ad Simplicianum, Augustine takes the biblical contrasts out of this context of stages and uses them to point to the absolute contrast between the damned and the saved. Possibly Augustine might have reinterpreted the contrast between the outer and the inner man in the same way but here, as in the case of ideas of order, he is dealing with terms

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quid intersit inter duos homines, veterem et novum, exteriorem et interiorem . . . ; §51,1.

[179] c. Faust. XXIV,2 Paulus quidem apostolus interiorem hominem per spiritum mentis, exteriorem uero in corpore atque in ista mortali vita uult intelligi; non tamen utrumque horum simul duos homines eum dixisse aliquando in eius litteris legitur, sed unum, quem totum Deus fecerit, id est, et id, quod interius est, et id, quod exterius.

[180] c. Faust. XXIV,2 item cum de terreno et caelesti homine dissereret idem Paulus inter mortalem immortalemque discernens, inter id quod in Adam sumus, et illud quod in Christo erimus. For Augustine's earlier use of the outer-inner contrast in this same context, see div. quaest. 83, §51.1.

[181] c. Faust. XXIV,2 ergo totus ille homo, id est, et interiore et exteriore sui parte, inueteravit propter peccatum . . .

which to him still seem to have useful descriptive meanings. He accordingly separates the contrast between inner and outer man from the biblical contrasts such as between the old man and the new: both inner and outer man are damned (i.e. are the old man) and both inner and outer man are saved (i.e. are the new man).

Thus Augustine in his early writings begins with the assumption that there are stages leading to salvation. By about 400, if the stages still appear, as in the inner and outer man, they have been reduced to the level of description and do not define salvation. If it is a question of salvation, as in the case of the old man and the new, Augustine finds not stages but an absolute contrast.

A second significant development of the Contra Faustum is the new sense of Christian triumph arising out of the conversion of the Roman Empire. At one time the kings of this world (huius saeculi) had persecuted the Christian religion, but now the kings of the earth (terrae) are subject to Christ's Empire.[182] Augustine thus sees in his own time the fulfilment of the prophecy of Psalm LXXI,11: And all the kings of the earth shall adore him, and all nations shall serve him. The nations have been led to the cult of the one true God by Christian empire (imperio Christiano), and the whole inhabitable world has been conquered not by war but by truth. Augustine can even write that Christian emperors, with full confidence of Christian piety, have won most glorious victories over sacrilegious enemies who placed their trust in the sacraments of idols and demons.[183] Something of the same attitude appears in the roughly contemporary De consensu evangelistarum. The Jews, though worshipping the true God, were conquered by the Romans, but God subjected the Roman Empire to His name through Christ the King and He converted the Empire to the destruction of idols.[184]

After the Contra Faustum, the De doctrina christiana is among the works of this period the most illuminating for Augustine's ideas on society. In the opening sections of Book I Augustine

[182] c. Faust. XIII,7. Compare XIII,9 . . . Domini, qui per reges terrae, secundum eandem prophetiam, iam sibi seruientes seque adorantes, seuerissimis legibus terram confringit, id est, terreni cordis frangit audaciam; XXII,38. serm. XLIV,2 (c. 400 A.D.).

[183] c. Faust. XII,42; XXII,60,76.

[184] cons. evang. I,13,§20.

makes considerable use of the old metaphor of the fatherland (patria); for the most part what he says differs little from the early De beata vita.[185] But the early ideas fall far short of solving Augustine's problem at this time, and in the Confessiones, as we have seen, he had attacked the Platonists for seeing only the fatherland and not Christ as the way to the fatherland. How he is now to explain the relation of Christ to the fatherland, and in what sense is Christ the way to it?

Augustine in the De doctrina christiana presents a fundamentally new solution to these problems: in the Incarnation the fatherland and the way are united. He first states the point in terms of God's Wisdom: "While therefore Wisdom is the fatherland (patria), Wisdom also made itself for us the way (viam) to the fatherland." [186] Later he rephrases the point in terms of the Christ who appeared in space and time. The believer in Christ both begins with what is temporal and also transcends what is temporal.[187]

The new solution of Augustine on the relation between the fatherland and the way is admirably adapted to the previous development of his thought and experience. In his early works he had seen salvation (for example in the De musica [188]) as the ascent by gradual stages from what is temporal to what is eternal; under such conditions there is evidently no reason for think-

[185] doctr. christ. I,4,§4–10,§10. Compare with p. 259 above and with c. Acad. II,1,§1.

[186] doctr. christ. I,11,§11 Cum ergo ipsa sit patria, viam se quoque nobis fecit ad patriam.

[187] doctr. christ. I,34,§38 Christ . . . non solum pervenientibus possessionem, sed etiam viam praebere se voluit venientibus ad principium viarum. . . . There are close connections between the argument here and the analysis of time in Book XI of the Confessiones. Compare conf. XI.29,§39 with doctr. christ. I,34,§38. Apostolus igitur, quamvis adhuc ambularet in via et ad palmam supernae vocationis sequeretur vocantem Deum, tamen ea quae retro sunt oblivescens et in ea quae ante sunt extentus (Philipp. III,12–14), jam principium viarum transierat; hoc est, eo non indigebat a quo tamen aggrediendum et exoriendum iter est omnibus qui ad veritatem pervenire, et in vita aeterna permanere desiderant. The notion of Christ as both *patria* and *via* appears in a number of sermons dating roughly c. 400 A.D.: serm. XCII,3§3 (391–405 A.D.); serm. Denis VIII,1 (393–405 A.D.). For an early statement of the same point in terms of time and eternity, see cons. evang. I,35,§53. For a discussion of Augustine's later use of the idea, see M. Comeau, "Le Christ, chemin et terme de l'ascension spirituelle d'après saint Augustine," Recherches de Science Religieuse XL(1952)80–89.

[188] See p. 264 f. above.

ing of an identification of the eternal fatherland with the temporal way. Later however he had abandoned the theory of salvation through stages, and he had come to place his emphasis on the total gulf between the creator and the creature, between eternal and temporal, a gulf which disappears only in the coincidence of the eternal and the temporal effected by grace. In the Confessiones he had worked out some of the implications of this position in the area of knowledge. He had come to feel that nowhere in this life will the Christian see God directly. His vision is mediated by the "firmament" of the Bible, and Augustine's highest intuition is that his own temporal understanding of the Scriptures coincides with God's eternal statement of them. If Augustine is now to rethink in terms of these new insights his older idea of man's goal as the eternal fatherland, he must say, as he does in the De doctrina christiana, that faith in Christ is an experience both of the way and of the fatherland. He no longer moves on the level of society from temporal to eternal, but through grace the two coincide. In the De doctrina christiana, as in the De beata vita, one feels that the metaphor of the fatherland still serves to explain a primarily individual and intellectual experience. If, however, the fatherland is considered as the heavenly ecclesia or as Jerusalem or as the body of Christ, then important social consequences are immediately apparent.

In addition to these new ideas on the fatherland, Augustine introduces in the De doctrina christiana the concept of a common society of fallen angels and of sinful men. The various rites of superstition result from such a fellowship, for the demons, led by their prince the devil, endeavor in every way to make it impossible for men to achieve the return to the fatherland.[189]

On the level of the proper order of society, Augustine in the De doctrina christiana again repeats essentially unchanged the ideas of the early writings. Man should love his neighbor as himself, but through vice men try to lord it over their fellows while they themselves deny obedience to God.[190] It is true that after Adam the spirit struggles against the flesh, but the struggle is necessary only because of the consequences of Adam's sin; the

[189] doctr. christ. II,23,§35 f.; 39,§58 f.
[190] doctr. christ. I,23,§23.

aim of the spirit is simply to check all disordered motion and to restore the "natural order." [191]

Augustine continues to picture the Christian as accepting the existing order of society on the human level. "The Christians do not neglect those human institutions which are valuable for a common society in view of the needs of the present life." [192] Augustine hopes for the reform of individuals within existing institutions; he does not envisage a change in the institutions.

The last work of the period we are studying is the De catechizandis rudibus. Here Augustine presents a very simple statement for those who are only beginning to study Christianity; we must not expect the subtlety or the profundity of the Confessiones. Nevertheless this simple statement consolidates and codifies some of the most important results of the developments we have analyzed, and the doctrine of the two cities, which first appears here, may be regarded as the end-point of all the previous tendencies toward a dualistic theory of society.

The most important part of the De catechizandis rudibus is an outline of history from the creation through the kingdom of the just in heaven. More clearly and simply than in the Ad Simplicianum or in the Confessiones Augustine now explains all history in terms of a contrast between two societies, here called the two cities. "Thus there are two cities, one of the wicked and the other of the holy, which endure from the beginning of the human race even to the end of time, and which, moreover, are to be separated in body also on the day of judgment. For all men who love pride and temporal dominion together with empty vanity and display of presumption and all evil spirits who set their affections on such things and seek their own glory by the subjection of men are bound fast together in one fellowship (societate); and even though they frequently fight with one another for these ends, still they are flung headlong by an equal weight of desire into the same abyss, and are united to one another by the likeness of their ways and their deserts. And again all men and all spirits who humbly seek God's glory, not their own, and

[191] doctr. christ. I,24,§25.
[192] doctr. christ. II,39,§58.; 25,§38 f.

who follow Him in godliness, belong to one fellowship."[193]

This description of the two cities carries further in several respects the dualistic tendencies of Augustine's previous ideas on society. There are now only two societies, and they include all men and all spirits; both are present from the creation of man to the end of history. Augustine in the De doctrina christiana had argued that in Christ the fatherland and the way are identical; [194] he now goes on to argue that the angels in heaven and the Christians on earth form one society. Through faith the Christians here and now *are* the heavenly city. Augustine as early as the Expositio epistolae ad Galatas had assimilated the Jewish heroes to the New Testament Christians; he now goes on to state that they are members of the same society with the Christians and the angels.[195] And as a result of these developments Augustine can make the city of the holy synonomous with the ecclesia and with the body of Christ.[196] On the other side, Augustine had earlier abandoned the theory that the Jewish people represented a special stage in the progress of mankind; he now places the Jews as a people on the side of the city of the wicked.[197]

Augustine in the De catechizandis rudibus then uses these ideas

[193] catech. rud. 19,§31. I have in general followed the translation by J. P. Christopher in his edition in the Catholic University of America Patristic Studies, Vol. VIII (Washington, 1926). Another general statement on the two cities, possibly almost as early as that of the De catechizandis rudibus is found in De Genesi ad Litteram XI, 15,§20 (CSEL XXVIII,347 f.)

The bibliography on Augustine's theory of the two cities is very extensive, but most of the writings concentrate their attention on the De civitate Dei. Some discussion of the earlier period may be found in the following. H. Scholz, Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte (Leipzig, 1911); W. Kamlah, Christentum und Geschichtlichkeit, 2nd ed. (Stuttgart, 1951); E. Gilson, Les metamorphoses de la cité de Dieu (Paris, 1952); G. Bardy, "La formation du concept de 'Cité de Dieu' dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin" L'année théologique augustinienne XII(1952) 5–19.; A. Lauras and H. Rondet, "Le thème des deux cités dans l'oeuvre de saint Augustin" in Études Augustiniennes, H. Rondet etc. (Paris, 1953) 99–160. An article by Ratzinger, "Les origines de l'idée des deux cités et la notion des deux cités chez st. Augustin" has been announced for publication in the Congrès International Augustinien (to appear September, 1954).

[194] See p. 306 above.

[195] catech. rud. 19,§33. neque tunc sane defuerunt justi qui Deum pie quaererent, et superbiam diaboli vincerent, cives illius sanctae civitatis . . . Ex quibus Abraham pius . . . For the earlier development in exp. Galat., see p. 281 above.

[196] Compare catech. rud. 3,§6 ecclesia id est populus Dei per omnes gentes, quod est corpus ejus; adjunctis etiam et annumeratis omnibus sanctis, qui etiam ante adventum ejus in hoc saeculo vixerunt . . . ; 19,§33.

[197] catech. rud. 19,§33.

in his outline of universal history. God created man and placed him in Paradise, but Adam fell and here was the real beginning of human history. "For by the most just laws of God, all were condemned." [198] Nevertheless Adam's sin could not frustrate God's purpose and a new city of God emerged within the race of sinful men.

Augustine continues with a summary of some of the high points of Old Testament history. He mentions the traditional five ages but he attaches little importance to them, and there is no suggestion of the older theory that they mark stages in the universal progress of mankind. Indeed the contrast between the two cities so dominates Augustine's thinking that he now has little interest in Jewish history as such. As we have seen, the Jewish heroes have no special place since they are members of the ecclesia, the body of Christ, and the city of the holy; the mass of the Jews have no special place since they belong to the city of the wicked. What remains unique in Jewish history is simply its prophetic character. As Augustine had said in the De consensu evangelistarum, the fact that the Romans conquered the Jews after the coming of Christ showed that "the kingdom of that nation, its temple, its sacrifices, and its mystic unction . . . existed for no purpose but the foretelling of Christ." [199]

Of the various prophetic aspects of Jewish history, the Babylonian captivity is the most significant for Augustine's ideas of society. Jerusalem symbolizes the society of the holy and Babylon the society of the wicked. Consequently the primary figurative meaning of the captivity is the future subjection of the ecclesia to the kings of this world (sub regibus hujus saeculi). But Augustine also notes that through the captivity some earthly kings (terreni reges) were converted to the worship of the true God and granted temporal peace to the Christians. Thus the Christians were enabled to carry on Christian missionary work, which now extends over the whole world with the permission of Christian kings (cum pace regum Christianorum).[200] Augustine supports his reading of the allegory by such New Testament texts

[198] For the six ages, see 17,§28 and 22,§39.

[199] cons. evang. I,13,§20.

[200] catech. rud. 21,§37. For the general exegesis, compare c. Faust. XII,36.

as Romans XIII,1 and I Timothy II,1. Christians are to be subject to their temporal rulers (dominis). If the rulers remain wicked, the Christians will finally judge them; if the rulers are converted, the Christians will finally reign with them.[201]

In the De catechizandis rudibus, as in the earlier works, earthly kingship and temporal rule appear as goods which are independent of the contrast between the two societies into which mankind is divided. This appears in the account of the Jewish kingdom [202] and it was implied in the account of the Babylon captivity. In his discussion of the New Testament he mentions earthly kingship among the goods which Christ spurned.[203] In the same passage Augustine writes that Christ was born in Bethlehem, a city so small that it was finally classified as a mere village (villa): "He did not wish anyone to glory in the sublimity of any earthly city (de cuiusquam terrenae civitatis sublimitate)." [204]

Thus Augustine in the De catechizandis rudibus confirms on a simpler level the pattern established by the earlier works. In the Ad Simplicianum and in the Confessiones, he had moved toward a dualist interpretation of history and of society, but the older philosophic statement on the proper order of society remained valid as description. So in the De catechizandis rudibus he achieves the consistent dualism of the two cities, but earthly kingship and earthly cities remain, as before, goods which are neutral in relation to the absolute contrast between the two cities.

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The preceding analysis of Augustine's changing ideas on society suggests certain more general, and also more tentative, conclusions.

The first and most evident conclusion is that Augustine's thought does indeed develop significantly during the period from

[201] catech. rud. 21,§37.

[202] See catech. rud. 20,§36.

[203] catech. rud. 22,§40.

[204] catech. rud. XXII,40. An identification of *Babylon* with *terrena civitas* is found in the Adnotationum in Iob Lib. I:3 (CSEL XXVIII,2 p. 511); compare 6 (p. 519). This is exceptional for the period 386–400, and it will be remembered that Augustine does not revise nor take responsibility for the work: see retract II,39,1 (= ed. Maur. II,13).

386 to about 400 A.D. Further, from a historical standpoint, there is no justification for restricting this development to a "theological" in contrast to a "philosophical" aspect. In Augustine's early writings, "philosophy" and "theology" form a rational unity, and the breakdown of this unity is in itself an important philosophic development.

In the tracing of the development, Augustine's ideas on society supply a thread of continuity, perhaps the most convenient one. In the early works, though society is relatively unimportant, Augustine explains with some clarity how it fits into his whole world-view. During the transition period from about 393 through 396, certain problems of history and society are in the foreground of Augustine's interest. And in such later works as the Confessiones or the Contra Faustum Augustine continues to discuss many of these same problems.

How can we best characterize the general course of Augustine's development? We must, I think, start from the fact that Augustine's early thought represents an attempted synthesis of Greco-Roman and of Christian ideas and that at this time the Greco-Roman elements are dominant. Later Augustine becomes aware of the tensions within the synthesis. He accordingly rethinks his Christian ideas from the standpoint of their unique values and works out a new position.

Most simply, Augustine in his early period argues that man through his own powers ascends by gradual stages to his destination, the vision of eternal truth. He later denies man's ability to do this. Man's salvation rests on the eternal, incomprehensible choice of a God who from the sinful mass of mankind chooses some, whom He saves.

But if Augustine denies his early position as a doctrine of salvation, it is almost equally important for the historian of his thought that he preserves a large part of it on the "secular" or "creaturely" level. Intellectually, man is still able to achieve some vision of eternity, though he is not saved by it.[205] Morally,

[205] It is difficult to determine just what Augustine's position on this point is in about 400. Sometimes he seems to admit the vision and deny that it saves; sometimes he seems to deny the vision and admit that it saves. Compare, for example, doctr. christ. I,4,§4; conf. VII,20,§26; X,6,§10; XIII,21,§31; De Trinitate IV,16,§20 f. (PL XLII,901 f.) For the early dating of this book, see E. Hendrikx,

Augustine still affirms the old order of body and mind, of things sensible and things intelligible, but man cannot realize the order or, if he can, this does not in itself lead to salvation.

On the positive side, Augustine in his later position emphasizes the total gulf between the temporal and the eternal, between the creature and the creator; not even grace creates intermediate stages here. At the same time he sees Christian experience as a transcending of the gulf. His general explanation, though not yet codified or systematized, is that the Christian experience, in contrast to the Greek movement away from the temporal to the eternal, represents a coincidence of the temporal with the eternal. Christ is both in time and above time; he is the way and at the same time the fatherland.

Augustine's general development is reflected in his changing ideas of society. He begins in the early period with a properly ordered human society as a sure stage on the way to eternity and the fatherland. There are also stages in the universal progress of mankind in history. In his later position he abandons these stages in favor of dualistic contrasts. The crucial point about human society is the absolute division between those who are to be damned and those who are to be saved, between the city of the wicked and the city of the holy; the crucial point about history is not universal progress but again the absolute and abiding contrast of the two cities.

Nevertheless Augustine does not abandon his early ideas on how a human society should be properly ordered; these ideas persist but they are "secularized" and made neutral in relation to the dichotomy between the two cities. And insofar as Augustine has thus established a gulf between God and society, he again finds that Christianity transcends the gulf. Through faith the believer in his heavenly calling participates in a society which never falls into the mutability of time; the believer, though himself in time, is already a member of the eternal city.

One special feature of the development deserves note. Augustine starts with two large bodies of ideas, his Platonism and his Christianity, and he uses them both to say the same thing. Later

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"La date de composition du De Trinitate de S. Augustin" L'année théologique augustinienne XII(1952)305–16 part. 309–10.

he develops the Christian ideas, as we have seen, into the one true doctrine of salvation, and he reduces the Greco-Roman ideas to the secular level. As a result the Christian propositions may become statements *about* the Greek propositions with which they were originally identified. For example, the old man and the new were once identified with the outer man and the inner man. Later Augustine uses "old" and "new" to point out the relation of the whole man to eternal damnation or salvation, and he uses "outer" and "inner" to describe the parts of the whole man. Similarly the two cities of the wicked and the holy served to make statements *about* an earthly city and an earthly kingship which are neutral with respect to the eternal dualism of the two cities of damnation and salvation.

A second group of conclusions deal with the reasons for Augustine's development as these are revealed in his writings. Here we are on even more uncertain ground, and several negative observations may preface the attempt to reach some positive conclusions.

Augustine nowhere in this period seems troubled about his own individual salvation. The triumph of the Ad Simplicianum is not a "Now I am saved" but a "Now I see what I believe about how any man is saved, though I cannot grasp it."

Further, Augustine's thought does not in this period appear to have developed through any increasing concern with the ecclesia as an institution or with its sacraments or with Augustine's own office as priest or bishop. The argument is essentially *ex silentio*, but there appears to be adequate material to validate the argument.[206]

Finally, Augustine does not develop the contrast between the two cities through fear of Rome nor through enmity toward the Empire. At about the same time that he first introduces the contrast, he also expresses in the Contra Faustum a strong Christian and imperial optimism.

On the positive side, the general conclusion is, I think, that Augustine's thought develops because as a Christian intellectual he aims to state, and as far as possible to understand, what he believes and what he has experienced. He begins as a Christian

[206] For the place of the ecclesia and the sacraments, compare Simplic. I,2,2 and 2,22; conf. XIII,21,§29; on the ecclesia and rule, compare conf. XIII,23,§33.

and a Platonist. Why did he move away from this first position? To a first approximation, because he found that the Greco-Roman forms of thought which dominated his first position were not adequate as a statement of his own commitment and of his own experience. Why did he move to his later position on salvation? Again to a first approximation, because certain of the Christian writings available to him, and which he had always willingly accepted as authority, did to some extent offer a better statement of his commitment and his experience. It is perhaps impossible to say how far the Christian writings, notably the letters of Paul, at this stage gave something radically new and how far they merely helped him to formulate what he had already experienced. But against any thesis that Augustine is totally dependent on Paul, two main points must be made. First, there are a great many ideas in Paul, and Augustine is highly selective; second, there are a great many ideas in Augustine, and only some of them can be found also in Paul. In very over-simplified statement, Paul is primarily engaged in a Christian transformation of an earlier Judaism; Augustine is primarily engaged in a Christian transformation of an earlier Hellenism. But while Paul "secularizes" *and* relativizes the Jewish Law, Augustine secularizes but does not relativize the natural order. Augustine can make no statement about the natural order which corresponds to Paul's "Circumcision is nothing; uncircumcision is nothing." (Ist. Corinthians VII,19). Lastly, why did Augustine even in his later development continue to make such extensive use of Greco-Roman forms of thought on the descriptive level? One might suggest that he had only recently been strongly committed to them, that his new theory of salvation had not given him any other answer on this level, and that one cannot live or think merely in terms of the eternal contrast between damnation and salvation.

One last question may be raised, on the relation between Augustine's position of about 400 A.D. and his still later position in the De civitate Dei. The full answer is extremely complex, but one crucial difference may be noted. In the two cities doctrine of the De catechizandis rudibus, the earthly cities and the Roman Empire are neutral in relation to the absolute contrast between the cities of the wicked and of the holy. In the De civitate Dei,

however, the earthly city (terrena civitas), which is often represented by the Roman Empire, loses its neutrality, and Augustine organizes a dualistic history around the contrast between it and the city of God. The new terminology produces many problems for Augustine and many difficulties for his commentators. Perhaps the best approach to these problems and difficulties is to see that Augustine's position of about 400 A.D. is both the end-point of one development and the beginning of another. And as the earlier development modifies without totally abandoning the ideas of 386–93 A.D., so the later development of the De civitate Dei modifies without totally abandoning the ideas of 400 A.D.

# A NOTE ON ORIGEN, IN EV. JOANNIS XIX.5
## (PG xiv. 568 b–c)

In Origen's discussion of the part played by the Logos in the creation of the world, In Ev. Joannis xix.5 (PG xiv. 568 b–c), there occurs a long sentence which is not altogether clear, chiefly because of the uncertainty of the punctuation. The text, as given by the four modern editors, Lommatzsch, Migne, Preuschen and Brooke, who agree throughout except in the two instances to be noted, is as follows (with punctuation after the biblical quotation omitted):

*τῷ γὰρ εἶναι παντὸς οὐτινοσοῦν τοὺς λόγους καθ' οὓς γεγένηται πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν σοφίᾳ πεποιημένα, ὡς φησιν ὁ προφήτης, "πάντα ἐν σοφίᾳ ἐποίησας" ἐν αὐτῷ εἴη ἂν καὶ αὐτὸς κόσμος τοσούτῳ ποικιλώτερος τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ κόσμου καὶ διαφέρων ὅσῳ διαφέρει γυμνὸς πάσης ὕλης τοῦ ὅλου κόσμου λόγος τοῦ ἐνύλου κόσμου οὐκ ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τῆς μετοχῆς τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς σοφίας τῶν κοσμούντων τὴν ὕλην κεκοσμημένων.*

In place of *παντὸς* Migne reads *πάντας*. Lommatzsch notes that Cod. Bodl. lacks *ὅλου* before the first *κόσμου*. P. Koetschau in his monograph on the text of Origen's commentary on John does not refer to this particular passage. We may therefore assume that the above text represents the tradition of the MSS.

The difficulty lies in the punctuation, about which Migne and the other editors differ. Migne, by use of a comma, construes the words *ἐν αὐτῷ* with the words following; the other editors construe them with the words preceding. If we follow Migne, we shall find that the initial infinitive phrase lacks an adverbial complement to *εἶναι*. The Latin translation in Migne tacitly acknowledges this incompleteness by arbitrarily transposing the words *ἐν σοφίᾳ* (in the relative clause *καθ' οὓς γεγένηται πάντα τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν σοφίᾳ πεποιημένα*) to the initial phrase, rendering "eo enim quod sint in sapientia omnes rei cujuscumque rationes etc."

A study of the context as well as of the alternative renderings of this sentence by itself indicates that the Latin was on the right track in supplying the words "in sapientia" in the initial infinitive phrase. Apparently the words *ἐν σοφίᾳ* were accidentally omitted after *εἶναι*, which would not be strange in view of the fact that they occur twice in the rest of the sentence, or the words *ἐν αὐτῷ*, referring to the Logos or "first-born of all creation," were accidentally omitted after *εἶναι*.

If this assumption is correct, we shall have to translate the whole sentence as follows:

"For since the *logoi* of anything whatever, in accordance with which all things created by God in wisdom came into being, as the prophet says, 'All things hast thou made in wisdom', are ⟨in wisdom⟩ (or ⟨in {The first-born / The Logos}⟩, (then) there would also be in it (i.e. in the Logos) the (intelligible) world which is as much more manifold than the sense-perceptible world and different from it as the Logos of the whole world, which is bare of all matter, differs from the enmattered world, not {in respect of / because of its matter but} {in respect of / because of} its participation in the Logos and wisdom, which (both) order the matter of ordered things."

If, however, we refrain from supplying the hypothetically missing phrase, and follow the majority of editors in construing ἐν αὐτῷ with the initial infinitive phrase, we should have to translate the whole sentence in one of the following two ways.

(a) "For since the *logoi* of anything whatever, in accordance with which all things created by God in wisdom came into being, as the prophet says, 'All things hast thou made in wisdom,' are in it (i.e., in the Logos), then also the (intelligible) world itself would be as much more manifold than the sense-perceptible world and different from it as the Logos of the whole world, which is bare of all matter, differs from the enmattered world, not because of its matter but because of its participation in the Logos and in wisdom, which (both) order the matter of ordered things."

(b) "For since the *logoi* of anything whatever, in accordance with which all things created by God in wisdom came into being, as the prophet says, 'All things hast thou made in wisdom' are in it (i.e., in the Logos), then also the (intelligible) world, which is as much more manifold than the sense-perceptible world and different from it as the Logos of the whole world, which is bare of all matter, differs from the enmattered world, would be (created) not from matter but from its participation in the Logos and wisdom, which (both) order the matter of ordered things."

It seems to me that these latter renderings make less sense than the one given above, even though the text lacks the participle ὤν after ποικιλώτερος, which would make the construction clearer.

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# ST. PETER IN AMMIANUS?

In his digression on Egypt, Ammianus Marcellinus tells of the influence which Egyptian learning exerted on Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, and Solon. He then continues: *Ex his fontibus per sublimia gradiens, sermonum amplitudine Iovis aemulus Platon, visa Aegypto militavit sapientia gloriosa* (xxii, 16.22). Such is Clark's standard text (1910): Gardthausen's edition of 1874 printed the *non* of the codices in place of Valesius' suggested *Platon*, and *Iesus* (from an assumed *ihs.*), a clever emendation of Gutschmid's, after *his*. At this late day it would be superfluous to observe that the reading *non* is the more probable point of corruption in the received text; *Iesus*, I believe, has vanished forever from this passage, leaving us without a single specific allusion to Christ in the surviving portion of the history. Of course Ammianus has much to say about Christianity and its bishops and other devotees, but an expression of warm regard for its founder would have changed our estimate of his attitude, which, as matters now stand, seems one of tolerance at best.

A recent interpretation of another passage gives rise to an analogous situation, with the difference that it would weigh on the other side of the balance. At xxix, 2.17 we read that the Emperor Valens surprisingly released without punishment a tribune who had confessed a shocking crime: . . . *Pollentianum* (Clark: Numerium) *tribunum malitia quendam exsuperantem isdem diebus convictum confessumque, quod exsecto vivae mulieris ventre atque intempestivo partu extracto, infernis manibus excitis de permutatione imperii consulere ausus est, . . . abire iussit inlaesum.* Léon Herrmann suggests that ". . . l'historien écrit que Pollentianus . . . avait encore dépassé quelqu'un d'autre en méchanceté . . . ," and he sees a cryptic reference to a wicked individual supposed to have assisted St. Peter in similarly gruesome rites performed with the object of ascertaining how long Christianity would endure.[1] Augustine, our source for this well-known story (De civitate Dei, xviii, 53–54), says that the prophecy allegedly obtained by St. Peter promised that the faith would live for a "year of years," that is, 365 years, and his concern is to show that this term has long since safely expired.

If *malitia quendam exsuperantem* referred with certainty to this

[1] Annuaire de l'Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves, X (= Mélanges Grégoire) (1950) 329–32.

episode, the passage would assume great interest for students of Ammianus, because Herrmann's interpretation of the prophecy would tempt them to revive an older conjecture about the historian. Herrmann follows Seeck in accepting that chronological reckoning which would place the expiry of the year of years in 394, when Theodosius defeated the pagan usurper Eugenius, and he assumes, reasonably enough, that the anti-Christian prophecy must have been forged not many years before that event by one of Eugenius' followers. Perhaps the most ardent of these was Virius Nicomachus Flavianus, the author of Annales which Seeck (Hermes, XLI [1906] 536) regarded as a source for Ammianus. It was in these chronicles, Herrmann maintains, that both Ammianus and Augustine must have read the anecdote about St. Peter, for Flavianus, of all men, would have had the least scruple about divulging it.

Ensslin once theorized that Ammianus may have supported the dissident faction, because a letter of Symmachus (Ep. ix, 110), presumably addressed to him, was later published without his name, like all of those which had been written to the usurper and his following.[2] The supposed reference to St. Peter occurs in Book XXIX, one of a series (XXVI–XXXI) which was probably composed in 392–94, the period of Eugenius' rebellion, but was published only after his downfall.[3] So one would surmise that Ammianus alluded to the prophecy in such veiled and indirect terms — and with a lingering rancor — because he prudently wished, at the time of publication, to avoid offending the triumphant Christian emperor.[4]

Yet I am afraid that there is a dangerous weakness in this structure. The fact of the matter is that Ammianus likes to introduce minor characters with *quidam*, as a few random examples will show: *Clematii cuiusdam Alexandrini nobilis* (xiv,1.3); *Abdigildum quendam tribunum* (xviii,6.12); *Strategium quendam ex palatino milite senatorem* (xxvi, 6.5). In the passage in question, *Pollentianum* (or: *Numerium*) *tribunum malitia quendam exsuperantem* may therefore owe its ambiguity[5] to sheer awkwardness — the phrase *Paulus . . . coluber quidam sub vultu latens* (xiv,5.6) is also awkward, if not ambiguous —

[2] W. Ensslin, Klio, Beiheft XVI (1923) 9; E. A. Thompson, The Historical Work of Ammianus Marcellinus (Cambridge, 1947), 18.

[3] See Thompson, op. cit., 18, 117.

[4] Thompson, op. cit., 108–17, argues plausibly that Ammianus felt restricted in the expression of his opinions, especially on religious topics, when he was writing Books XXVI–XXXI in the last years of Theodosius' reign.

[5] *Exsuperare* is common enough in both the absolute sense (e.g., Virgil, Aeneid, xii, 19–20: *quantum ipse feroci/ virtute exsuperas*) and as a transitive. According

and Rolfe's translation would seem more evidently correct than Herrmann's: ". . . the tribune Numerius, a man of surpassing wickedness . . ." Could Ammianus have deliberately introduced a double meaning into this common formula of his? I doubt that he was capable of such subtlety, and philologists would probably frown upon so fine-drawn an interpretation. Finally, there is no compelling reason for connecting his statement with the story in Augustine, because ancient literature provides instances in which various persons were charged with murdering women or children for magical purposes.[6]

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to the index verborum in Ernesti's edition (1773), Ammianus uses the verb in only two other passages, once with an object and once without: . . . *quas* (sc. *gentes*) *exsuperant Tochari* (xxiii, 6.57); *leges . . . inter quas diritate exsuperant latae contra ingratos et desertores* (xxiii,6.81).

[6] See Cicero, In Vatinium 14; Horace, Epode 5; Juvenal, Sat., vi,551–52; an epigram attributed to Seneca, De sacris evocantis animas Magnorum (Baehrens, Poetae Latini Minores, IV, p. 60), which Herrmann, by an ingenious but hardly cogent argument, would relate to St. Peter (Latomus, V [1946] 303–10); Eusebius, Hist. Eccles., viii,14.5, concerning Maxentius; and two such charges brought against Julian: Theodoretus, Hist. Eccles., iii,21 (cf. Cassiodorus, Hist. Tripart., vi,48, in Migne, PL, LXIX, cols. 1062–63), and a Syriac text (published by J. G. Ernst, Kiel, 1880; inaccessible) which alleges that the Apostate tore out the hearts of five infants for use in magic (see P. Labriolle, La réaction païenne [Paris, 1934], p. 427).

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